•  29
    We focus on a class of multicriteria methods that are commonly used in environmental decision making--those that employ the weighted linear average algorithm (and this includes the popular analytic hierarchy process (AHP)). While we do not doubt the potential benefits of using formal decision methods of this type, we draw attention to the consequences of not using them well. In particular, we highlight a property of these methods that should not be overlooked when they are applied in environment…Read more
  •  1272
    The main aim of this book is to introduce the topic of limited awareness, and changes in awareness, to those interested in the philosophy of decision-making and uncertain reasoning.
  •  691
    Transformative Experience, Awareness Growth, and the Limits of Rational Planning
    with H. Orri Stefánsson
    Philosophy of Science 89 (5): 939-948. 2022.
    Laurie Paul argues that, when it comes to many of your most significant life-changing decisions, the principles of rational choice are silent. That is because, in these cases, you anticipate that one of your choice options would yield a transformative experience. We argue that such decisions are best seen as ones in which you anticipate awareness growth. You do not merely lack knowledge about which possible outcome will arise from a transformative option; you lack knowledge about what are the po…Read more
  •  1662
    The Bayesian maxim for rational learning could be described as conservative change from one probabilistic belief or credence function to another in response to newinformation. Roughly: ‘Hold fixed any credences that are not directly affected by the learning experience.’ This is precisely articulated for the case when we learn that some proposition that we had previously entertained is indeed true (the rule of conditionalisation). But can this conservative-change maxim be extended to revisi…Read more
  •  22
    Model-Selection Theory: The Need for a More Nuanced Picture of Use-Novelty and Double-Counting
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (2): 351-375. 2018.
    This article argues that common intuitions regarding (a) the specialness of ‘use-novel’ data for confirmation and (b) that this specialness implies the ‘no-double-counting rule’, which says that data used in ‘constructing’ (calibrating) a model cannot also play a role in confirming the model’s predictions, are too crude. The intuitions in question are pertinent in all the sciences, but we appeal to a climate science case study to illustrate what is at stake. Our strategy is to analyse the intuit…Read more
  •  32
    Dynamic Decision Theory
    In Sven Ove Hansson & Vincent F. Hendricks (eds.), Introduction to Formal Philosophy, Springer. pp. 657-667. 2012.
    This chapter considers the controversial relationship between dynamic choice models, which depict a series of choices over time, and the more familiar static choice models, which depict a single ‘one-shot-only’ decision. An initial issue concerns how to reconcile the normative advice of these two models: Should an agent take account of the broader dynamic context when making a decision, and if so, in a sophisticated manner, or rather in a resolute manner? Further controversies concern what the d…Read more
  •  52
    Meta-uncertainty and the proof paradoxes
    Philosophical Studies 180 (7): 1927-1950. 2023.
    Various real and imagined criminal law cases rest on “naked statistical evidence”. That is, they rest more or less entirely on a probability for guilt/liability derived from a single statistical model. The intuition is that there is something missing in these cases, high as the probability for guilt/liability may be, such that the relevant standard for legal proof is not met. Here we contribute to the considerable debate about how this intuition is best explained and what it teaches us about evi…Read more
  •  18
    Why Time Discounting Should Be Exponential: A Reply to Callender
    Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (3): 284-295. 2021.
    According to Craig Callender [2022], the ‘received view’ across the social sciences is that, when it comes to time and preference, only exponential time discounting is rational. Callender argues that this view is false, even pernicious. Here I endorse what I take to be Callender’s main argument, but only in so far as the received view is understood in a particular way. I go on to propose a different way of understanding the received view that makes it true. In short: When time discounting is sui…Read more
  •  93
    We sometimes seem to face fundamental moral uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty about what is morally good or morally right that cannot be reduced to ordinary descriptive uncertainty. This phenomenon raises a puzzle for noncognitivism, according to which moral judgments are desire-like attitudes as opposed to belief-like attitudes. Can a state of moral uncertainty really be a noncognitive state? So far, noncognitivists have not been able to offer a completely satisfactory account. Here, we argue that…Read more
  •  49
    The distinct moral importance of acting together
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2): 505-510. 2022.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 104, Issue 2, Page 505-510, March 2022.
  •  468
    Levelling counterfactual scepticism
    Synthese 199 (1-2): 927-947. 2020.
    In this paper, we develop a novel response to counterfactual scepticism, the thesis that most ordinary counterfactual claims are false. In the process we aim to shed light on the relationship between debates in the philosophy of science and debates concerning the semantics and pragmatics of counterfactuals. We argue that science is concerned with many domains of inquiry, each with its own characteristic entities and regularities; moreover, statements of scientific law often include an implicit c…Read more
  •  1530
    The Repugnant Conclusion served an important purpose in catalyzing and inspiring the pioneering stage of population ethics research. We believe, however, that the Repugnant Conclusion now receives too much focus. Avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion should no longer be the central goal driving population ethics research, despite its importance to the fundamental accomplishments of the existing literature.
  •  312
    Modelling the Moral Dimension of Decisions
    Noûs 44 (3): 503-529. 2010.
    In this paper we explore the connections between ethics and decision theory. In particular, we consider the question of whether decision theory carries with it a bias towards consequentialist ethical theories. We argue that there are plausible versions of the other ethical theories that can be accommodated by “standard” decision theory, but there are also variations of these ethical theories that are less easily accommodated. So while “standard” decision theory is not exclusively consequentialis…Read more
  •  327
    Should subjective probabilities be sharp?
    Episteme 11 (3): 277-289. 2014.
