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663Zahavi versus Brentano: A rejoinderPSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12. 2006.Dan Zahavi has argued persuasively that some versions of self- representationalism are implausible on phenomenological and dialectical grounds: they fail to make sense of primitive self-knowledge and lead to an infinite regress. Zahavi proposes an alternative view of ubiquitous prereflective self-consciousness
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560Millikan and her critics (edited book)Wiley. 2013.Millikan and Her Critics offers a unique critical discussion of Ruth Millikan's highly regarded, influential, and systematic contributions to philosophy of mind and language, philosophy of biology, epistemology, and metaphysics. These newly written contributions present discussion from some of the most important philosophers in the field today and include replies from Millikan herself.
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293The logic of phenomenal transparencySoochow Journal of Philosophical Studies 2007 (16): 181-195. 2007.This paper explores the logical consequences of the the thesis that all of the essential properties of consciousness can be known introspectively (Completeness, called "Strong Transparency" in the paper, following D.M. Armstrong's older terminology). It is argued that it can be known introspectively that consciousness does not have complete access to its essential properties; and it is show how this undermines conceivability arguments for dualism.
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249Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness (edited book)MIT Press. 2006.Leading theorists examine the self-representational theory of consciousness as an alternative to the two dominant reductive theories of consciousness, the ..
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149Husserl’s hyletic data and phenomenal consciousnessPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3): 501-519. 2013.In the Logical Investigations, Ideas I and many other texts, Husserl maintains that perceptual consciousness involves the intentional “animation” or interpretation of sensory data or hyle, e.g., “color-data,” “tone-data,” and algedonic data. These data are not intrinsically representational nor are they normally themselves objects of representation, though we can attend to them in reflection. These data are “immanent” in consciousness; they survive the phenomenological reduction. They partly gro…Read more
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112Berkeley's theory of meaning in alciphron VIIBritish Journal for the History of Philosophy 17 (1). 2009.
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103Demea's a priori Theistic ProofHume Studies 29 (1): 99-123. 2003.Hume's examination of the causal maxim in 1.3.3 of A Treatise of Human Nature can be considered, at least in part, a thinly veiled critique of the cosmological argument, attacking as it does the privileged status of the principle upon which that proof rests. As well, Hume's remarks on the impossibility of demonstrating matters of fact a priori in Part 3 of Section 12 of An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding clearly strike at the heart of the ontological argument, even if not explicitly. Unfo…Read more
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102I Am a Strange Loop (review)Philosophical Psychology 24 (6): 861-865. 2011.Philosophical Psychology, Volume 0, Issue 0, Page 1-5, Ahead of Print
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91Berkeley's theory of operative language in the manuscript introductionBritish Journal for the History of Philosophy 11 (2). 2003.(2003). Berkeley's theory of operative language in the Manuscript Introduction. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 271-301. doi: 10.1080/09608780320001047877
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88The integrated information theory of consciousness: A case of mistaken identityBehavioral and Brain Sciences 45. 2022.Giulio Tononi's integrated information theory (IIT) proposes explaining consciousness by directly identifying it with integrated information. We examine the construct validity of IIT's measure of consciousness,phi(Φ), by analyzing its formal properties, its relation to key aspects of consciousness, and its co-variation with relevant empirical circumstances. Our analysis shows that IIT's identification of consciousness with the causal efficacy with which differentiated networks accomplish global …Read more
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69Neo-Cartesianism and the expanded problem of animal sufferingInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 94 (2): 177-198. 2023.Several well-known theodicies, whatever their merits, seem to make little sense of animal suffering. Here we argue that the problem of animal suffering has more layers than has generally been acknowledged in the literature and thus poses an even greater challenge to traditional Judeo-Christian Theism than is normally thought. However, the Neo-Cartesian (NC) defence would succeed in defanging this Expanded Problem of Animal Suffering. Several contemporary philosophers have suggested that recent e…Read more
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69Self-representational Approaches to Consciousness (edited book)Bradford. 2006.Leading theorists examine the self-representational theory of consciousness as an alternative to the two dominant reductive theories of consciousness, the representational theory of consciousness and the higher-order monitoring theory. In this pioneering collection of essays, leading theorists examine the self-representational theory of consciousness, which holds that consciousness always involves some form of self-awareness. The self-representational theory of consciousness stands as an alterna…Read more
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66Against Neo-Cartesianism: Neurofunctional Resilience and Animal PainPhilosophical Psychology 34 (4): 474-501. 2021.Several influential philosophers and scientists have advanced a framework, often called Neo-Cartesianism (NC), according to which animal suffering is merely apparent. Drawing upon contemporary neuroscience and philosophy of mind, Neo-Cartesians challenge the mainstream position we shall call Evolutionary Continuity (EC), the view that humans are on a nonhierarchical continuum with other species and are thus not likely to be unique in consciously experiencing negative pain affect. We argue that s…Read more
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59Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness & Projective GeometryReview of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (2): 365-396. 2022.We argue that the projective geometrical component of the Projective Consciousness Model can account for key aspects of pre-reflective self-consciousness and can relate PRSC intelligibly to another signal feature of subjectivity: perspectival character or point of view. We illustrate how the projective geometrical versions of the concepts of duality, reciprocity, polarity, closedness, closure, and unboundedness answer to salient aspects of the phenomenology of PRSC. We thus show that the same ma…Read more
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56The intentionality of consciousness and consciousness of intentionalityIn G Forrai (ed.), Intentionality: Past and Future, Amsterdam/new York: Rodopi. 2005.Some philosophers think that intentionality is ontologically distinct from phenomenal consciousness; call this the Thesis of Separation. Terence Horgan and John Tienson (2002, p. 520) call this.
