• In Praise of Gorgias
    Illinois Classical Studies 47 (2): 293-314. 2022.
    In this essay I use Socrates’s aside to Callicles at Gorgias 481c5-482b1 to argue that love is essential to philosophy on Plato’s conception. On my reading, Plato uses the drama of the dialogue to critique the discussion therein, against a standard for philosophy which is implicit in Socrates’s remarks. Plato suggests that Socrates’s exchange with Gorgias is the best of the three, since it best realizes the inseparable goals of pursuing truth and becoming more persuadable by reason. What make…Read more
  •  226
    Aristotle on Non-substantial Particulars, Fundamentality, and Change
    Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 106. 2024.
    There is a debate about whether particular properties are for Aristotle non-recurrent and trope-like individuals or recurrent universals. I argue that Physics I.7 provides evidence that he took non-substantial particulars to be neither; they are instead non-recurrent modes. Physics I.7 also helps show why this matters. Particular properties must be individual modes in order for Aristotle to preserve three key philosophical commitments: that objects of ordinary experience are primary substances, …Read more
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    Hypokeimenon versus Substance
    Review of Metaphysics 74 (2): 227-250. 2020.
  •  2
    Hypokeimenon vs. Substance
    Review of Metaphysics 74 (294): 227-250. 2020.
    Aristotle’s concept of subject, or hypokeimenon, has been understudied in scholarship, in part because, since Aristotle associates it with his concept of ousia or substance, discussion of hypokeimenon is often eclipsed by that of substance. It is often thought that Aristotle introduces hypokeimenon as the criterion for being a substance in his Categories. In this essay I argue that he does not, thus calling into question some entrenched views about Aristotelian substance. Divorcing hypokeimenon …Read more
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    Continuity and Mathematical Ontology in Aristotle
    Journal of Ancient Philosophy 14 (1): 30-61. 2020.
    In this paper I argue that Aristotle's understanding of mathematical continuity constrains the mathematical ontology he can consistently hold. On my reading, Aristotle can only be a mathematical abstractionist of a certain sort. To show this, I first present an analysis of Aristotle's notion of continuity by bringing together texts from his Metaphysica and Physica, to show that continuity is, for Aristotle, a certain kind of per se unity, and that upon this rests his distinction between continui…Read more