•  2
    Metazoa: Animal Life and the Birth of the Mind (review)
    The Philosophers' Magazine 94 108-110. 2021.
  •  9
    If Skill is Normative, Then Norms are Everywhere
    Analyse & Kritik 43 (1): 203-218. 2021.
    Birch sketches out an ingenious account of how the psychology of social norms emerged from individual-level norms of skill. We suggest that these individual-level norms of skill are likely to be much more widespread than Birch suggests, extending deeper into the hominid lineage, across modern great ape species, all the way to distantly related creatures like honeybees. This suggests that there would have been multiple opportunities for social norms to emerge from skill norms in human prehistory.
  •  33
    Animal cognition
    with Susana Monsó
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2021.
    Rewritten entry for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  •  22
    This introduction to the topical collection, Folk Psychology: Pluralistic Approaches reviews the origins and basic theoretical tenets of the framework of pluralistic folk psychology. It places special emphasis on pluralism about the variety folk psychological strategies that underlie behavioral prediction and explanation beyond belief-desire attribution, and on the diverse range of social goals that folk psychological reasoning supports beyond prediction and explanation. Pluralism is not present…Read more
  •  26
    The philosophy of animal minds addresses profound questions about the nature of mind and the relationships between humans and other animals. In this fully revised and updated introductory text, Kristin Andrews introduces and assesses the essential topics, problems, and debates as they cut across animal cognition and philosophy of mind, citing historical and cutting-edge empirical data and case studies throughout. The second edition includes a new chapter on animal culture. There are also new s…Read more
  •  19
    How to Study Animal Minds
    Cambridge University Press. 2020.
    Comparative psychology, the multidisciplinary study of animal behavior and psychology, confronts the challenge of how to study animals we find cute and easy to anthropomorphize, and animals we find odd and easy to objectify, without letting these biases negatively impact the science. In this Element, Kristin Andrews identifies and critically examines the principles of comparative psychology and shows how they can introduce other biases by objectifying animal subjects and encouraging scientists t…Read more
  •  3
    On Predicting Behavior
    The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 35 8-14. 1998.
    I argue that the behavior of other agents is insufficiently described in current debates as a dichotomy between tacit theory and simulation theory. I introduce two questions about the foundation and development of our ability both to attribute belief and to simulate it. I then propose that there is one additional method used to predict behavior, namely, an inductive strategy.
  •  1
    It’s common to think that animals think. The cat thinks it is time to be fed, the monkey thinks the dominant is a threat. In order to make sense of what the other animals around us do, we ascribe mental states to them. The cat meows at the door because she wants to be let in. The monkey the monkey fails the test because he doesn’t remember the answer. We explain animal actions in terms of their mental states, just as we do with humans. One of us has argued that our science of animal minds requi…Read more
  •  52
    Naïve Normativity: The Social Foundation of Moral Cognition
    Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (1): 36-56. 2020.
    To answer tantalizing questions such as whether animals are moral or how morality evolved, I propose starting with a somewhat less fraught question: do animals have normative cognition? Recent psychological research suggests that normative thinking, or ought-thought, begins early in human development. Recent philosophical research suggests that folk psychology is grounded in normative thought. Recent primatology research finds evidence of sophisticated cultural and social learning capacities in …Read more
  •  11
    How to Study Animal Minds
    Cambridge University Press. 2020.
    Comparative psychology, the multidisciplinary study of animal behavior and psychology, confronts the challenge of how to study animals we find cute and easy to anthropomorphize, and animals we find odd and easy to objectify, without letting these biases negatively impact the science. In this Element, Kristin Andrews identifies and critically examines the principles of comparative psychology and shows how they can introduce other biases by objectifying animal subjects and encouraging scientists t…Read more
  •  552
    Animal moral psychologies
    In John M. Doris & Manuel Vargas (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology, Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
    Observations of animals engaging in apparently moral behavior have led academics and the public alike to ask whether morality is shared between humans and other animals. Some philosophers explicitly argue that morality is unique to humans, because moral agency requires capacities that are only demonstrated in our species. Other philosophers argue that some animals can participate in morality because they possess these capacities in a rudimentary form. Scientists have also joined the discussion, …Read more
  •  126
    Animal cognition
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2010.
    Entry for the Stanford Encylcopedia of Philosophy.
  •  370
    Normative Practices of Other Animals
    In Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology, . pp. 57-83. 2018.
    Traditionally, discussions of moral participation – and in particular moral agency – have focused on fully formed human actors. There has been some interest in the development of morality in humans, as well as interest in cultural differences when it comes to moral practices, commitments, and actions. However, until relatively recently, there has been little focus on the possibility that nonhuman animals have any role to play in morality, save being the objects of moral concern. Moreover, when n…Read more
  •  57
    Why Bush should explain September 11th
    In Patrick Hayden, Tom Lansford & Robert P. Watson (eds.), America's War on Terror, Ashgate Publishing. pp. 29-42. 2003.
    There were various initial reactions to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and among those reactions were some contradictions. There were those who demanded an explanation for the attacks, and others who condemned attempts to explain as immoral or unpatriotic. Though President George W. Bush did make some rhetorical remarks that, I believe, masqueraded as explanatory, it appears that he agrees with the latter set.
  •  2790
    Chimpanzee Rights: The Philosophers' Brief
    with Gary Comstock, G. K. D. Crozier, Sue Donaldson, Andrew Fenton, Tyler John, L. Syd M. Johnson, Robert Jones, Will Kymlicka, Letitia Meynell, Nathan Nobis, David M. Pena-Guzman, and Jeff Sebo
    Routledge. 2018.
