•  243
    Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement (edited book)
    Cambridge University Press. 2005.
    This volume provides an up to date and comprehensive overview of the philosophy and neuroscience movement, which applies the methods of neuroscience to traditional philosophical problems and uses philosophical methods to illuminate issues in neuroscience. At the heart of the movement is the conviction that basic questions about human cognition, many of which have been studied for millennia, can be answered only by a philosophically sophisticated grasp of neuroscience's insights into the processi…Read more
  •  107
    Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Theory of the Mind/Brain
    Journal of Philosophy 87 (2): 93-102. 1990.
  • Colour perception
    In Mohan Matthen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception, Oxford University Press Uk. 2015.
  •  18
    The Imagery Debate (review)
    Philosophical Review 103 (1): 172-175. 1994.
  •  52
    Over 35 years ago, Meltzoff and Moore (1977) published their famous article ‘Imitation of facial and manual gestures by human neonates’. Their central conclusion, that neonates can imitate, was and continues to be controversial. Here we focus on an often neglected aspect of this debate, namely on neonatal spontaneous behaviors themselves. We present a case study of a paradigmatic orofacial ‘gesture’, namely tongue protrusion and retraction (TP/R). Against the background of new research on mammal…Read more
  •  22
    In our target article, we argued that the positive results of neonatal imitation are likely to be by-products of normal aerodigestive development. Our hypothesis elicited various responses on the role of social interaction in infancy, the methodological issues about imitation experiments, and the relation between the aerodigestive theory and the development of speech. Here we respond to the commentaries.
  •  266
    In Consciousness Explained, Daniel Dennett presents the Multiple Drafts Theory of consciousness, a very brief, largely empirical theory of brain function. From these premises, he draws a number of quite radical conclusions—for example, the conclusion that conscious events have no determinate time of occurrence. The problem, as many readers have pointed out, is that there is little discernible route from the empirical premises to the philosophical conclusions. In this article, I try to reconstruc…Read more
  •  38
    The prevalence of synaesthesia depends on early language learning
    with Marcus R. Watson, Jan Chromý, Lyle Crawford, David M. Eagleman, and James T. Enns
    Consciousness and Cognition 48 212-231. 2017.
  •  27
    Synesthesia and learning: a critical review and novel theory
    with Marcus R. Watson, Chris Spiker, Lyle Crawford, and James T. Enns
    Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8. 2014.
  • This dissertation is motivated by the following question: Is the portrayal of mind/brain processes as representations--as entities that in some sense reflect, correspond with, or symbolize the world--particularily apt? Through detailed examples from the neuroscientific literature, with an emphasis on sensory processing, I argue that this way of viewing brain functioning is typically misleading. It depicts neural functioning as a bipartite process: first the production of a set of neural "calibra…Read more
  •  15
    The Imagery Debate (review)
    Philosophical Review 103 (1): 172-175. 1994.
  •  91
    More than Mere Colouring: The Role of Spectral Information in Human Vision
    with Martin Hahn
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (1): 125-171. 2014.
    A common view in both philosophy and the vision sciences is that, in human vision, wavelength information is primarily ‘for’ colouring: for seeing surfaces and various media as having colours. In this article we examine this assumption of ‘colour-for-colouring’. To motivate the need for an alternative theory, we begin with three major puzzles from neurophysiology, puzzles that are not explained by the standard theory. We then ask about the role of wavelength information in vision writ large. How…Read more
  •  42
    Who may I say is calling?
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (3): 517-518. 1986.
  •  30
    Just science?
    with Mary E. Windham
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2): 376-377. 1992.
  •  41
    More than mere coloring: The art of spectral vision
    with John Lamping
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1): 26-27. 1992.
  •  95
    Grapheme-color synaesthesia benefits rule-based Category learning
    with Marcus R. Watson, Mark R. Blair, Pavel Kozik, and James T. Enns
    Consciousness and Cognition 21 (3): 1533-1540. 2012.
    Researchers have long suspected that grapheme-color synaesthesia is useful, but research on its utility has so far focused primarily on episodic memory and perceptual discrimination. Here we ask whether it can be harnessed during rule-based Category learning. Participants learned through trial and error to classify grapheme pairs that were organized into categories on the basis of their associated synaesthetic colors. The performance of synaesthetes was similar to non-synaesthetes viewing graphe…Read more
  •  282
    A bat without qualities?
    In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays, Blackwell. pp. 345--358. 1993.
  •  53
    Introduction
    Biology and Philosophy 18 (1): 1-11. 2003.
    Nativists about syntactic processing have argued that linguisticprocessing, understood as the implementation of a rule-basedcomputational architecture, is spared in Williams syndrome, (WMS)subjects – and hence that it provides evidence for a geneticallyspecified language module. This argument is bolstered by treatingSpecific Language Impairments (SLI) and WMS as a developmental doubledissociation which identifies a syntax module. Neuroconstructivists haveargued that the cognitive deficits of a d…Read more
  •  40
    A question of content
    In Andrew Brook & Don Ross (eds.), Daniel Dennett, Cambridge University Press. pp. 206. 2002.
  •  399
    Of sensory systems and the "aboutness" of mental states
    Journal of Philosophy 93 (7): 337--372. 1996.
    La autora presenta una critica a la concepcion clasica de los sentidos asumida por la mayoria de autores naturalistas que pretenden explicar el contenido mental. Esta crítica se basa en datos neurobiologicos sobre los sentidos que apuntan a que estos no parecen describir caracteristicas objetivas del mundo, sino que actuan de forma ʼnarcisita', es decir, representan informacion en funcion de los intereses concretos del organismo.El articulo se encuentra también en: Bechtel, et al., Philosophy and…Read more
  • [Book Chapter] (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 1996.
  •  153
    Of Sensory Systems and the "Aboutness" of Mental States
    Journal of Philosophy 93 (7): 337-372. 1996.