•  1
    The Logic of Objectivity: Reflections on the Priority of Inference
    Philosophy of Education 63 116-124. 2007.
  •  1
    Review of Paradoxes: Their Roots, Range, and Resolution, by Nicholas Rescher (review)
    Essays in Philosophy 4 (2): 170-172. 2003.
  •  3
    Oscillation and Emancipation: Collingwood on History and Human Nature
    In Karim Dharamsi, Giuseppina D'Oro & Stephen Leach (eds.), Collingwood on Philosophical Methodology, Springer Verlag. pp. 177-207. 2018.
    Dharamsi considers Collingwood’s defence of the autonomy of the mental and contrasts it with the one articulated by liberal naturalists such as McDowell. Both Collingwood and McDowell, Dharamsi argues, acknowledge the irreducibly normative nature of the study of mind and both reject the widespread naturalist assumption that philosophy is continuous with natural science. The liberal naturalist’s and Collingwood’s strategy are however fundamentally different. McDowell’s strategy is to soften natur…Read more
  •  2
    Review of Historical Ontology, by Ian Hacking (review)
    Essays in Philosophy 5 (2): 498-500. 2004.
  •  17
    Review of “Historical Ontology” (review)
    Essays in Philosophy 5 (2): 9. 2004.
  • Introduction to Vol. 7, No. 2
    Essays in Philosophy 7 (2): 158-160. 2006.
    This issue of Essays in Philosophy brings together five articles that work in the spirit of the philosophy of history3⁄4broadly construed. Each author provides us a glimpse into the methodological relationship between philosophy and history
  •  69
    Re-enacting in the Second Person
    Journal of the Philosophy of History 5 (2): 163-178. 2011.
    R. G. Collingwood's theory of re-enactment has long been understood as an important contribution to the philosophy of history. It has also been challenging to understand how re-enactment is operationalized in the practice of understanding past actors or, indeed, other minds occupying less remote regions of our experiences. Sebastian Rödl has recently articulated a compelling defence of second person ascription, arguing that it is, in form, analogous to first person understanding. By Rödl's light…Read more
  •  27
    Review of “Paradoxes: Their Roots, Range, and Resolution” (review)
    Essays in Philosophy 4 (2): 10. 2003.
    Professor Rescher has provided us with an interesting introduction to paradoxes. His scope is literally exhaustive; the writing is clear and the content has been made accessible to a wide audience. One can imagine this text replacing many introductory level texts in critical thinking courses; while at the same time many of Rescher’s conclusions warrant detailed scrutiny by honours or graduate level students interested in this subject. Indeed, the strength of the book is Rescher’s substantively o…Read more
  •  9
    Biographical Encyclopedia of British Idealism (review)
    Journal of the History of Philosophy 50 (1): 146-147. 2012.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Biographical Encyclopedia of British IdealismKarim DharamsiWilliam Sweet, editor. Biographical Encyclopedia of British Idealism. New York-London: Continuum, 2010. Pp. xx + 724. Cloth, $295.00.The term ‘British Idealism’ underdetermines the interests and geographies of philosophers classed under its heading. It may imply a common goal or, indeed, location. This is misleading. The Biographical Encyclopedia of British Ideali…Read more
  •  1
    Re-Situating Learning
    Dissertation, University of Toronto (Canada). 2003.
    In this dissertation I examine the Theory-Theory . I argue that T-T represents the orthodox conception of learning in today's psychological literature. T-T theorists hold that human beings come "equipped" with innate representations that are "a theory." Theorists believe that this innate theory guides our relations to the world. If T-T theorists are correct, learning amounts to theory-revision. Hence, T-T brings together two commitments: innate knowledge and theory-revision. In this dissertation…Read more
  •  12
    "Review of" Truth and Justification" (review)
    Essays in Philosophy 6 (2): 2. 2005.
  •  59
    From norms to uses and back again
    Journal of the Philosophy of History 2 (2): 167-184. 2008.
    I defend the idea that Collingwood's discussion of self-knowledge implies that meaning is normative. Against the view that treats the social as primitive in explaining a normativity of meaning thesis, I argue that Collingwood is an internalist about epistemic justification. Collingwood's internalism about epistemic justification and meaning is normative, but its character involves a logical-epistemic relation between use and meaning. I suggest that this view is well represented by Collingwood's …Read more