Among the central claims forwarded in Arpaly and Schroeder’s In Praise of Desire are the following: A person acts praiseworthily who performs a right or good action out of an intention caused by the joint rationalizing property of her beliefs and her desire to perform that action under the aspect that makes it right or good. Virtues consist of desires for right or good things under the aspects that make them right or good or of mental states that manifest such desires. Being virtuous means posse…
Read moreAmong the central claims forwarded in Arpaly and Schroeder’s In Praise of Desire are the following: A person acts praiseworthily who performs a right or good action out of an intention caused by the joint rationalizing property of her beliefs and her desire to perform that action under the aspect that makes it right or good. Virtues consist of desires for right or good things under the aspects that make them right or good or of mental states that manifest such desires. Being virtuous means possessing an array of these desires. This paper reviews Arpaly and Schroeder’s arguments at length and suggests that, though the person so motivated may be somewhat praiseworthy, acting out of motivations structured in this way cannot by itself suffice for praiseworthiness without qualification.
