•  1
    A DNA Account of Propositions as Events
    The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 37 227-242. 1998.
    Michael Dummett has argued that antirealism requires a rejection of bivalence. However, his version of antirealism is not the only available one. In fact, it is arguable that his antirealism is not sufficiently antirealist and falls short of his intentions. On the basis of a study of the Indian Buddhist philosopher, Nāgārjuna, I think that a more complete and coherent kind of antirealism is possible, one that respects the phenomena of conventional ontology and retains the principles of classical…Read more
  •  29
    A DNA Account of Propositions as Events: Dummett, Nāgārjuna, Aristotle
    The Paideia Project Online: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1998. 1999.
    Michael Dummett has argued that antirealism requires a rejection of bivalence. However, his version of antirealism is not the only available one. In fact, it is arguable that his antirealism is not sufficiently antirealist and falls short of his intentions. On the basis of a study of the Indian Buddhist philosopher, Nāgārjuna, I think that a more complete and coherent kind of antirealism is possible, one that respects the phenomena of conventional ontology and retains the principles of classical…Read more
  •  971
    The Mind’s ‘I’ in Meditation: Early Pāli Buddhadhamma and Transcendental Phenomenology in Mutual Reflection
    Buddhist Philosophy and Meditation Practice: Academic Papers Presented at the 2nd International Association of Buddhist Universities Conference. 2012.
    This essay provides a condensed introductory ‘snapshot’ of just a few of the many and profound correlations existing between early (pre-Abhidhamma) Pāḷi Buddhism and Transcendental Phenomenology, by focusing on what is arguably the most central and essential ‘philosophical problem’ in both traditions: the true nature and significance of the ‘I’ of subjective intentional consciousness. It argues that the Buddhist axiom of ‘not-self’ (anattā) is by no means incompatible with the fundamental phenom…Read more
  •  46
    Investigating the Pāli suttas, compiled prior to the development of Abhidhamma, from a phenomenological perspective reveals an internally coherent and consistent doctrine/theory whose crucial theme is the intentionality and subjectivity of consciousness. Reductive interpretations tend to interpret the basic Buddhist principle of ‘non-self ’, and its correlative repudiation of the concept/conceit ‘I am’, as entailing a rejection of any genuine (phenomenological) meaningfulness for the term ‘I’ as…Read more