The focus of this project, Moral Realism: From Metaphysics To Ethics As Action, is to show that the effort to ground ethics in metaphysics is profoundly misguided. Various accounts of moral realism are discussed as leading examples of the effort to support the authority of ethics by means of metaphysical realism. These views require adherance both to the theses of globalism and precision which jointly imply the construction of ethics as system of thought split between the first-order and second-…
Read moreThe focus of this project, Moral Realism: From Metaphysics To Ethics As Action, is to show that the effort to ground ethics in metaphysics is profoundly misguided. Various accounts of moral realism are discussed as leading examples of the effort to support the authority of ethics by means of metaphysical realism. These views require adherance both to the theses of globalism and precision which jointly imply the construction of ethics as system of thought split between the first-order and second-order levels of inquiry. Such a split results in a characterization of moral life which is phenomenologically inappropriate. Furthermore, these various accounts of moral realism are unable to account for the historical character of moral traditions. ;After the consideration of leading accounts of moral realism and the flaws found therein, the focus shifts to a consideration of the tradition-based approach to ethics championed by Alasdair MacIntyre. Although the MacIntyrean moral life approach provides an understanding of the historicality of moral life, his view still remains embedded in the metaphysical project. Ultimately, there is no way to consistently maintain a belief in metaphysical truth while holding to the tradition-embodied character of moral thought. ;Finally, the inquiry takes a postmetaphysical turn by asserting the need for an account of the imaginative transcendentals which ground the seriousness of the moral life without a recourse to the metaphysical project. Upon reflection on various of the writings of William James, the project concludes with the view that moral realism ought to be seen as just such an imaginative transcendental