Koichiro Misawa

Approaches to studying the ‘social’ are prominent in educational research. Yet, because of their insufficient acknowledgement of the social nature of human beings and the reality we experience, such attempts often commit themselves to the dualism of scheme and content, which in turn is a by-product of the underlying dualism of reason and nature that has characterised modern thinking. Drawing largely on John McDowell’s argument, this paper attempts to illuminate the sense that nature, nurture and human nature are interconnected and that the capacity to be responsive to reasons is a necessary prerequisite for the essential nature of human beings as social and natural animals at the same time. It ends by acknowledging the importance of philosophy in the study of education as a primary discipline that highlights distinctive features of human beings that make us the kind of beings we are, and by briefly mentioning how we could do more than draw obvious but trivial ‘educational implications’ from McDowell’s argument.

The central thesis of this article is that the notion of second nature that John McDowell has reanimated has something of ethical and educational importance, thereby possibly extending the borders of the philosophy of education. The argument to this conclusion is the subject of serious consideration and criticism. The aim of this article is therefore to clarify the educational implications of the conception of second nature by responding to the three likely objections: (1) the charge of idealism, (2) the charge of anthropocentrism, and (3) the charge of triviality. Through critical discussions of these criticisms, it is made explicit that second nature, from the outset, illuminates every sphere of the lives of human beings. A lively appreciation of this leads to the conclusion that the issue of how we develop our world of meaning with the conception of second nature should come under the scope of serious philosophical discourse on education.

David Bakhurst's 2011 book ‘The Formation of Reason’ explores the philosophy of John McDowell in general and the Aristotelian notion of second nature more specifically, topics to which philosophers of education have not yet given adequate attention. The book's widespread appeal led to the symposium ‘Second Nature, Bildung and McDowell: David Bakhurst's The Formation of Reason’, which appeared in the first issue of the 50th anniversary volume of the Journal of Philosophy of Education in 2016. Despite its obvious educational relevance, whether and how Bakhurst's McDowellian line of philosophical argument shapes the domain of educational enquiry or discourse remains up for debate. The rich contributions of Sebastian Rödl, Paul Standish and Jan Derry help us confront this issue. Proceeding with an analysis that is partly explanatory and partly critical of the central aspects of their respective views, I try to show that the basic attraction of the McDowellian/Bakhurstian line of argument concerning educational thinking is that it enables us to address education in the proper context of the natural and the social. In other words, their depiction of a human being as a natural animal in a normative world allows us not to be perturbed either by the natural-scientific conception of the natural or by the social constructivist thinking of the social, both of which have occasionally distorted how education is addressed and therefore impoverished our understanding of education itself. I conclude with a brief word on the significance of continuing and advancing the conversation initiated by the symposium by noting two viable examples of future work.

This article examines the benefits and burdens of the debate between Paul Hirst and Wilfred Carr over a set of issues to do with philosophy and education specifically and theory and practice more generally. Hirst and Carr, in different ways, emphasise the importance of Aristotelian practical philosophy as an antidote to the theory-oriented confined method of ‘conceptual analysis’ that has haunted the philosophy of education. Despite their proper recognition of the irreducible character of practice to theory, they fail to provide a satisfying account of their interpenetrating relation. Hirst falls into error by fencing off ‘forms of theoretical knowledge’ from ‘forms of practice’; Carr’s dismissive attitude to theory is saturated with internal tensions in his own discourse. This article contends that what is left unaddressed both in Hirst’s and Carr’s arguments is the most fundamental sense of ‘social’, which is prior to relative differences in the standards of knowledge among societies and which reminds us that theory is not a socially disembodied enterprise. A lively appreciation of this point encourages us to see the prevailing outlook towards the relation between philosophy and education quite differently.

In philosophy, it is almost a platitude to argue that fact and value intertwine. However, in empirically oriented educational research, it is not. Hence, there is some affinity between logical positivism, which is no longer tenable in philosophy, and empirically based contemporary educational research in terms of assumptions each makes about “the given.” In this essay, Koichiro Misawa casts light on how fact and value intertwine by invoking the notion of “second nature” that John McDowell has reanimated. This will in turn prompt us to see the relation between nature and nurture, as well as between mind and world, quite differently and to discern two senses of “the given”: one is illusory; the other educational. Misawa concludes that the philosophy of education should and can take the lead in forming rigorous interdisciplinary studies of the human future with a certain sensitivity to the tight and complex interweaving between the empirical and the conceptual, or between the factual and the normative

ABSTRACT At the heart of our current environmental predicament lies the issue of our relationship with nature. Michael Bonnett’s educational rehabilitation of nature, which might be called a ‘metaphysical’ turn in nature-related issues, brings us back to the core question of educational-philosophical thinking: how we are to understand ourselves and our relation to the world. In this paper, by confronting his environmental philosophy of education with what John McDowell, in his debate with Hubert Dreyfus, terms the ‘pervasiveness thesis’ – that conceptual rationality in a relevant sense pervades human lives – I try to offer an analytical supplement to the notion Bonnett entertains: that a phenomenological project to ‘retrieve’ nature and ‘ecologise’ education can have massive implications for the character of philosophy of education and the whole enterprise of education. I also argue a confluence of their nature-related ideas adds an educational nuance to the traditional picture of human beings as rational animals.