    There has been much recent interest in imprecise probabilities, models of belief that allow unsharp or fuzzy credence. There have also been some influential criticisms of this position. Here we argue, chiefly against Elga (2010), that subjective probabilities need not be sharp. The key question is whether the imprecise probabilist can make reasonable sequences of decisions. We argue that she can. We outline Elga's argument and clarify the assumptions he makes and the principles of rationality he…Read more
  •  132
    Climate Science, The Philosophy of
    with Richard Bradley, Roman Frigg, Erica Thompson, and Charlotte Werndl
    Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2020.
    The Philosophy of Climate Science Climate change is one of the defining challenges of the 21st century. But what is climate change, how do we know about it, and how should we react to it? This article summarizes the main conceptual issues and questions in the foundations of climate science, as well as of the … Continue reading Climate Science, The Philosophy of →
  •  41
    How to be imprecise and yet immune to sure loss
    Synthese 199 (1-2): 427-444. 2020.
    Towards the end of Decision Theory with a Human Face, Richard Bradley discusses various ways a rational yet human agent, who, due to lack of evidence, is unable to make some fine-grained credibility judgments, may nonetheless make systematic decisions. One proposal is that such an agent can simply “reach judgments” on the fly, as needed for decision making. In effect, she can adopt a precise probability function to serve as proxy for her imprecise credences at the point of decision, and then sub…Read more
  •  211
    Choice models
    In Nancy Cartwright & Eleonora Montuschi (eds.), Philosophy of Social Science: A New Introduction, Oxford University Press. 2014.
  •  128
    There are at least two plausible generalisations of subjective expected utility (SEU) theory: cumulative prospect theory (which relaxes the independence axiom) and Levi’s decision theory (which relaxes at least ordering). These theories call for a re-assessment of the minimal requirements of rational choice. Here, I consider how an analysis of sequential decision making contributes to this assessment. I criticise Hammond’s (Economica 44(176):337–350, 1977; Econ Philos 4:292–297, 1988a; Risk, dec…Read more
  •  38
    Assessing ethical trade-offs in ecological field studies
    with Kirsten M. Parris, Sarah C. McCall, Michael A. McCarthy, Ben A. Minteer, Sarah Bekessy, and Fabien Medvecky
    Journal of Applied Ecology 47 (1): 227-234. 2010.
    Summary 1. Ecologists and conservation biologists consider many issues when designing a field study, such as the expected value of the data, the interests of the study species, the welfare of individual organisms and the cost of the project. These different issues or values often conflict; however, neither animal ethics nor environmental ethics provides practical guidance on how to assess trade-offs between them. 2. We developed a decision framework for considering trade-offs between values in e…Read more
  •  625
    In the biomedical context, policy makers face a large amount of potentially discordant evidence from different sources. This prompts the question of how this evidence should be aggregated in the interests of best-informed policy recommendations. The starting point of our discussion is Hunter and Williams’ recent work on an automated aggregation method for medical evidence. Our negative claim is that it is far from clear what the relevant criteria for evaluating an evidence aggregator of this sor…Read more
  •  67
    The Diversity of Model Tuning Practices in Climate Science
    Philosophy of Science 83 (5): 113-114. 2016.
    Many examples of calibration in climate science raise no alarms regarding model reliability. We examine one example and show that, in employing Classical Hypothesis-testing, it involves calibrating a base model against data that is also used to confirm the model. This is counter to the "intuitive position". We argue, however, that aspects of the intuitive position are upheld by some methods, in particular, the general Cross-validation method. How Cross-validation relates to other prominent Class…Read more
  •  746
    Climate Models, Calibration, and Confirmation
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (3): 609-635. 2013.
    We argue that concerns about double-counting—using the same evidence both to calibrate or tune climate models and also to confirm or verify that the models are adequate—deserve more careful scrutiny in climate modelling circles. It is widely held that double-counting is bad and that separate data must be used for calibration and confirmation. We show that this is far from obviously true, and that climate scientists may be confusing their targets. Our analysis turns on a Bayesian/relative-likelih…Read more
  •  172
    The Scientist qua Policy Advisor Makes Value Judgments
    Philosophy of Science 79 (5): 893-904. 2012.
    Richard Rudner famously argues that the communication of scientific advice to policy makers involves ethical value judgments. His argument has, however, been rightly criticized. This article revives Rudner’s conclusion, by strengthening both his lines of argument: we generalize his initial assumption regarding the form in which scientists must communicate their results and complete his ‘backup’ argument by appealing to the difference between private and public decisions. Our conclusion that scie…Read more
  •  13
    No Title available: Reviews
    Economics and Philosophy 25 (2): 236-242. 2009.
  •  114
    Uncertainty, Learning, and the “Problem” of Dilation
    Erkenntnis 79 (6): 1287-1303. 2013.
    Imprecise probabilism—which holds that rational belief/credence is permissibly represented by a set of probability functions—apparently suffers from a problem known as dilation. We explore whether this problem can be avoided or mitigated by one of the following strategies: (a) modifying the rule by which the credal state is updated, (b) restricting the domain of reasonable credal states to those that preclude dilation
  •  30
    Review of Husain Sarkar, Group Rationality in Scientific Research (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (10). 2007.
  •  106
    I focus my discussion on the well-known Ellsberg paradox. I find good normative reasons for incorporating non-precise belief, as represented by sets of probabilities, in an Ellsberg decision model. This amounts to forgoing the completeness axiom of expected utility theory. Provided that probability sets are interpreted as genuinely indeterminate belief, such a model can moreover make the “Ellsberg choices” rationally permissible. Without some further element to the story, however, the model does…Read more