Jürgen Sirsch

The paper discusses the adequate role of ideal theory for the discussion of practical problems. Therefore, I will reconstruct the Rawlsian understanding of the ideal-theoretical method and confront it with the critiques of Raymond Geuss and Amartya Sen. While Geuss is sceptical, whether ideal theory provides an appropriately critical perspective, Sen doubts the practical usefulness of ideal-theoretical models. It will be shown, that Rawlsian ideal theory can deal with these criticisms and that it is a useful tool for solving practical problems.

What kinds of feasibility restrictions should be taken into account in practically relevant political philosophy? David Estlund argues that “ought” does not imply “can will,” and, hence, that we should be very cautious regarding the inclusion of motivational restrictions in political philosophy. As Nicholas Southwood and David Wiens point out, however, Estlund’s position clashes with the requirement that “ought” implies “feasible.” The present article argues that even though we must accept that “ought” implies “feasible,” this does not settle the question regarding the adequate set of feasibility restrictions to be included in applied normative thinking. Instead, we need to distinguish different kinds of normative theory that require different sets of feasibility restrictions. For this, the article provides a taxonomy of feasibility restrictions and a preliminary discussion of the adequate set of feasibility restrictions for different kinds of normative theory.

Neorepublicans like Philip Pettit and Frank Lovett claim that neorepublicanism provides a superior normative research program compared to egalitarian-liberalism. Particularly, they argue that neorepublicanism offers a better justification of redistributive policies, which are normally associated with egalitarian-liberalism. According to Lovett and Pettit, the neorepublican justification is superior because it rests on parsimonious theoretical assumptions and is more suitable to persuade people of redistributive institutions. We contest these claims on the grounds of methodological and substantive moral reasons. We argue that the neorepublican arguments claiming rhetorical effectiveness and parsimony rest on methodological presuppositions that reflect an unattractive understanding of political philosophy. Additionally, since neorepublicanism lacks a (thin) theory of the good, it does not provide a sufficient basis for justifying redistributive policies.

Building on the work of John Rawls, this book offers a conception of ideal theory which provides practical guidance and a critical perspective on politics, institutions and society. The author develops this approach by discussing recent criticism of ideal theory by authors such as Amartya Sen and Raymond Geuss. Answering Sen’s criticism, the author proposes a novel account of feasibility in relation to ideal theory, especially with regard to ideal institutional design. As a reply to Geuss’ criticism, he discusses constructivist approaches of moral theory-building. Building on this discussion, the book develops an account of practical ideal–theoretical thinking that can be used for evaluating and criticizing societies and can guide institutional design under nonideal conditions.

Die vorliegenden Beiträge in deutscher und englischer Sprache behandeln begriffliche, normative und empirische Probleme der Demokratie aus Sicht der Analytischen Politischen Theorie. Sie beschäftigen sich mit Themen wie Freiheit und Zwang, Ungleichheit und Ungerechtigkeit, Wahlversprechen und Dirty Hands. Das Motto dieses Sammelbandes ist folglich ‚Einheit in Vielfalt‘: Er gibt einen außergewöhnlichen Einblick in den Facettenreichtum der aktuellen Forschungsdiskussionen im Rahmen der Analytischen Politischen Theorie.

Algorithmic systems are increasingly used by state agencies to inform decisions about humans. They produce scores on risks of recidivism in criminal justice, indicate the probability for a job seeker to find a job in the labor market, or calculate whether an applicant should get access to a certain university program. In this contribution, we take an interdisciplinary perspective, provide a bird’s eye view of the different key decisions that are to be taken when state actors decide to use an algorithmic system, and illustrate these decisions with empirical examples from case studies. Building on these insights, we discuss the main pitfalls and promises of the use of algorithmic system by the state and focus on four levels: The most basic question whether an algorithmic system should be used at all, the regulation and governance of the system, issues of algorithm design, and, finally, questions related to the implementation of the system on the ground and the human–machine-interaction that comes with it. Based on our assessment of the advantages and challenges that arise at each of these levels, we propose a set of crucial questions to be asked when such intricate matters are addressed.

The article deals with the question whether an unconditional basic income is part of an ideal liberal-egalitarian welfare regime. Analyzing UBI from an ideal-theoretical perspective requires a comparison of the justice performance of ideal welfare regimes instead of comparing isolated institutional designs. This holistic perspective allows for a more systematic consideration of issues like institutional complementarity. I compare three potential ideal welfare regimes from a liberal-egalitarian perspective of justice: An ideal social democratic regime, a mixed regime containing a moderate UBI and a maximal UBI regime where UBI replaces most of the welfare state. These regimes are evaluated with respect to three aspects of justice performance: the scope and neutrality of opportunities provided, institutional complementarities with a dynamic, globalized economy and the policy feedback effects on the political stability of liberal-egalitarian political coalitions. I conclude that the overall performance of a mixed regime is superior to the other regimes.

Often, an unconditional basic income (UBI) is seen as a means for reducing economic inequality. For many of its proponents, UBI is both just and efficient, which potentially makes it an effective means of redistribution. Among other reasons, this has led egalitarian theorists to view UBI as part of an egalitarian ideal society. However, this assessment mostly includes only immediate distributive implications of an implementation of UBI. From the perspective of egalitarian ideal theory, however, long-term distributive implications of institutional designs are relevant as well. Especially, with respect to UBI, a proper investigation of its longterm political effects is lacking: Therefore, we need to investigate the long-term political stability of UBI. In this paper, I derive hypotheses regarding long-term political support for different variants of UBI by employing mechanisms of ‘policy feedback’. In addition, the article contributes to broader methodological debates within political theory by showing that ideal-theoretical approaches can be fruitful for practical questions.

The article deals with the question whether an unconditional basic income (UBI) is part of an ideal liberal-egalitarian welfare regime. Analyzing UBI from an ideal-theoretical perspective requires a comparison of the justice performance of ideal welfare regimes instead of comparing isolated institutional designs. This holistic perspective allows for a more systematic consideration of issues like institutional complementarity. I compare three potential ideal welfare regimes from a liberal-egalitarian perspective of justice: An ideal social democratic regime, a mixed regime containing a moderate UBI and a maximal UBI regime where UBI replaces most of the welfare state. These regimes are evaluated with respect to three aspects of justice performance: the scope and neutrality of opportunities provided, institutional complementarities with a dynamic, globalized economy and the policy feedback effects on the political stability of liberal-egalitarian political coalitions. I conclude that the overall performance of a mixed regime is superior to the other regimes.

Political Theory is a broad field, comprising subjects as varied as conceptual analysis, positive political theory, political philosophy, and the history of normative political thought. The present edited volume includes contributions to all of these fields: Contested concepts such as extremism or freedom are discussed, issues such as expertocracy, dirty hands, global poverty and inequality are tackled from a normative perspective; empirical topics such as the conditions of democratic stability or the relationship between rational action and informational inequalities are illuminated from a theoretical point of view, and “Eastern” critiques of “Western” political ideals are presented.