Michael Bonnett has long attempted to rehabilitate the concept of nature, thereby challenging us to reconsider its profound implications for diverse educational issues. Castigating both ‘postmodern’ and ‘scientistic’ accounts of nature for failing to appreciate that nature is at once transcendent and normative, Bonnett proposes his phenomenology-inspired view of nature as the ‘self-arising’, which is bound up with the notion of ‘our experience of nature’. Despite its enormous strengths, however, Bonnett’s argument might obscure the ways in which the real issue involved in nature is addressed: the issue of our nature, which enables our experience of nature in the first place. In this paper, after reviewing Bonnett’s view of nature and considering his criticism of Richard Rorty’s assault on the reality of nature, I will try to show how the Aristotelian notion of second nature that John McDowell has reanimated can supplement Bonnett’s project and render plausible the idea that the naturalness of our sensibility is unique to human beings; through this approach, the issue of human nature can be located in discussions of nature at large and, connectedly, brought again within the scope of the philosophical study of education in the present-day intellectual climate that increasingly marginalises non-scientific, intellectual endeavours. I will also briefly reflect on the relevance of the notion of second nature to Stephen Boulter’s recently proposed idea of ‘education from a biological point of view’.

In this paper, I examine Steve Fuller’s “sociological” social epistemology that must be distinguished from its “philosophical” counterpart. Fuller’s sociological social epistemology can prompt deep philosophical analyses of the conditions for knowledge that themselves bear on what should count as knowledge. That is, it can be a vital prelude to developing an interdisciplinary investigation into educational issues. This paper looks at the three features that form an integral part of Fuller’s social epistemology, which is partly elucidatory and partly critical: naturalistic, normative, and organizational aspects. It goes on to explore whether and to what extent Fuller’s criticism of an “always already” thesis in philosophy and his idea of “knowledge management” afford an understanding of human knowledge in particular and human development in general. This paper concludes with an observation that Fuller’s social epistemology is flawed in some respects but nonetheless is of relevance to the philosophical study of education.

“What is the nature of the beings that we are?” is perhaps the most difficult question. The difficulty lies in our being a natural animal in a normative environment. In harmony with John McDowell’s conception of a naturalism of second nature, this paper claims that we should not rest satisfied with the predominant scientific picture in which the seeming rift between our animality and our rationality is to be resolved by detailed studies of empirically knowable facts about our animal modes of existence. Instead, appreciating the sui generis character of a distinctive mode of human engagement with the world is a necessary clearing of the ground and an essential first step toward addressing meticulously the above difficult question on human nature. The paper suggests that the human sciences in general and education studies in particular should start off not with disclosed first-natural facts but with a sensitivity to second-natural backgrounds that set the stage for the first-natural facts

The ever-growing development of modern science and its understanding of nature have disjoined the domain of the natural from the domain of the normative, accordingly disjoining nature from nurture and making the concept of human nature resemble an oxymoron. Yet, what is really at stake in the long-running nature-nurture controversy is human nature and the question of whether human nature is nearer to nature or nurture is fundamentally misplaced. This chapter casts light on the notion of ‘second nature’, through which we aim to appreciate the sense in which human beings are natural animals in a normative environment.This chapter first sketches out the current framework of the nature-nurture debate that is dominated by natural-scientific investigations and then maps in a very broad outline the shifting conception of nature in Western thought, from which the modern sense of nature and accordingly what we call the natural sciences sprang. After providing a brief overview of attempts in philosophy of education to resist such a natural-scientific domination, the chapter attends to the Aristotelian concept of ‘second nature’, which has become widely known mainly through the work of the contemporary philosopher John McDowell, in order to recast the nature-nurture controversy from the perspective of what does or does not make us the beings that we are, in and in relation to the realm of the natural and the realm of the normative. Spelling out some tenable and untenable ‘educational implications’ of the notion of second nature, this chapter concludes with some thoughts on the justification and future development of the detailed analysis of the idea of second nature, which illuminates the linkage between nature, education and the human condition.

How concerned should we be about the state and status of philosophy of education? To this familiar worry, I maintain that there is no need to worry. In this essay, I try to secure this conclusion, not by shoring up the authority and identity of the discipline, but by asking the fundamental question: Who is and should be the audience for philosophers of education, and what does philosophy of education owe to whom? I argue that to be worthy of that name, philosophy of education ought to have educational significance and continue being philosophical, requiring the discipline to serve the interests of all the three audiences—other philosophers of education, non-philosophical educators, and non-educational philosophers. Through a close analysis of several important scholarly materials concerning the range, quality and relevance of philosophy of education, I urge that working out its disciplinary nature in a broad context of philosophy makes the discipline capable of fulfilling that promise.

Paul Hirst’s philosophical ‘conversion’ from forms of knowledge to forms of social practices was largely prompted by his radical reappraisal of the philosophical underpinnings that had validated his classic conception of liberal education. The primary motivation for Hirst’s later works was to remedy his own neglect of practical reason, whose sharp distinction from theoretical reason he acknowledged he had failed to appreciate. There is much to commend in his ‘practical’ turn. The main challenge that remains, however, is that the social practices view is something of a ‘foundationalist’ two-part picture, where overwhelming priority is given to practical reason. I appreciate the importance of the two issues Hirst puts on the table, in his debate with Wilfred Carr particularly and in his later works more generally: the issues of cultivating phronesis and of making sense of the practical character of critical-reflective activities. But I argue that addressing these issues fully requires us to recognize that neither theoretical nor practical rationality can be intelligible apart from the other. To press the point home, I review the analogous debate between Hubert Dreyfus and John McDowell over whether to accept, and how to understand, the view that rational conceptuality in a relevant sense pervades not only deliberation and propositional thinking but also perception and embodied coping skills. I conclude by briefly considering the prospect that the legacy of Hirst and recent discussions around human nature, practical rationality, and the formation of reason will interactively enrich our philosophical-educational scholarship.