Kimberly Baltzer-Jaray

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called 'euphemism'. Euphemisms create emotional distance and thus provide a level of comfort and ease when discussing a topic that is sensitive, difficult, or disturbing. In some instances, euphemisms are intentionally used to sway people's opinions or emotions to a particular side, as in the example of politicians' referring to the anti‐abortion position as “pro‐life”, torture techniques as “enhanced interrogation”, or the non‐combatants civilians who die during armed conflict as “collateral damage”. Euphemisms are fallacious because they are intentionally used to conceal the truth and obscure any real meaning; they are soft language used to mask or downplay warranted emotional force. Being ambiguous or vague in meaning brands euphemisms as a type of weasel word. Using honest, direct language and making sure the neutrality deployed is accurate is the best way to avoid euphemisms and weasel wording.

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy, 'confusing an explanation for an excuse'. This fallacy occurs when there is an uncritical assumption that an explanation given for an action or event is an attempt to justify it. Sometimes this fallacy comes about when there is general confusion about the difference between an explanation and an excuse. Other times, we see this fallacy committed intentionally when someone is attempting to use an explanation of facts as some kind of justification or proof for an action. One of the best ways to avoid this fallacy is simply to ask someone if he/she is stating facts or justifying some event or action rather than assuming. Another way to avoid committing this fallacy is to listen carefully to what someone is saying, especially when the argument is rather emotionally charged.

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called 'homunculus fallacy' (HmF). The HmF was coined by Anthony Kenny in 1971, in his essay by the same name. Following Ludwig Wittgenstein, Kenny describes the fallacy as occurring when we ascribe to the brain attributes that can be ascribed only to the animal as a whole. Historically this fallacy is connected to the theory of vision or what is sometimes called the Cartesian theater. Someone might explain human vision by saying that when we look around at objects in the world, the light forms an image on the retinas of eyes and something or some little person (where the term homunculus comes from) in the brain looks at these as if they were images on a movie screen.

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called 'proving too much'. The proving too much fallacy has been committed when an argument can be used to also prove something false or leads to contradictory conclusions. An argument that proves too much demonstrates a lack of soundness, since sound arguments can only establish true conclusions, and thus when an argument can be used to prove false conclusions, it becomes evident that there is a flaw in its reasoning. The fallacy of proving too much is not really a single fallacy so much as a great tool for detecting faulty reasoning, since any argument that leads to a contradiction cannot be sound. There are a few forms this fallacy can take on such as when an argument leads to multiple contradictory conclusions.

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy, “unwarranted assumption”. Unwarranted assumptions are claims or beliefs that possess little to no supporting evidence, things we might take for granted as true, or just completely false ideas we inherited without reflection. When we reason using implicit assumptions or further propositions whose truth is uncertain or implausible, we commit the fallacy of unwarranted assumption and the truth of our conclusions is grossly affected. Prejudices and stereotypes are some common ways in which we make unwarranted assumptions. The key to preventing this fallacy is evidence: warranted assumptions have evidence and ways of demonstrating their truth with certainty. It is best to not hold something as true or applicable without proof that it is true and applicable. This implies that we need to assess our ways of thinking and belief formation critically.

Adolf Reinach began his education in phenomenology with the teachings of Theodor Lipps before encountering Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investigations in 1902. What attracted Reinach to the Logical Investigations was the philosophical realism he saw accompanying Husserl’s criticism of psychologism and discussions of the formal structures of meaning therein. However, shortly after Reinach and a number of the Munich Circle members began studying with him in Göttingen, it became clear that the position Husserl espoused was shifting into transcendental idealism. Reinach maintained a theoretical independence from Husserl while embarking on the richest kind of dialogue with his revolutionary texts and teachings. By bringing out the strengths of some of Husserl’s ideas and finding ways to repair the weaknesses of others, Reinach discovered new applications for the realism he found so attractive and significant in the Logical Investigations. I argue that this was how Reinach’s response to Husserl took shape and grew, and set the foundation for the version of phenomenology that Reinach would continue to build upon with his own students until he left for the battlefield of World War I. This article sets forth and explores Reinach’s realist response to Husserl by focusing on his expansion of the a priori, and his ontological work on essence and states of affairs – including his original contributions to jurisprudence.

Adolf Reinach and Gerda Walther were two figures of the early movement who gave phenomenological description to mystical and uncanny experiences; and, while the phenomenological approach each employs is slightly different, both commit to phenomenological description of the experiences of God and the uncanny, including the foreseeing of one’s death, in a manner that is open-minded and unprejudiced. In this chapter I will discuss the experiences of foreseeing and of God for both Reinach and Walther. I will rely on their first-hand accounts of such experiences, utilizing the battlefield notes of Reinach from WWI found in his Sämtliche Werke and the mystical experience Walther describes having in 1918 in her book Zum Anderen Ufer. In the end it will become clear that phenomenology is an approach for all kinds of experiences, even those that are most unconventional, and thus the potential for further and fresh research is great.

In this paper, we first investigate a bit of feminist and hermeneutical aesthetics. Building upon these theories, we expand the discussion of art to include the fleshy canvas.We argue that a feminist philosophy of art suggests a sound theoretical framework by which one can maintain that skin art is just that – art. In its contemporary practice, tattooing has become a new form of art, and feminist theory provides context for interpretation. The tattooed body may agitate conventional conceptions of fine art – but art evolves, and history makes this much clear. Definitions of art tend to develop, as does artistic practice. Artistic innovations subvert what is old and stale within the institutional art world, while art theory empowers that subversion and provides a context for the appreciation of art.

Contemporary scholars have generally labelled Adolf Reinach, a founding member of early phenomenology’s Göttingen Circle, a Platonist. Because Reinach conceives of states of affairs as neither real nor ideal, as involved with timeless essences and necessary logical laws, many have hastily concluded that states of affairs are Platonic entities. In this essay, I analyse Barry Smith’s argument that Reinach is a Platonist. Smith’s widely accepted argument often becomes utilised to show that Reinach and other phenomenologists, including Husserl, are Platonic realists (or, simply, Platonists). A closer look at Reinach’s text indicates, however, that he is notcommitted to Platonic realism