Juraj Hvorecky

The paper criticizes the novel approach of Miščević to apriority and analyticity. In a nutshell, it aims to show that Miščević has failed to appreciate the power and impact of semantic atomism in the theory of concepts. He simply assurnes a clean distinction between concept-analyzing propositions and those that do not analyze concepts, misconstrue the way atomists understand concept-analyzing propositions, namely epistemically and not semantically, and fails to provide an answer to atomistic considerations. Finally, I analyze his examples of alleged a posteriori concept analyzing propositions and I argue that they fail to support his theory.

This paper traces the empiricist program from early debates between nativism and behaviorism within philosophy, through debates about early connectionist approaches within the cognitive sciences, and up to their recent iterations within the domain of deep learning. We demonstrate how current debates on the nature of cognition via deep network architecture echo some of the core issues from the Chomsky/Quine debate and investigate the strength of support offered by these various lines of research to the empiricist standpoint. Referencing literature from both computer science and philosophy, we conclude that the current state of deep learning does not offer strong encouragement to the empiricist side despite some arguments to the contrary.

Embodied Appraisals and Non-emotional States We present the embodied appraisal theory of emotions and show how it handles a variety of intuitions we hold about affective states. While appreciating its integrative potential, we point out possible difficulties that it might face from further investigation of embodied non-emotional states. Following Darwin and his work on the expression of emotions, we suggest that some obviously non-emotional mental states comply with the criteria set by Prinz's theory. Therefore it is doubtful whether his definition of emotions is correct and whether perceptual approaches are useful in explicating the nature of emotion types.

In this collection of essays, experts in the field of consciousness research shed light on the intricate relationship between conscious and unconscious states of mind. Advancing the debate on consciousness research, this book puts centre stage the topic of commonalities and differences between conscious and unconscious contents of the mind. The collection of cutting-edge chapters offers a breadth of research perspectives, with some arguing that unconscious states have been unjustly overlooked and deserve recognition for their richness and wide scope. Others contend that significant differences between conscious and unconscious states persist, highlighting the importance of their distinct characteristics. Explorations into the nature of the transition from unconscious to conscious mind further complicate the picture, with some authors questioning whether a sharp divide between unconscious and conscious states truly exists. Delving into ontological, epistemological, and methodological issues, this thought-provoking text challenges established paradigms and paves the way for a reimagining of consciousness research. It does so in an understandable and accessible way, making this a perfect companion to both experts and students of philosophy, psychology, and related fields.

Embodied Appraisals and Non-emotional States We present the embodied appraisal theory of emotions and show how it handles a variety of intuitions we hold about affective states. While appreciating its integrative potential, we point out possible difficulties that it might face from further investigation of embodied non-emotional states. Following Darwin and his work on the expression of emotions, we suggest that some obviously non-emotional mental states comply with the criteria set by Prinz's theory. Therefore it is doubtful whether his definition of emotions is correct and whether perceptual approaches are useful in explicating the nature of emotion types.

The volume presents original contributions from the 2009 Knowledge, Value, Evolution conference, held in Prague in 2009. While the conference was held during the year of Darwin's double anniversary, its aims were not historical. Rather, we brought together researchers from many different countries who work on topics at the interface of philosophy, the humanities and evolutionary biology. Chapters included in this volume give a very comprehensive picture of the work on a Darwinian-inspired epistemology, philosophy of mind, ethics, social philosophy, as well as a more empirical study of cognition and religion.

In the midst of the 1980 Daniel Dennett published a series of papers on the problematic of the Self. The resolution offered by Dennett is rather unconventional in philosophy and it might appear as contradicting several contemporary theoretical as well as experimental works in this field. The latter appeal namely to conside_rably different sources of the development of human Self. The aim of the paper is to show, that understanding the resolution offered by Dennett as an attempt at explaining just a particular stage of the development of the Self makes it possible to bring his attitude into accordance with other, seemingly different attitudes