Kirk Besmer

In my comments, I address two issues that are important but not central to the paper under review here. First, I present a reading of the postphenomenological concept of multistability by going back to Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the primacy of perception. I conclude that assertions affirming the multistability of technologies should not be seen as merely empirical. Second, I address the adequacy of using the language of ‘empirical’ and ‘transcendental’ as a means to categorize exclusionary approaches in philosophy of technology.

In this paper, I seek to contribute to post-phenomenological descriptions of human-technological relations and the intentionalities exhibited in them by focusingon the intentionality exhibited in the use of a cochlear implant. To do so, I will use concepts developed by Don Ihde and further extended by Peter-Paul Verbeek to show that while post-phenomenological categories illuminate the intentional relationship of a cochlear implant wearer to her world, this relationship defies easy categorization. An examination of successful functioning with a cochlear implant will reveal a distinct form of technological embodiment and intentionality that confirms and extends previous post-phenomenological analyses.

In this paper, I pursue a postphenomenological analysis of navigating with GPS in an automobile. I argue that GPS use is essentially different from navigating with a map insofar as one need not establish nor maintain orientation and directionality. Also, GPS provides a disembodied, omniscient navigational perspective. These aspects stem from the fact that GPS relies on earth-orbiting satellites, thereby reinforcing the modern view of the space/place relation that privileges abstract space over concrete, lived places. Following a postphenomenological thesis that technologies are non-neutral mediators of human experience, I examine some important qualitative aspects of traveling with GPS.

This dissertation describes Merleau-Ponty's final view of phenomenology by following the theme of ideality through the itinerary of his thought. As is standard, I divide his career into three periods. Unlike most interpretations, however, I argue that the middle period is crucial for understanding the overall itinerary of his thought and provides the proper orientation by which Merleau-Ponty's ultimate claims about phenomenology can be adjudicated. ;In the first chapter, I examine the problem of ideality in Husserl's work. Originally motivated by the threat of relativism, Husserl's work was polarized by questions of ideality. In the second chapter, I describe Merleau Ponty's early account of ideality, which arises from his attempt to articulate a new transcendental aesthetic. In the early period, rational idealities are based on pre-predicative, perceptual experience understood in terms of the phenomenological concept of Fundierung. This account of ideality is incomplete, for it fails to account for higher-order idealities and the historical constitution of language. ;In the middle period, which I describe in Chapters Three, Four, and Five, Merleau-Ponty directly addresses these shortcomings by focusing on an account of intersubjective ideal structures and constitution, especially the historical constitution of language. Outlining the possiblity of novel expression is crucial to the middle-period account of language because with it Merleau-Ponty seeks to overcome a persistent problem in phenomenology, namely, the difficulty of rendering ordinary language transcendentally appropriate. Thus, Merleau-Ponty's middle period account of novel expression is nothing less than a re-writing of the transcendental moment. It also provides an alternative account of ideality, one based on the phenomenological concept of Stiftung. Ideality is now understood in terms of a diacritical development, internal to language itself, of a never-fully recoverable origin. The middle period represents a crucial extension of the early period and a transformation of Merleau-Ponty's understanding of phenomenology away from investigations into egological perceptual experience towards an active, intersubjective engagement with our philosophic tradition. ;In the final chapter, I indicate the influence of the middle period on Merleau-Ponty's late thought, particularly on many of the innovative concepts in the Visible and Invisible and describe his late account of ideality, phenomenology, and historical rationality.