1199Darwin and moral realism: Survival of the iffiestPhilosophical Studies 152 (2): 229-243. 2011.This paper defends moral realism against Sharon Street’s “Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value” (this journal, 2006). I argue by separation of cases: From the assumption that a certain normative claim is true, I argue that the first horn of the dilemma is tenable for realists. Then, from the assumption that the same normative claim is false, I argue that the second horn is tenable. Either way, then, the Darwinian dilemma does not add anything to realists’ epistemic worries.
515David Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism , pp. xi + 295 (review)Utilitas 27 (4): 487-490. 2015.