•  385
    Implicit Bias and Prejudice
    with Jules Holroyd
    In Miranda Fricker, Peter J. Graham, David Henderson, Nikolaj Pedersen & Jeremy Wyatt (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology, . 2019.
    Recent empirical research has substantiated the finding that very many of us harbour implicit biases: fast, automatic, and difficult to control processes that encode stereotypes and evaluative content, and influence how we think and behave. Since it is difficult to be aware of these processes - they have sometimes been referred to as operating 'unconsciously' - we may not know that we harbour them, nor be alert to their influence on our cognition and action. And since they are difficult to contr…Read more
  •  366
    Findings from the cognitive sciences suggest that the cognitive mechanisms responsible for some memory errors are adaptive, bringing benefits to the organism. In this paper we argue that the same cognitive mechanisms also bring a suite of significant epistemic benefits, increasing the chance of an agent obtaining epistemic goods like true belief and knowledge. This result provides a significant challenge to the folk conception of memory beliefs that are false, according to which they are a sign …Read more
  •  216
    Epistemic Agency and the Generalisation of Fear
    Synthese 202 (1): 1-23. 2023.
    Fear generalisation is a psychological phenomenon that occurs when fear that is elicited in response to a frightening stimulus spreads to similar or related stimuli. The practical harms of pathological fear generalisation related to trauma are well-documented, but little or no attention has been given so far to its epistemic harms. This paper fills this gap in the literature. It shows how the psychological phenomenon, when it becomes pathological, substantially curbs the epistemic agency of thos…Read more
  •  160
    This paper focuses on how experiences of trauma can lead to generalized fear of people, objects and places that are similar or contextually or conceptually related to those that produced the initial fear, causing epistemic, affective, and practical harms to those who are unduly feared and those who are intimates of the victim of trauma. We argue that cases of fear generalization that bring harm to other people constitute examples of injustice closely akin to testimonial injustice, specifically, …Read more
  •  129
    Dissolving the epistemic/ethical dilemma over implicit bias
    Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup1): 73-93. 2017.
    It has been argued that humans can face an ethical/epistemic dilemma over the automatic stereotyping involved in implicit bias: ethical demands require that we consistently treat people equally, as equally likely to possess certain traits, but if our aim is knowledge or understanding our responses should reflect social inequalities meaning that members of certain social groups are statistically more likely than others to possess particular features. I use psychological research to argue that oft…Read more
  •  124
    It has been suggested, by Michael Bishop, that empirical evidence on human reasoning poses a threat to the internalist account of epistemic responsibility, which he takes to associate being epistemically responsible with coherence, evidence-fitting and reasons-responsiveness. Bishop claims that the empirical data challenges the importance of meeting these criteria by emphasising how it is possible to obtain true beliefs by diverging from them. He suggests that the internalist conception of respo…Read more
  •  119
  •  78
    Accessibilism and the Challenge from Implicit Bias
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3): 421-434. 2015.
    Recent research in social psychology suggests that many beliefs are formed as a result of implicit biases in favour of members of certain groups and against members of other groups. This article argues that beliefs of this sort present a counterexample to accessibilism in epistemology because the position cannot account for how the epistemic status of a belief that is the result of an implicit bias can differ from that of a counterpart belief that is the result of an unbiased response to the ava…Read more
  •  72
    Stereotyping: The multifactorial view
    Philosophical Topics 45 (1): 137-156. 2017.
    This paper proposes and defends the multifactorial view of stereotyping. According to this view, multiple factors determine whether or not any act of stereotyping increases the chance of an accurate judgment being made about an individual to whom the stereotype is applied. To support this conclusion, various features of acts of stereotyping that can determine the accuracy of stereotyping judgments are identified. The argument challenges two existing views that suggest that it is relatively easy …Read more
  •  46
  •  40
    Eyewitnesses are susceptible to recollecting that they experienced an event in a way that is consistent with false information provided to them after the event. The effect is commonly called the misinformation effect. Because jurors tend to find eyewitness testimony compelling and persuasive, it is argued that jurors are likely to give inappropriate credence to eyewitness testimony, judging it to be reliable when it is not. It is argued that jurors should be informed about psychological findings…Read more
  •  37
    Implicit Bias and Epistemic Oppression in Confronting Racism
    Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (3): 476-495. 2022.
    Motivating reforms to address discrimination and exclusion is important. But what epistemic practices characterize better or worse ways of doing this? Recently, the phenomena of implicit biases have played a large role in motivating reforms. We argue that this strategy risks perpetuating two kinds of epistemic oppression: the vindication dynamic and contributory injustice. We offer positive proposals for avoiding these forms of epistemic oppression when confronting racism.
  •  31
    Epistemic innocence and the production of false memory beliefs
    Philosophical Studies 176 (3): 755-780. 2019.
    Findings from the cognitive sciences suggest that the cognitive mechanisms responsible for some memory errors are adaptive, bringing benefits to the organism. In this paper we argue that the same cognitive mechanisms also bring a suite of significant epistemic benefits, increasing the chance of an agent obtaining epistemic goods like true belief and knowledge. This result provides a significant challenge to the folk conception of memory beliefs that are false, according to which they are a sign …Read more
  •  30
    The Bright Side of Memory Errors
    The Philosophers' Magazine 82 41-47. 2018.
    The paper discusses the epistemic benefits of cognitive mechanisms producing distorted memories. Aimed at a non-specialist audience.
  •  27
    How Stereotypes Deceive Us
    Oxford University Press. 2021.
    Stereotypes sometimes lead us to make poor judgements of other people, but they also have the potential to facilitate quick, efficient, and accurate judgements. How can we discern whether any individual act of stereotyping will have the positive or negative effect? How Stereotypes Deceive Us addresses this question. It identifies various factors that determine whether or not the application of a stereotype to an individual in a specific context will facilitate or impede correct judgements and pe…Read more
  •  26
    Accessibilism and the Challenge from Implicit Bias
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (3): 421-434. 2015.
    Recent research in social psychology suggests that many beliefs are formed as a result of implicit biases in favour of members of certain groups and against members of other groups. This article argues that beliefs of this sort present a counterexample to accessibilism in epistemology because the position cannot account for how the epistemic status of a belief that is the result of an implicit bias can differ from that of a counterpart belief that is the result of an unbiased response to the ava…Read more
  •  18
    Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.
  •  18
    Disclosure of Mental Health: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 26 (4): 333-348. 2019.
    PEOPLE WITH MENTAL HEALTH conditions are often required to address the question of whether they should disclose information about their mental health. Should they inform their employers, colleagues, friends, family, neighbors, and so on, that they have a mental health condition? Should they be encouraged by others to do so? There has been a recent move to promote disclosure as a way to increase the empowerment and decrease the self-stigma of people with mental health conditions. For instance, a …Read more
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