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522How to be minimalist about shared agencyPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 109 (1): 155-178. 2024.What is involved in acting together with others? Most shared agency theorists endorse the Shared Intention Thesis, i.e., the claim that shared agency necessarily involves shared intentions. This article dissents from this orthodoxy and offers a minimalist account of shared agency—one where parties to shared activities need not form rich webs of interrelated psychological states. My account has two main components: a conceptual analysis of shared agency in terms of the notion of plan, and an expl…Read more
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410Shared Agency and Mutual Obligations: A Pluralist AccountPhilosophical Quarterly 73 (4): 1120-1140. 2023.Do participants in shared activity have mutual obligations to do their bit? This article shows this question has no one-size-fits-all answer and offers a pluralist account of the normativity of shared agency. The first part argues obligations to do one's bit have three degrees of involvement in shared activity. Such obligations might, obviously, bolster co-participants’ resolve to act as planned (degree 1). Less obviously, there also are higher and lower degrees of involvement. Obligations to do…Read more
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96Collective IntentionsIn Mortimer Sellers & Stephan Kirste (eds.), Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, Springer. 2017.This entry surveys main accounts of collective intentions.
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53In our racially unjust societies, what should white people do? In this paper, I survey answers to this question that recent work in ethics, social epistemology, and philosophy of race suggests.
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79Agency and Practical ReasoningIn Luca Ferrero (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Agency, Routledge. pp. 412-420. 2022.Unlike other ways of coming to act, for example as a result of habit or impulse, practical reasoning imprints our actions with the distinctive mark of rational full-blooded agency. This entry enquires into what practical reasoning consists in. First, we lay out four basic criteria—mentality, evaluation, practicality, attributability—that adequate accounts of practical reasoning ought to satisfy in order to capture essential features of the phenomenon. Specifically, practical deliberation is a by…Read more
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618Cooperation: With or without Shared IntentionsEthics 132 (2): 414-444. 2022.This article articulates our everyday notion of cooperation. First, I topple an orthodoxy of shared agency theory by arguing that shared intentions to J are neither necessary nor sufficient for J to be cooperative. I refute the necessity claim by providing examples of shared intention-free cooperation (in institutional contexts and beyond). I refute the sufficiency claim by observing that coercion and exploitation need not preclude shared intentions but do preclude cooperation. These arguments, …Read more
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35Présentation. L'empirisme rationaliste de Durkheim et MaussIn Émile Durkheim & Marcel Mauss (eds.), De quelques formes primitives de classification. Contribution à l’étude des représentations collectives, Presses Universitaires De France. pp. 3-25. 1903.In this introduction to the new edition of Durkheim and Mauss's Primitive Classification, I flesh out Durkheim and Mauss’s account of the acquisition of the concept of class, and I argue that their account steers a middle course between traditional strands of rationalism and empiricism.
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The Queen's College, OxfordCareer Development Fellow (5-year Appointment)
The Graduate Center, CUNY
PhD, 2021
APA Eastern Division
Oxford, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland