•  17
    Frege is an anti-psychologist about logic who takes logic to be sharply distinguished from psychology. However, Frege also takes judgment, which seems to be a subject of psychology, to be essential to logic. Van der Schaar attempts to explain away this tension by arguing that judgments relevant to logic in Frege are not mental actions psychology deals with. Against this reading, I show that for Frege, judgments are mental actions consistently. The tension in question should be explained away by …Read more
  •  23
    Taking Frege at His Word, by Joan Weiner (review)
    Mind. forthcoming.
    Early view.
  •  32
    The current discussion on the relationship of epistemic justice to democracy focuses on its relationship to deliberative democracy. This article concerns the relationship of epistemic justice—specifically, testimonial justice which I call “epistemic fairness”—to aggregative democracy or democracy by voting. The aim of this article is to establish that in a good theory of democracy, epistemic fairness is one of the founding principles of the democratic institution of voting, that is, the principl…Read more
  •  37
    Gottlob Frege takes logic to be the science of truth throughout his career. However, the mature Frege makes remarks which seem to go against the idea that logic is the science of truth. This paper shows that we can explain away this tension in the mature Frege’s conception of logic if we accept that truth is an object, that is, the truth-vale True qua the reference of a sentence, for Frege. Even though the main thesis of this paper is a conditional, I provide reasons why we ought to consider the…Read more
  • Epistemic Entitlement: Intellectual Desires and Epistemic Rationality
    In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Luca Moretti (eds.), Non-Evidentialist Epistemology. pp. 139-151. 2021.
  •  137
    Frege's Choice: The Indefinability Argument, Truth, and the Fregean Conception of Judgment
    Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 9 (5): 1-26. 2021.
    I develop a new reading of Frege’s argument for the indefinability of truth. I concentrate on what Frege literally says in the passage that contains the argument. This literal reading of the passage establishes that the indefinability argument is an arguably sound argument to the following conclusion: provided that the Fregean conception of judgment—which has recently been countered by Hanks—is correct and that truth is a property of truth-bearers, a vicious infinite regress is produced. Given t…Read more
  •  34
    Does Frege Have a Metalinguistic Truth-Predicate in Begriffsschrift?
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (3): 191-203. 2021.
    In the explanations of logical laws and inference rules of the mature version of Begriffsschrift in Grundgesetze, Frege uses the predicate “… is the True.” Scholars like Greimann maintain that this predicate is a metalinguistic truth-predicate for Frege. This paper examines an argument for this claim that is based on the “nominal reading” of Frege’s conception of sentences—the claim that for Frege a sentence “p” is equivalent to a nonsentential phrase like “the truth-value of the thought that p.…Read more
  •  60
    Frege's Conception of Truth as an Object
    Dissertation, University of Connecticut. 2020.
    In this dissertation I explore Frege’s conception of truth. In particular I defend the thesis that Frege in his mature career takes truth to be an object, i.e., the True qua the reference of true sentences. In the literature on truth Frege has been usually taken to be a truth deflationist or a truth primitivist. Indeed Frege leaves a number of comments that sound like typical deflationist claims and his famous indefinability argument is the most discussed argument for primitivism. However, Frege…Read more
  •  77
    The horizontal in Frege’s Begriffsschrift
    Synthese 198 (12): 11625-11644. 2020.
    This paper addresses an issue with the sign ‘⊢’ in Frege’s mature version of Begriffsschrift, i.e., the version in ‘Function and Concept’ and Grundgesetze. The sign is a performative for asserting in that writing down ‘⊢p’ is equivalent to asserting that p. Frege further says that writing ‘ p’ is also equivalent to identifying the reference of ‘p’ with the truth-value True. It looks as if he holds that asserting that p consists in identifying the True with the reference of ‘p’. Frege’s commitmen…Read more
  •  44
    The circularity reading of Frege’s indefinability argument
    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (2): 128-136. 2020.
    This paper criticizes the circularity reading of Frege's argument for the indefinability of truth. According to this reading, Frege is appealing to a sort of circularity in the argument. I argue that the circularity reading is interpretatively incorrect, or makes Frege's argument a non‐starter.
  •  78
    Composers and Performers
    Philosophia 48 (4): 1469-1481. 2020.
    We take performers of classical music as producers of creative performances. We sometimes criticize a performer’s performance by saying ‘That is not what the composer wants’. The literature takes this kind of criticism, which I call ‘intentionalist criticism’, to be in tension with performers’ creativity—taking the criticism to be an attempt to restrict performers’ creativity by historical authenticity. This paper aims to construct a possible understanding of intentionalist criticisms according …Read more
  •  63
    Frege's Conception of Truth: Two Readings
    Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6. 2019.
    The object reading of Frege's conception of truth holds that, for him, truth is an object---the truth-value the True. Greimann rejects the object reading and suggests an alternative reading. According to his suggested reading, Frege is the proponent of the assertion theory of truth the main thesis of which is that truth is what is expressed by the form of assertoric sentences and truth as such is neither an object nor a property. I argue that Frege cannot accept the assertion theory. I also defe…Read more