•  634
    Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual Analyst’s Defense
    Philosophy of Science 58 (2): 168-184. 1991.
    In this paper I defend an etiological theory of biological functions (according to which the proper function of a trait is the effect for which it was selected by natural selection) against three objections which have been influential. I argue, contrary to Millikan, that it is wrong to base our defense of the theory on a rejection of conceptual analysis, for conceptual analysis does have an important role in philosophy of science. I also argue that biology requires a normative notion of a "prope…Read more
  •  428
    The teleological notion of 'function'
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (4). 1991.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  374
    Misrepresenting and malfunctioning
    Philosophical Studies 79 (2): 109-41. 1995.
  •  285
  •  280
    Explaining Complex Adaptations: A Reply to Sober’s ”Reply to Neander’
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4): 583-587. 1995.
  •  218
  •  201
    Toward an Informational Teleosemantics
    In Dan Ryder, Justine Kingsbury & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Millikan and Her Critics, Wiley. pp. 21--40. 2012.
    This chapter contains section titles: Introduction Response Functions Information and Singular Causation The Functions of Sensory Representations The Contents of Sensory Representations: The Problem of Error The Contents of Sensory Representation: The Distality Problem.
  •  153
  •  143
    Functional analysis and the species design
    Synthese 194 (4). 2017.
    This paper argues that a minimal notion of function and a notion of normal-proper function are used in explaining how bodies and brains operate. Neither is Cummins’ notion, as originally defined, and yet his is often taken to be the clearly relevant notion for such an explanatory context. This paper also explains how adverting to normal-proper functions, even if these are selected functions, can play a significant scientific role in the operational explanations of complex systems that physiologi…Read more
  •  140
    Are homologies (selected effect or causal role) function free?
    Philosophy of Science 76 (3): 307-334. 2009.
    This article argues that at least very many judgments of homology rest on prior attributions of selected‐effect (SE) function, and that many of the “parts” of biological systems that are rightly classified as homologous are constituted by (are so classified in virtue of) their consequence etiologies. We claim that SE functions are often used in the prior identification of the parts deemed to be homologous and are often used to differentiate more restricted homologous kinds within less restricted…Read more
  •  114
    Pruning the tree of life
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (1): 59-80. 1995.
    argue that natural selection does not explain the genotypic arid phenotypic properties of individuals. On this view, natural selection explains the adaptedness of individuals, not by explaining why the individuals that exist have the adaptations they do, but rather by explaining why the individuals that exist are the ones with those adaptations. This paper argues that this ‘Negative’ view of natural selection ignores the fact that natural selection is a cumulative selection process. So understoo…Read more
  •  108
    Pictorial representation: A matter of resemblance
    British Journal of Aesthetics 27 (3): 213-226. 1987.
  •  98
    Minds without Meanings: An Essay on the Content of Concepts
    Philosophical Review 126 (3): 410-417. 2017.
  •  93
    What does natural selection explain? Correction to Sober
    Philosophy of Science 55 (3): 422-426. 1988.
    In this paper I argue against Sober's claim that natural selection does not explain the traits of individuals. Sober argues that natural selection only explains the distribution of traits in a population. My point is that the explanation of an individual's traits involves us in a description of the individual's ancestry, and in an explanation of the distribution of traits in that ancestral population. Thus Sober is wrong, natural selection is part of the explanation of the traits of individuals
  •  84
    Dretske's innate modesty
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2): 258-74. 1996.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  57
    Drawing on insights from causal theories of reference, teleosemantics, and state space semantics, a theory of naturalized mental representation. In A Mark of the Mental, Karen Neander considers the representational power of mental states—described by the cognitive scientist Zenon Pylyshyn as the “second hardest puzzle” of philosophy of mind. The puzzle at the heart of the book is sometimes called “the problem of mental content,” “Brentano's problem,” or “the problem of intentionality.” Its motiv…Read more
  •  45
    Misrepresenting & Malfunctioning
    Philosophical Studies 79 (2): 109-141. 1995.
  •  33
    Peacocke on Primitive Self-Representation
    Analysis 76 (3): 324-334. 2016.
  •  25
    15. Types of Traits: The Importance of Functional Homologues
    In Andre Ariew, Robert C. Cummins & Mark Perlman (eds.), Functions: New Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology and Biology, Oxford University Press. pp. 390. 2002.
  •  24
    Les explications fonctionnelles
    Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 1 (1): 5-34. 2009.
    On dit souvent que, tandis que la biologie de l'évolution utilise un concept étiologique de fonction (la fonction d'un trait biologique n'est autre que son effet sélectionné), la physiologie prend appui sur un autre concept de fonction, celui de rôle causal. Cependant, un examen plus attentif montre que le concept non normatif de rôle causal n'est pas ce dont la physiologie générale ou la neurophysiologie ont besoin. Ces disciplines font un large usage de notions comme celles de bon fonctionneme…Read more
  •  23
    Misrepresenting & malfunctioning
    Philos Stud 79 (2): 109-141. 1995.