•  222
    Is the third man argument an inconsistent triad?
    Philosophical Quarterly 20 (81): 378-380. 1970.
    To understand the tma we should follow a rule of polemical force as well as a rule of validity. Following just the latter vlastos renders the explicit theory of forms and the two suppressed premises as an inconsistent triad. But the rule of polemical force indicates that the explicit theory is ambivalent. Just one f-Ness must be the basis, Either for any f thing being f, Or for any set of f things being just that set. It cannot be the basis for all f things being f
  •  127
    New books (review)
    with Bernard Mayo, G. J. Whitrow, G. C. Nerlich, and T. R. Miles
    Mind 70 (277): 107-117. 1961.
  •  65
    Doer and doing
    Mind 69 (275): 361-371. 1960.
  •  60
    Critical notices (review)
    Mind 71 (281): 117-123. 1962.
  •  41
  •  31
    The complete reality of substance
    Mind 91 (363): 377-397. 1982.
  •  24
  •  22
    McTaggart's Paradox: Two Parodies
    Philosophy 56 (217). 1981.
    To be truly provocative and outrageous the superior philosophical sophistry will commonly possess four somewhat adventitious features. I shall rate it as classic if it has all four. First, and least adventitiously, the argument will be crisp and initially seductive. Second, by the standard the sophistry sets direct rebuttal will be laborious and diffuse. Third, the recipe for the latter will prescribe that we pick out some hitherto unarticulated logical principle such that if the principle be tr…Read more
  •  22
    Can and Might
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1). 1971.
    Against Richard Taylor's position (Action and Purpose,Prentice Hall,1966) that there is some further factor in agency that in one of its roles supplements the contingency of an action that is freely performed
  •  22
    Image-Talk: The Myth in the Mirror
    Philosophy 67 (260). 1992.
    A mirror image is not an image of a thing seen, but that thing seen in a different perspective.
  •  20
    McTaggart, Mereology, Substance and Change
    Dialogue 21 (1): 57-78. 1982.
    McTaggart maintained that, without the kind of change which events undergo in passing from the future through the present into the past, how things are would be fundamentally different from how they appear. More particularly Without A-change there could be no change at all. Without any change there could be no time. Without A-change there could be no time.
  •  20
    Choice and Chance
    with C. A. Campbell
    Philosophical Quarterly 13 (50): 85. 1963.
  •  20
    McTaggart's Paradox: Two Parodies
    Philosophy 56 (217): 333-348. 1981.
    To be truly provocative and outrageous the superior philosophical sophistry will commonly possess four somewhat adventitious features. I shall rate it as classic if it has all four. First, and least adventitiously, the argument will be crisp and initially seductive. Second, by the standard the sophistry sets direct rebuttal will be laborious and diffuse. Third, the recipe for the latter will prescribe that we pick out some hitherto unarticulated logical principle such that if the principle be tr…Read more
  •  20
    The role of imagination, rule-operations, and atmosphere in Wittgenstein's language-games
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 10 (1-4). 1967.
    Wittgenstein argues that understanding a language consists of mastery of techniques for playing language?games rather than some sort of mental state or episode such as mental imagery, rule invocation, or atmosphere investing our experience of words. His elimination of the three mentalistic alternatives presupposes the peculiar distinction, or its virtual lack, between speaker and listener presupposed by his positive claim, instead of establishing the latter. This paper vindicates the episodic na…Read more
  •  19
    Past and future
    Philosophical Quarterly 17 (69): 317-333. 1967.
  •  19
    Being in Time (review)
    International Studies in Philosophy 25 (3): 114-115. 1993.
  •  16
    Image-Talk: The Myth in the Mirror: Discussion
    Philosophy 67 (260): 241-246. 1992.
  •  16
    Rule and reality
    Philosophical Quarterly 11 (43): 145-157. 1961.
  •  15
    Ifs as labels on cans
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (June): 257-279. 1980.
  •  14
  •  14
    A deterministic windmill
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41 (2). 1963.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  14
    Referential Indentifiers
    American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (3). 1964.
  •  13
    The Trinitarian Vision of P. F. Strawson
    Philosophy Research Archives 1164 745-771. 1976.
    Along with more frequently discussed theses, Strawson in his Chapter on Persons has maintained that the perceptual experience of the same subject could be causally dependent upon a multiplicity of bodies. But, without drastic revision, his effort to show in illustration that the visual experience of one subject might causally depend upon three different bodies is too fraught with difficulty to lend coherent support. When the difficulties are removed by revision, the truth of the thesis depends u…Read more
  •  12