Julie E. Ponesse

Talk of anonymity floats freely and, in many contexts, rampantly in everyday, nonphilosophical discourse. But despite a surge of interest in anonymity—in anonymity protections, on the one hand, and anonymity harms and abuses, on the other—it is not at all clear what anonymity is. Is it simply a matter of being unknown? Or is anonymity something more, or less, than this? Unfortunately, existing analyses frame anonymity very generally as a phenomenon of unknowability and/or concealment. Consequently, they fail to capture what distinguishes anonymity and anonymity relations from, for example, privacy and privacy relations. In this paper, I explore a more precise way of articulating anonymity, developing what I call the “central anonymity paradigm,” which frames anonymity as the result of a specific exercise of control in which true pieces of information about a person are concealed from others with an effect of dissociability. I use this paradigm to show how anonymity is characteristically interpersonal and network-relative, and deeply connected to issues of personal identity

Infertility can be an agonizing experience, especially for women. And, much of the agony has to do with luck: with how unlucky one is in being infertile, and in how much luck is involved in determining whether one can weather the storm of infertility and perhaps have a child in the end. We argue that bad luck associated with being infertile is often bad moral luck for women. The infertile woman often blames herself or is blamed by others for what is happening to her, even when she cannot control or prevent what is happening to her. She has simply had bad luck. We focus on the self-blame of infertile women and show how it stems from pro-natalism that targets women. We also argue that overall for women, regret is a better moral response to infertility than self-blame

This paper has two main aims: one is to understand the mechanisms that allow anonymity to facilitate both good and bad ends; the other is to use this understanding to determine the value of anonymity relative to its disvalue across a variety of moral and socio-political domains. Building on previous work in which I characterize anonymity by what I call the ‘central anonymity paradigm,’ I argue here that anonymity is primarily instrumentally valuable as a strategic device to procure some other valued good or set of goods, and is justified derivatively to the extent that it successfully achieves this end. Here, I leave open the question whether anonymity is intrinsically good and, in the final sections, I give reasons why it should sometimes be resisted. My argument proceeds in four stages: first, I describe four domains in which the tensions between the value and disvalue of anonymity can be felt; second, I briefly present the central anonymity paradigm; third, I draw on Kathleen Wallace’s taxonomy of three kinds of anonymity to show how anonymity is typically achieved in the paradigmatic cases, and why it is so effective at achieving and securing certain ends; and finally, I draw on the concept of “intimate anonymity” from the fields of architecture and urban design as a model for anonymity relations that preserves the individualizing benefits of anonymity—security, privacy, freedom, etc.—while encouraging individuals to form meaningful relations with others that support intimacy, trust and community. I begin with four anonymity tensions.