Kirk Fitzpatrick

The sources that we have conveying information about the early Greek philosophers are far removed from the original texts. Manuscripts from the era were disseminated by scribes, making copies of a text. The text that formed the basis for the scribe was more likely than not a copy of a copy of a copy. Scribes are imperfect conduits of information. In addition to the challenges faced in ascertaining accuracy of the base text, there are errors that often occur in transcription of the base text. There are errors of omission: Homeoteleuton occurs when a transcription skips words because a subsequent word has the same or a similar ending. Homeoarchy occurs when the transcriber skips lines, because of the similarity of the beginning of the lines. Haplography occurs when the transcriber copies once a term that appears twice in the base text. There are errors of addition. Dittography occurs when the transcriber writes a term twice that appeared once in the base text. Contamination occurs when a transcriber inserts text that was not in the base text. There are errors of transposition. Metathesis occurs when a transcriber reverses letters, words, or phrases from the base text. Finally, but not exhaustively, there are errors of alteration. These errors occur when a transcriber attempts, deliberately or not, to make sense of the base text in the transcription.

The dissertation is an attempt to become more clear about akrasia or incontinence , and the relations among various accounts. In the first chapter, I attempt to distinguish akratic acts from other similar acts. Though I distinguish akratic acts, the description is problematic. It involves features that some philosophers reject as being involved in akrasia. Further, it involves features that some philosophers believe are inessential to akrasia. I argue that no set of features is both involved in all accounts of akrasia and sufficient for an akratic act. There is, however, a set of features common among the accounts: I identify a set of basic features. Though these features are not sufficient for an akratic act, they are involved in each account. ;In the second chapter, I demonstrate agreement and disagreement among six dfferent accounts. I show that the basic features are involved in each account. Also, I categorize the disagreements. I argue that philosophers disagree about: the frequency, the features of the objects involved, the features of the judgment, and the features of the action. ;In the body of the dissertation, I evaluate the cogency of six accounts. To do so, I contrast the basic features with each author's supplementary features. I accept an account, if all the supplementary features are supported by cogent argument. I begin with Plato's account in Protagoras and move to his account in Republic IV. I consider Aristotle's account in Nicomachean Ethics, VII.3. Finally, I evaluate the accounts of Donald Davidson in "How is Weakness of Will Possible," Alfred Mele in Irrationality , and Michael Stocker in Plural and Conflicting Values. ;In the final chapter, I explore Am6lie Rorty's thesis in "Where Does the Akratic Break Take Place." She argues that there are four types of akrasia: akrasia of direction, interpretation, irrationality, and character. I place the accounts in Rorty's taxonomy and conclude that my sample offers a cogent account of only three types. My sample does not offer a cogent account of akrasia of irrationality