My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Lean toward: yes
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Lean toward: Platonism
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Accept both
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Accept both
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Accept both
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Lean toward: idealism
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Accept more than one
God: theism and atheism Lean toward: theism
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism Accept both
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Accept more than one
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Lean toward: Humean
Logic: classical and non-classical Accept another alternative
Mental content: internalism and externalism Accept: internalism
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Reject both
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism Accept both
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Lean toward: non-physicalism
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Accept: cognitivism
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Accept both
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Accept both
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Reject all
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Accept more than one
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view Accept another alternative
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Accept: libertarianism
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Accept another alternative
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Lean toward: scientific realism
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death Accept both
Time: A-theory and B-theory Lean toward: B-theory
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch Accept another alternative
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Accept: correspondence
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Accept more than one