•  40
  •  6
    Brill Online Books and Journals
    with Patricia Kenig Curd, Christopher J. Martin, C. J. F. Williams, Nicholas Denyer, and Christopher Kirwan
    Phronesis 36 (3): 319-327. 1991.
  •  37
    How Should I Be? A Defense of Platonic Rational Egoism
    European Journal of Philosophy 23 (1): 39-67. 2015.
    There has been a long tradition of interpreting Plato as a rational egoist. Over the past few decades, however, some scholars have challenged this reading. While Rational Egoism appeals to many ordinary folk, in sophisticated philosophical circles it has fallen out of favor as a general and complete account of the nature of reasons for action. I argue that while the theory of practical rationality that is often equated with rational egoism—a view that I call ‘Simple-Minded Rational Egoism'—is ne…Read more
  •  22
    "Recollection and the Problem of the Elenchus"
    Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 10 (1): 257-295. 1994.
    Socratic cross-examination is used for a number of purposes in Plato's early dialogues; among the most important is inquiry. However, it is difficult to see how a method for rendering one's belief-set coherent is likely to move one closer to knowledge of a mind-independent reality. The Theory of Recollection is introduced in the 'Meno' to explain why successful moral inquiry by means of Socratic cross-examination is probable at least in the long run.
  •  467
    The Attractions and Delights of Goodness
    Philosophical Quarterly 54 (216): 353-367. 2004.
    What makes something good for me? Most contemporary philosophers argue that something cannot count as good for me unless I am in some way attracted to it, or take delight in it. However, subjectivist theories of prudential value face difficulties, and there is no consensus about how these difficulties should be resolved. Whether one opts for a hedonist or a desire-satisfaction account of prudential value, certain fundamental assumptions about human well-being must be abandoned. I argue that we s…Read more
  • Knowledge and Method in Plato's Early and Middle Dialogues
    Dissertation, Cornell University. 1991.
    The view that there is a break in doctrine between the epistemology expressed in Plato's early/transitional and in his middle dialogues has been influential. In particular, it has been held that Plato's early dialogues are relatively innocent of epistemological concerns, but that to the extent that they are committed to any theory of epistemic justification, it is coherentist. In the middle dialogues, many suggest, Plato adopts some version of foundationalism. I argue that this interpretation of…Read more
  •  48
    Method in Ancient Greek Philosophy (edited book)
    Clarendon Press. 1998.
    Method in Ancient Philosophy brings together fifteen new, specially written essays by leading scholars on a broad subject of central importance. The ancient Greeks recognized that different forms of human activity are guided by different methods of reasoning; examination of how they reasoned, and how they thought about their own reasoning, helps us to see how they came to hold the views they did, and how our own methods of enquiry have developed under their influence. Contributors include Terenc…Read more
  •  900
    Cross-Examining Socrates (review)
    Philosophical Review 110 (4): 587-590. 2001.
    A review of John Beversluis' "Cross-Examining Socrates: A Defense of the Interlocutors in Plato's Early Dialogues"
  •  314
    “συμφωνειν” in Plato's Phaedo
    Phronesis 36 (3): 265-276. 1991.
    In Socrates' account of his earlier investigations into the nature of causation in the "Phaedo", he describes a method that uses hypotheses. He posited as true those propositions that appeared to harmonize ("sumphonein") with his hypothesis and as false those propositions that failed to harmonize with his hypothesis. Earlier commentators on this passage have maintained that it is impossible to give a univocal reading of the occurrences of "sumphonein"' such that the method that Socrates describe…Read more
  •  241
    How to Know the Good: The Moral Epistemology of Plato's Republic
    Philosophical Review 114 (4): 469-496. 2005.
    John Mackie famously dismissed the rational tenability of moral objectivism with two quick arguments. The second, the so-called “argument from queerness,” proceeds as follows. A commitment to moral objectivism brings with it a commitment to the existence of moral properties as “queer” as Platonic Forms that are apprehended only through occult faculties like so-called “moral intuition” (Mackie 1977, 38). Since we have no reason to believe that there is any faculty such as moral intuition that ser…Read more
  •  1068
    The Sophistic Cross-Examination of Callicles in the Gorgias
    Ancient Philosophy 15 (1): 17-43. 1995.
