How are pictures to be individuated from other kinds of representations, such as linguistic representations? The traditional view is that a picture represents what it represents because it resembles it. Thus, the so-called “resemblance” theory has been the dominant view in understanding pictorial representation. More recently, however, the basis of this view has been brought into question; several philosophers have tried to provide the right theory of pictorial (or iconic) representations. Flint…
Read moreHow are pictures to be individuated from other kinds of representations, such as linguistic representations? The traditional view is that a picture represents what it represents because it resembles it. Thus, the so-called “resemblance” theory has been the dominant view in understanding pictorial representation. More recently, however, the basis of this view has been brought into question; several philosophers have tried to provide the right theory of pictorial (or iconic) representations. Flint Schier is one of them. He tries to explain pictorial representations in terms of what he calls “natural generativity” in his book, Deeper Into Pictures. In this paper, I will raise a new problem that has never been debated before. Specifically, I will argue that Flint Schier’s individuation of iconic systems is problematic. I will show a counterexample to his method of individuation and argue that he cannot avoid the problem without abandoning one of the core claims of his theory.