• The phenomenology of clumsiness
    In Katherine J. Morris (ed.), Sartre on the body, Palgrave-macmillan. pp. 161--182. 2010.
  • Some problems of other minds
    In Talia Morag (ed.), Sartre and Analytic Philosophy, Routledge. 2023.
  •  6
    The Sartrean Mind (edited book)
    Routledge. 2018.
    Introduction to Global Military History provides a lucid and comprehensive account of military developments around the modern world from the eighteenth century up to the present day. Beginning with the background to the American War of Independence and the French Revolutionary wars and ending with the recent conflicts of the twenty-first century, this third edition combines fully up-to-date global coverage with close analysis not only of the military aspects of war but also its social, cultural,…Read more
  • Western Philosophy (edited book)
    with Malcolm Seymour, Trevor Green, Audrey Healy, J. D. G. Evans, Richard Cross, James Ladyman, W. J. Mander, Christine Battersby, A. W. Moore, Robert Stern, Christopher Hookway, Bob Carruthers, Gary Russell, Dennis Hedlund, Alex Ridgway, Alexander Fyfe, Paul Farrer, and Trevor Nichols
    Kultur. 2006.
  •  14
    Nature and Narrative is the launch volume in a new series of books entitled International Perspectives in Philosophy and Psychiatry. The series will aim to build links between the sciences and humanities in psychiatry. Our ability to decipher mental disorders depends to a unique extent on both the sciences and the humanities. Science provides insight into the 'causes' of a problem, enabling us to formulate an 'explanation', and the humanities provide insight into its 'meanings' and helps with ou…Read more
  •  12
    Sartre on the body (edited book)
    Palgrave-Macmillan. 2010.
    A who's who of Sartre scholars contribute to a collection of multidisciplinary perspectives from sociology, religion, and bioethics, on a hitherto neglected area of Sartre's philosophy.
  •  20
    Pain, Injury and First/Third-Person Asymmetry
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1): 125-136. 1996.
    Philosophers are wont to say that certain concepts, e.g., the concept of pain, exhibit ‘first/third-person asymmetry’, whereas others, e.g., the concept of injury, do not. The question I wish to address here concerns the status of such claims. They are commonly seen as nothing more than summary reports of how the relevant words are ordinarily used: as statements of ‘grammatical fact’. I want to argue against this view of their status.
  •  7
    Wittgenstein's Method (edited book)
    Wiley-Blackwell. 2004.
    This is a collection of the key articles written by renowned Wittgenstein scholar, G.P. Baker, on Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, published posthumously. Following Baker’s death in 2002, the volume has been edited by collaborator and partner, Katherine Morris. Contains articles previously only available in other languages, and one previously unpublished paper. Completely distinct from the widely-known work Baker did with P.M.S. Hacker in the Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigat…Read more
  •  7
    Wittgenstein's Method (edited book)
    Wiley-Blackwell. 2004.
    This is a collection of the key articles written by renowned Wittgenstein scholar, G.P. Baker, on Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, published posthumously. Following Baker’s death in 2002, the volume has been edited by collaborator and partner, Katherine Morris. Contains articles previously only available in other languages, and one previously unpublished paper. Completely distinct from the widely-known work Baker did with P.M.S. Hacker in the Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigat…Read more
  •  37
    Descartes' Dualism
    with Gordon P. Baker
    Routledge. 1995.
    Was Descartes a Cartesian Dualist? In this controversial study, Gordon Baker and Katherine J. Morris argue that, despite the general consensus within philosophy, Descartes was neither a proponent of dualism nor guilty of the many crimes of which he has been accused by twentieth century philosophers. In lively and engaging prose, Baker and Morris present a radical revision of the ways in which Descartes' work has been interpreted. Descartes emerges with both his historical importance assured and …Read more
  •  43
    Descartes's Dualism
    with Steven Nadler and Gordon Baker
    Philosophical Books 38 (3): 157-169. 1997.
  •  11
    Wittgenstein's Method: Ridding People of Philosophical Prejudices
    In Guy Kahane, Edward Kanterian & Oskari Kuusela (eds.), Wittgenstein and His Interpreters, Blackwell. 2007-08-24.
    This chapter contains section titled: The ‘Essence’ of a Philosophical Prejudice One Philosophical Task or Two? Techniques for Ridding People of Philosophical Prejudices.
  •  38
    Descartes unlocked
    with G. P. Baker
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy 1 (1). 1993.
  •  11
    Sartre
    In Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, Wiley‐blackwell. 2010.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Background: Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy Sartre's Account of Action Some Wider Background Assessment: Internal Relations Assessment: Human Beings and the Human World References.
  •  1
    Introduction
    In Gordon Baker (ed.), Wittgenstein's Method, Blackwell. 2004.
    This chapter contains section titled: Reading Wittgenstein Wittgenstein and Waismann Further Directions: History of Philosophy Envoi: AWittgensteinian Reading of Wittgenstein?
  •  81
    The `context principle' in the later Wittgenstein
    Philosophical Quarterly 44 (176): 294-310. 1994.
  •  14
    Sartre on Violence: Curiously Ambivalent
    International Philosophical Quarterly 45 (1): 121-122. 2005.
  •  68
  •  33
    Phenomenology, Naturalism and Science: A Hybrid and Heretical Proposal
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (1): 115-119. 2019.
    Volume 27, Issue 1, February 2019, Page 115-119.
  •  89
    Pain, injury, and first/third-person asymmetry
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1): 125-56. 1996.
    Philosophers are wont to say that certain concepts, e.g., the concept of pain, exhibit ‘first/third-person asymmetry’, whereas others, e.g., the concept of injury, do not. The question I wish to address here concerns the status of such claims. They are commonly seen as nothing more than summary reports of how the relevant words are ordinarily used: as statements of ‘grammatical fact’. I want to argue against this view of their status.
  •  99
    In defense of methodological solipsism: A reply to Noonan
    Philosophical Studies 45 (May): 399-412. 1984.
    Noonan's arguments against methodological solipsism ("methodological solipsism," "philosophical studies" 4, 1981) assumes that mental states are individuated by (russellian) content; this assumption entails that narrowness and wideness are intrinsic to mental states. I propose an alternative "extrinsic" reading of methodological solipsism, According to which narrowness and wideness are modes of attribution of mental states, And thus reject the doctrine of individuation by russellian content. Noo…Read more
  •  29
    Intermingling and confusion
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 3 (2). 1995.
    Abstract An understanding of Descartes? concept of ?confusion? is important both for making sense of his epistemological enterprise and for grasping his doctrine of the union of mind and body. An analysis of Descartes? notion of confusion is offered which is grounded in the (more or less controversial) theses that confused thoughts are thoughts, that confusion is confusion by a thinker of one thought with another, and that confusion both can and should be avoided or ?undone?. This analysis takes…Read more
  •  34
    Cartesian Reflections: Essays on Descartes’s Philosophy
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (5): 753-758. 2009.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  73
    Actions and the body: Hornsby vs. Sartre
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (3): 473-488. 1988.
  •  52
    Critical notices
    with Edward J. McKenna, Gordon P. Baker, John Cottingham, and Timothy Williamson
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 2 (1). 1994.