Kenneth Knies

I argue that Husserl’s manuscripts on intersubjectivity discover a decisive role for self-movement in the constitution of the shared world. I explore two complementary constitutive functions. The first enables empathetic apperception by closing the divergence in sense between the original ego, which does not find itself at a location, and the alter ego, which is found over there. By traversing distances with its organically articulated Leibkörper, the original ego establishes an analogy between self-movement and thing-movement that guides the recognition of another ego in space. The second accounts for the exchangeability of perspectives between differently located subjects. The restricted motility of the Leibkörper is discovered against the background of ideal but motivated possibilities of going to any distant perspective. These possibilities are rooted in the purely kinaesthetic potential of the Leib. To inhabit another perspective need not involve changing the world. This evidence underlies the Weltanschauung according to which what appears from the other’s perspective is a possible appearance for me. Taken together, these two constitutive functions show how self-movement discloses a definite but accidental location from which the ego shares the world.

Shedding new light on the theme of "crisis" in Husserl's phenomenology, this book reflects on the experience of awakening to one's own naïveté. Beginning from everyday examples, Knies examines how this awakening makes us culpable for not having noticed what was noticeable. He goes on to apply this examination to fundamental issues in phenomenology, arguing that the appropriation of naïve life has a different structure from the reflection on pre-reflective life. Husserl's work on the "crisis" is presented as an attempt to integrate this appropriation into a systematic transcendental philosophy. Crisis and Husserlian Phenomenology brings Husserl into dialogue with other key thinkers in Continental philosophy such as Descartes, Kant, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Derrida. It is suitable for students and scholars alike, especially those interested in subjectivity, responsibility and the philosophy of history.

Husserl’s reflections on the European crisis appear philosophically confused and politically counterproductive. After acknowledging this appearance, I make a case for their continued philosophical and political importance. I attempt to resolve philosophical confusion by clarifying the attitude that addresses the crisis as the ‘attitude of the phenomenologist’ and distinguishing this from the phenomenological attitude. The former contends with problems pertaining to phenomenology as a cultural structure. I show how Husserl’s conception of a ‘European crisis’ results from confronting one such problem. After outlining what Husserl means by ‘Europe,’ I assess the relevance of the concept to the critique of Western imperialism. I argue that Husserl’s program of Europeanization opposes ethnocentrism and cultural imperialism, but remains within the framework of an unwarranted European exceptionalism. I suggest that the political and historical concepts central to Husserl’s engagement with the crisis problematic need not determine the problematic itself, which deserves further thinking through.

I argue that the strict account of techne agreed to by Socrates and Thrasymachus in Republic I provides a useful framework for addressing a central question of the dialogue as a whole: how philosophy might belong to the polis. This view depends upon three positions: 1) that Plato invites us to interpret the relationship between techne and polis outside the terms of the city-soul analogy, 2) that the strict account contributes to a compelling description of vocational work, and 3) that this description determines what Socrates means by a true polis, and thus frames the problem of philosophy’s political inclusion.

I argue that the teleological-historical reflections of the Crisis are an effort to clarify what Husserl calls the ultimate presuppositions of phenomenology. I begin by describing the kind of presuppositions revealed in natural-attitude and phenomenological reflection. I then consider how the ultimate presuppositions become problematic for Husserl. After clarifying the distinction between these presuppositions and those already handled by the reduction, I consider the appropriateness of the new reflections Husserl undertakes in order to address them

ABSTRACTThis paper presents Husserl’s concept of Europe as a postulate of phenomenological reason. I begin by showing that a certain interpretation of history is necessary in order for phenomenology to be possible as science. I then show how Husserl’s concept of Europe enables this interpretation. Working with a general definition of postulation that brings Husserl into conversation with Kant, I examine the motives and truth conditions for asserting that Europe is what Husserl claims it to be. I highlight the critical import of Husserl’s concept by identifying three criteria it establishes for authentically European history: denationalization, renaissance and Europeanization. I conclude by considering the inherently controversial nature of “Europe” and outline the space for a contest of concepts that would serve the same theoretical–practical function.

After identifying a crisis in our contemporary understanding of the relationship between philosophy and politics, the author carries out a clarification of three modalities of political expression: the slogan, commentary, and criticism, differentiating them all from the phenomenological expression through which they are disclosed. The essay argues that only through a principled stance against a relativism that would subordinate philosophical consciousness to political context does it become possible to explicate political meaning and enhance our understanding of political practice. The author uses these reflections as an occasion to revisit the political thought of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Paul Sartre, consulting the former on the question of political language and the latter on the essential meaning-structures of praxis. The essay concludes with a reevaluation of Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason outside the rubric of critical theory.