•  870
    Rational social and political polarization
    Philosophical Studies 176 (9): 2243-2267. 2019.
    Public discussions of political and social issues are often characterized by deep and persistent polarization. In social psychology, it’s standard to treat belief polarization as the product of epistemic irrationality. In contrast, we argue that the persistent disagreement that grounds political and social polarization can be produced by epistemically rational agents, when those agents have limited cognitive resources. Using an agent-based model of group deliberation, we show that groups of deli…Read more
  •  479
    We motivate a picture of social epistemology that sees forgetting as subject to epistemic evaluation. Using computer simulations of a simple agent-based model, we show that how agents forget can have as large an impact on group epistemic outcomes as how they share information. But, how we forget, unlike how we form beliefs, isn’t typically taken to be the sort of thing that can be epistemically rational or justified. We consider what we take to be the most promising argument for this claim …Read more
  •  159
    Climate change denial and beliefs about science
    Synthese 198 (3): 2355-2374. 2019.
    Social scientists have offered a number of explanations for why Americans commonly deny that human-caused climate change is real. In this paper, I argue that these explanations neglect an important group of climate change deniers: those who say they are on the side of science while also rejecting what they know most climate scientists accept. I then develop a “nature of science” hypothesis that does account for this group of deniers. According to this hypothesis, people have serious misconceptio…Read more
  •  87
    Underdetermination and Evidence in the Developmental Plasticity Debate
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (1): 127-152. 2019.
    I identify a controversial hypothesis in evolutionary biology called the plasticity-first hypothesis. I argue that the plasticity-first hypothesis is underdetermined and that the most popular means of studying the plasticity-first hypothesis are insufficient to confirm or disconfirm it. I offer a strategy for overcoming this problem. Researchers need to develop a richer middle range theory of plasticity-first evolution that allows them to identify distinctive empirical traces of the hypothesis. …Read more
  •  79
    Biological Individuality and Scientific Practice
    Philosophy of Science 82 (5): 1092-1103. 2015.
    I consider the relationship between scientific practice and the philosophical debate surrounding biological individuality. I argue for the sensitivity account, on which biologists do not require a resolution to the individuality debate. This view puts me in disagreement with much of the literature on biological individuality, where it has become common to claim that there is a relationship of dependence between biologists’ conceptions of individuality and the quality of their empirical work
  •  74
    We motivate a picture of social epistemology that sees forgetting as subject to epistemic evaluation. Using computer simulations of a simple agent-based model, we show that how agents forget can have as large an impact on group epistemic outcomes as how they share information. But, how we forget, unlike how we form beliefs, isn’t typically taken to be the sort of thing that can be epistemically rational or justified. We consider what we take to be the most promising argument for this claim and f…Read more
  •  48
    A New Heuristic for Climate Adaptation
    Philosophy of Science 1-11. 2023.
    An influential heuristic for thinking about climate adaptation asserts that “natural” adaptation strategies are the best ones. This heuristic has been roundly criticized but is difficult to dislodge in the absence of an alternative. We introduce a new heuristic that assesses adaptation strategies by looking at their maturity, power, and commitment. Maturity is the extent to which we understand an adaptation strategy’s effects. Power is the size of the effect an adaptation strategy will have. Com…Read more
  •  35
    Correction to: Rational social and political polarization
    Philosophical Studies 176 (9): 2269-2269. 2019.
    In the original publication of the article, the Acknowledgement section was inadvertently not included. The Acknowledgement is given in this Correction.
  •  23
    Agriculture increases individual fitness
    with Carlos Santana, Raj Patel, Erol Akçay, and Michael Weisberg
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 39. 2016.
  •  21
    Meta-Analysis and Conservation Science
    Philosophy of Science 89 (5): 980-990. 2022.
    Philosophical work on meta-analysis focuses on biomedical research and revolves around the question: Is meta-analytic evidence the best kind of evidence? By focusing on conservation science rather than biomedical science, I identify further questions and puzzles for meta-analysis and show their importance for the epistemology of meta-analysis.
  •  20
    Different research projects require their own individuality concepts
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 61 50-53. 2017.
  •  18
    Fighting about frequency
    Synthese 199 (3-4): 7777-7797. 2021.
    Scientific disputes about how often different processes or patterns occur are relative frequency controversies. These controversies occur across the sciences. In some areas—especially biology—they are even the dominant mode of dispute. Yet they depart from the standard picture of what a scientific controversy is like. In fact, standard philosophical accounts of scientific controversies suggest that relative frequency controversies are irrational or lacking in epistemic value. This is because sta…Read more
  •  11
    Correction to: Fighting About Frequency
    Synthese 199 (3): 7799-7799. 2021.
    A correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03194-5.
  •  10
    Mate Choice and Null Models
    Philosophy of Science 87 (5): 1096-1106. 2020.
    Biologists have proposed a variety of explanations for extravagant sexual displays, and controversies over explanations define the history of sexual selection research. Recently, Richard Prum has d...
  •  7
    Evaluating community science
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 88 (C): 102-109. 2021.