Muncie, Indiana, United States of America
  •  43
    Thick, Thin, and Becoming a Virtuous Arguer
    Topoi 35 (2): 359-366. 2016.
    A virtue account is focused on the character of those who argue. It is frequently assumed, however, that virtues are not action guiding, since they describe how to be and so fail to give us specific actions to take in a sticky situation. In terms of argumentation, we might say that being a charitable arguer is virtuous, but knowing so provides no details about how to argue successfully. To close this gap, I develop a parallel with the thick-thin distinction from ethics and use Hursthouse’s notio…Read more
  •  24
    Venting as Epistemic Work
    with Christine Baker
    Social Epistemology 33 (2): 101-110. 2019.
    ABSTRACTWe claim that venting can be epistemic work: if one vents to the right sort of person, knowledge can be gained about an oppressive social structure, one’s place in it, and how to repair the epistemic damage it creates. To justify this claim, we define both epistemic damage and venting, and contrast venting with related notions such as complaining and ranting. Using Code’s understanding of testimony, Dotson’s notion of a linguistic exchange, and Fricker’s distinction between testimonial a…Read more
  •  16
    Drawing for Understanding, Insight, and Discovery
    American Association of Philosophy Teachers Studies in Pedagogy 5 22-33. 2019.
    The literature on drawing provides a justification for using drawing in the teaching of philosophy. The aim of the essay is to show how drawing as a pedagogy, though unusual in philosophy, fulfills high-quality teaching desiderata: make it personal, go beyond the text, allow students to show and explain their work, and unify the work of the course. I explain these four desiderata and how students complete drawing exercises to develop understanding, generate insights, and make philosophic discove…Read more