•  111
    Do Emotions Represent Values?
    Dialectica 69 (3): 357-380. 2015.
    This paper articulates what it would take to defend representationalism in the case of emotions – i.e. the claim that emotions attribute evaluative properties to target objects or events. We argue that representationalism faces a significant explanatory challenge that has not yet been adequately recognized. Proponents must establish that a representation relation linking emotions and value is explanatorily necessary. We use the case of perception to bring out the difficulties in meeting this exp…Read more
  •  77
    Moral Expertise
    Analyse & Kritik 34 (2): 217-230. 2012.
    This paper surveys recent work on moral expertise. Much of that work defends an asymmetry thesis according to which the cognitive deference to expertise that characterizes other areas of inquiry is out of place in morality. There are two reasons why you might think asymmetry holds. The problem might lie in the existence of expertise or in deferring to it. We argue that both types of arguments for asymmetry fail. They appear to be stronger than they are because of their focus on moral expertise r…Read more
  •  15
    Mind-making, Affective Regulation, and Resistance
    Tandf: Australasian Philosophical Review 3 (1): 86-89. 2020.
    Volume 3, Issue 1, March 2019, Page 86-89.