    In December 2013, the Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP) filed a petition for a common law writ of habeas corpus in the New York State Supreme Court on behalf of Tommy, a chimpanzee living alone in a cage in a shed in rural New York (Barlow, 2017). Under animal welfare laws, Tommy’s owners, the Laverys, were doing nothing illegal by keeping him in those conditions. Nonetheless, the NhRP argued that given the cognitive, social, and emotional capacities of chimpanzees, Tommy’s confinement constituted …Read more
  •  121
    Life in a Cage
    The Philosophers' Magazine 76 72-77. 2017.
    Personhood is not a redundant category, but a social cluster kind. On this view, chimpanzees have their own kind of personhood profile. Seeing that chimpanzees have a personhood profile allows us to argue that chimpanzees like Tommy are individuals who deserve rights under the law. If chimpanzee personhood is a matter of public policy that needs to be decided by society, then learning more about the person profiles of chimpanzees will be essential in making this case. As the public learns what …Read more
  •  320
    Chimpanzee Theory of Mind: Looking in All the Wrong Places?
    Mind and Language 20 (5): 521-536. 2005.
    : I respond to an argument presented by Daniel Povinelli and Jennifer Vonk that the current generation of experiments on chimpanzee theory of mind cannot decide whether chimpanzees have the ability to reason about mental states. I argue that Povinelli and Vonk's proposed experiment is subject to their own criticisms and that there should be a more radical shift away from experiments that ask subjects to predict behavior. Further, I argue that Povinelli and Vonk's theoretical commitments should l…Read more
  •  2
    Predicting Mind: Belief Attribution in Philosophy and Psychology
    Dissertation, University of Minnesota. 2000.
    There are two problems with many philosophical theories of the mind and language: they almost always focus exclusively on normal adult humans, excluding others such as children, people with autism, and animals, and they are often developed without regard to the relevant scientific research. In my dissertation, I explain why this is a problem. First, I argue that we should accept the existence of animal minds, and that we should use the methods of experimental psychology and cognitive ethology in…Read more
  •  184
    A review of Personhood, Ethics, and Animal Cognition: Situating Animals in Hare’s Two-Level Utilitarianism, by Gary E. Varner. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. xv + 336. H/b £40.23. and The Philosophy of Animal Minds, edited by Robert W. Lurz. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Pp. 320. P/b £20.21.
  •  563
    The Philosophers' Brief on Chimpanzee Personhood
    Proposed Brief by Amici Curiae Philosophers in Support of the Petitioner-Appelllant Court of Appeals, State of New York,. 2018.
    In this brief, we argue that there is a diversity of ways in which humans (Homo sapiens) are ‘persons’ and there are no non-arbitrary conceptions of ‘personhood’ that can include all humans and exclude all nonhuman animals. To do so we describe and assess the four most prominent conceptions of ‘personhood’ that can be found in the rulings concerning Kiko and Tommy, with particular focus on the most recent decision, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc v Lavery.
  •  279
    Interpreting autism: A critique of Davidson on thought and language
    Philosophical Psychology 15 (3): 317-332. 2002.
    Donald Davidson's account of interpretation purports to be a priori , though I argue that the empirical facts about interpretation, theory of mind, and autism must be considered when examining the merits of Davidson's view. Developmental psychologists have made plausible claims about the existence of some people with autism who use language but who are unable to interpret the minds of others. This empirical claim undermines Davidson's theoretical claims that all speakers must be interpreters of …Read more
  •  74
    Innovation and the grain problem
    with Anne Russon and Brian Huss
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (4): 422-423. 2007.
    Our concern is with Ramsey et al.'s method for identifying innovation. We show that either it yields false positives or the authors offer insufficient guidance for its application. To avoid these results, the authors need to modify the key or offer better guidelines for delineating input. Either choice requires addressing the processes that generate a behavior
  •  50
    Chimpanzee mind reading: Don't stop believing
    Philosophy Compass 12 (1). 2017.
    Since the question “Do chimpanzees have a theory of mind?” was raised in 1978, scientists have attempted to answer it, and philosophers have attempted to clarify what the question means and whether it has been, or could be, answered. Mindreading or theory of mind refers to the ability to attribute mental states to other individuals. Some versions of the question focus on whether chimpanzees engage in belief reasoning or can think about false belief, and chimpanzees have been given nonverbal vers…Read more
  •  98
    According to both the traditional model of folk psychology and the social intelligence hypothesis, our folk psychological notions of belief and desire developed in order to make better predictions of behavior, and the fundamental role for our folk psychological notions of belief and desire are for making more accurate predictions of behavior (than predictions made without appeal to folk psychological notions). My strategy in this paper is to show that these claims are false. I argue that we need…Read more
  •  63
    Explaining Terrorism
    The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 9 167-171. 2006.
    The official explanations the US gave for the September 11th terrorist attacks are not in fact explanatory, and there has been popular condemnation of those who attempt to offer causal explanations for the attacks. This paper is an investigation of the difficulty people have with finding and accepting explanations for acts they strongly condemn. Using research in the philosophy of mind and moral psychology, I distinguish between explanations for actual immoral behavior and explanations for ficti…Read more
  •  82
    Understanding Norms Without a Theory of Mind
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (5): 433-448. 2009.
    I argue that having a theory of mind requires having at least implicit knowledge of the norms of the community, and that an implicit understanding of the normative is what drives the development of a theory of mind. This conclusion is defended by two arguments. First I argue that a theory of mind likely did not develop in order to predict behavior, because before individuals can use propositional attitudes to predict behavior, they have to be able to use them in explanations of behavior. Rather,…Read more
  •  95
    Once upon a time, not too long ago, the question about apes and ethics had to do with moral standing—do apes have interests or rights that humans ought to respect? Given the fifty years of research on great ape cognition, life history, social organization, and behavior, the answer to that question seems obvious. Apes have emotions and projects, they can be harmed, and they have important social relationships