    Socrates' cross-examination of Callicles in the 'Gorgias' has traditionally been viewed as a paradigm of the Socratic method. I argue that, when he cross examines Callicles, Socrates behaves out of character. In fact, he acts like a Sophist and violates the very principles of persuasion that he advocates in the 'Gorgias'. I offer an explanation of Socrates' temporary transformation into a Sophist, and suggest that his role-reversal reinforces Plato's representation of Socrates as the model of th…Read more
  •  605
    “συμφωνειν” in Plato's Phaedo
    Phronesis 36 (3). 1991.
    In Socrates' account of his earlier investigations into the nature of causation in the "Phaedo", he describes a method that uses hypotheses. He posited as true those propositions that appeared to harmonize ("sumphonein") with his hypothesis and as false those propositions that failed to harmonize with his hypothesis. Earlier commentators on this passage have maintained that it is impossible to give a univocal reading of the occurrences of "sumphonein"' such that the method that Socrates describe…Read more
  •  1237
    Recollection and the Problem of the Elenchus
    Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 10 (1): 257-295. 1994.
    We simply cannot make sense of Socrates' procedure for cross-examining his interlocutors in the early dialogues if we insist that Socrates uses cross-examination only for the purpose of testing his interlocutor's claim to knowledge. This view of Socratic cross-examination cannot explain the fact that Socrates examines theses that he himself proposes and that neither he nor his interlocutor explicitly endorses. In contrast,the supposition that Socrates is inquiring on these occasions provides a g…Read more
  •  452
    Recollection and the Problem of the Socratic Elenchus
    Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 10 257-95. 1994.
    We simply cannot make sense of Socrates' procedure for cross-examining his interlocutors in the early dialogues if we insist that Socrates uses cross-examination only for the purpose of testing his interlocutor's claim to knowledge. This view of Socratic cross-examination cannot explain the fact that Socrates examines theses that he himself proposes and that neither he nor his interlocutor explicitly endorses. In contrast,the supposition that Socrates is inquiring on these occasions provides a g…Read more
  •  136
    How Should I Be? A Defense of Platonic Rational Egoism
    European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4): 39-67. 2012.
    There has been a long tradition of interpreting Plato as a rational egoist. Over the past few decades, however, some scholars have challenged this reading. While Rational Egoism appeals to many ordinary folk, in sophisticated philosophical circles it has fallen out of favor as a general and complete account of the nature of reasons for action. I argue that while the theory of practical rationality that is often equated with rational egoism—a view that I call ‘Simple-Minded Rational Egoism'—is ne…Read more
  •  1886
    What is a death with dignity?
    Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 28 (4). 2003.
    Proponents of the legalization of assisted suicide often appeal to our supposed right to "die with dignity" to defend their case. I examine and assess different notions of "dignity" that are operating in many arguments for the legalization of assisted suicide, and I find them all to be deficient. I then consider an alternative conception of dignity that is based on Aristotle's conception of the conditions on the best life. I conclude that, while such a conception of dignity fits best with our in…Read more
  •  116
    Method in ancient philosophy (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 1998.
    Method in Ancient Philosophy brings together fifteen new, specially written essays by leading scholars on a broad subject of central importance. The ancient Greeks recognized that different forms of human activity are guided by different methods of reasoning; examination of how they reasoned, and how they thought about their own reasoning, helps us to see how they came to hold the views they did, and how our own methods of enquiry have developed under their influence. Contributors include Terenc…Read more
  •  277
    Commentary on Bobonich
    Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 11 (1): 140-153. 1995.
    Bobonich argues that, in the Laws, Plato is committed to the view that the goodness of all goods entirely distinct from virtue is dependent on the virtue of their possessor. He suggests further that Plato's commitment to this dependency thesis is best explained by Plato's commitment to two other theses: (1) that knowledge is sufficient for all virtue, and (2) that the goodness of goods entirely distinct from virtue depends on their possessor's knowledge of the nature of their goodness. While I a…Read more
  •  321
    RM Dancy, Plato's Introduction of Forms
    Philosophy in Review 27 (5): 327. 2007.
  •  702
    It has often been noted that Socratic cross-examination is problematic as a method of inquiry, i.e., as a method for 'acquiring' knowledge. Rarely has it been noticed that there are problems with cross-examination when used for the purposes of 'testing' for knowledge. In the 'Charmides', Socrates commits himself to the following principle: In order to discriminate between the person who knows and the person who does not know the subject matter covered by a particular discipline (technê), one mus…Read more