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54Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions: Thomas Metzinger ; Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000, x + 350 pp., $52.00 , ISBN 0-262-13370-9 (review)Minds and Machines 15 (1): 106-112. 2005.
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48A Brief on Husserl and Bayesian Perceptual UpdatingAxiomathes 27 (5): 503-519. 2017.I aim to provide some evidence that Husserl’s description of perceptual updating actually fits very nicely into the Bayesian Brain paradigm, articulated by Karl Friston and others, and that that paradigm, in turn, can be taken as an excellent example of “Neurophenomenology”. The apparently un-phenomenological Helmholtzian component of the Bayesian Brain paradigm, according to which what one consciously seems to see is a product of unconscious causal reasoning to the best explanation of one’s sen…Read more
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47Book review: The feeling of what happens: Body and emotion in the making of consciousnerss (review)Minds and Machines 14 (3): 391-431. 2004.
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47Headlessness without Illusions: Phenomenological Undecidability and MaterialismJournal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6): 190-200. 2020.I argue that there is a version of (quasi-Armstrongian) weak illusionism that intelligibly relates phenomenal concepts and introspective opacity, accounts for the (hard) problem intuitions Chalmers highlights (modal, epistemic, explanatory, and metaphysical), and undermines the most important arguments Chalmers deploys against type-B and type-C materialisms. If this is successful, we can satisfactorily account for the meta-problem of consciousness, mollify our hard problem intuitions, and remain…Read more
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43What Makes Us Think?: A Neuroscientist and a Philosopher Argue about Ethics, Human Nature, and the Brain: Jean-Pierre Changeux and Paul Ricoeur, translated by M. B. DeBevoise, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000, x+335 pp., $29.95 , ISBN 0-691-00940-6 (review)Minds and Machines 15 (1): 91-97. 2005.
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36Self-Acquaintance and Three Regress ArgumentsProtoSociology 36 368-412. 2019.The three classic regress problems (the Extensive Regress of states, the Intensive Regress of contents, and the Fichte-Henrich-Shoemaker Regress of de se beliefs) related to the Self-Awareness Thesis (that one’s conscious states are the ones that one is aware of being in) can all be elegantly resolved by a self-acquaintance postulate. This resolution, however, entails that consciousness has an irreducibly circular structure and that self-acquaintance should not be conceived of in terms of an ind…Read more
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36The integrated information theory of consciousness: Unmasked and identifiedBehavioral and Brain Sciences 45. 2022.In our response to a truly diverse set of commentaries, we first summarize the principal topical themes around which they cluster, then address two “outlier” positions. Next, we address ways in which commentaries by non-integrated information theory authors engage with the specifics of our IIT critique, turning finally to the four commentaries by IIT authors.
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18Unlimited associative learning and the origins of consciousness: the missing point of viewBiology and Philosophy 36 (5): 1-4. 2021.
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9The self-representational structure of consciousnessIn Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness, Mit Press. 2006.
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8The Paradoxes of Subjectivity and the Projective Structure of ConsciousnessIn Sofia Miguens & Gerhard Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity, Ontos Verlag. pp. 321-354. 2012.
Areas of Interest
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Philosophy of Religion |
General Philosophy of Science |
Self-Knowledge |
Reasoning |
Philosophy of Economics |
French Philosophy |