•  108
    On perceptual presence
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4): 439-459. 2011.
    In his book Action in Perception, Alva Noë poses what he refers to as the “problem of perceptual presence” and develops his enactive view as solution to the problem. Noë describes the problem of perceptual presence as the problem of how to conceive of the presence of that which, “strictly speaking,” we do not perceive. I argue that the “problem of perceptual presence” is ambiguous between two problems that need to be addressed by invoking very different resources. On the one hand, there is the p…Read more
  •  50
    Visual Contents: Beyond Reach?
    Philosophical Forum 46 (2): 193-204. 2015.
    Susanna Siegel argues that visual contents are rich: visual experiences represent a variety of properties, over and above mere colors and shapes, including, notably, kind properties, e.g., the property of being a pine tree. To argue her case, she makes use of the method of phenomenal contrasts, which involves choosing among different explanatory hypotheses to account for phenomenal contrasts between relevant experiences. I will argue that there is reason to question whether the method of phenome…Read more
  •  48
    Wilhelm Schapp on Seeing Distant Things
    Studia Phaenomenologica 15 395-412. 2015.
    In 1909, Wilhelm Schapp, a student of Edmund Husserl’s at Göttingen, defended his doctoral thesis, Beiträge zur Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung. In this text, Schapp argues that color presents things to the sense of sight by contributing a certain order, or form, that manifests itself in the orderly, predictable variation of perspectives, in the course of experience. He also argues that we do not visually perceive certain distant things, like a house far down in the valley, due to a lack of such …Read more
  •  41
    Constitutive strata and the dorsal stream
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (3): 419-435. 2014.
    In his paper, “The Dorsal Stream and the Visual Horizon,” Michael Madary argues that “dorsal stream processing plays a main role in the spatiotemporal limits of visual perception, in what Husserl identified as the visual horizon” (Madary 2011, p. 424). Madary regards himself as thereby providing a theoretical framework “sensitive to basic Husserlian phenomenology” (Madary 2011). In particular, Madary draws connections between perceptual anticipations and the experience of the indeterminate spati…Read more
  •  37
    Norman Sieroka: Leibniz, Husserl, and the Brain (review)
    Phenomenological Reviews. 2015.
    Norman Sieroka’s book is about “the systematic, structural relations between phenomenological and (neuro)physiological aspects of perception, consciousness, and time, with a specific focus on hearing” (p. 4), based on Leibniz’s and Husserl’s views. While Sieroka displays a great depth of knowledge in his discussions of these two philosophers, his main aims are not exegetic, but consist, rather, in casting new light on the said philosophical and interdisciplinary issues. However, the scope of his…Read more
  •  34
    Visual Field and Empty Space
    European Journal of Philosophy (published online): 403-411. 2018.
    In a paper titled “Seeing Empty Space,” Louise Richardson argues for the thesis that seeing empty space involves a certain “structural feature,” namely, “it [s] seeming to one as if some region of space is one in which if some visible object were there, one would see it” (SF; Richardson, 2010, p. 237). I will argue that there is a reason to question whether a structural feature such as SF is needed in order to visually experience empty space. I will also propose that the visual experience of emp…Read more
  •  30
    In his book The Significance of Consciousness, Charles Siewert argues that some of our phenomenal features are intentional features, because we are assessable for accuracy in virtue of having these phenomenal features. In this paper, I will, first, show that this argument stands in need of disambiguation, and will emerge as problematic on both available readings. Second, I will use Thomas Szanto’s recent ideas to develop a deeper understanding of the difficulties with Siewert’s argument. Szanto …Read more
  •  28
    Action and Variation in Perception
    European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4): 1364-1375. 2017.
    In her paper, ‘Action and Self-location in Perception’, Susanna Schellenberg argues that perceptual experience of an object's intrinsic spatial properties, such as its size and shape, requires a capacity to act. More specifically, Schellenberg argues that, to have a perceptual experience of an object's intrinsic spatial properties, a subject needs to have a certain practical conception of space, or a spatial know-how. That, in turn, requires self-locating representations, which locate the subjec…Read more
  •  27
    Phenomenology and Perceptual Content
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 57 (3): 402-427. 2019.
    Terence Horgan and John Tienson argue that there is phenomenal intentionality, i.e., “a kind of intentionality, pervasive in human mental life, that is constitutively determined by phenomenology alone” (p. 520). However, their arguments are open to two lines of objection. First, Horgan and Tienson are not sufficiently clear as to what kind of content it is that they take to be determined by, or to supervene on, phenomenal character. Second, critics have objected that, for their conclusion to fol…Read more
  •  25
    Fears as Conscious Perceivings
    Philosophia 46 (3): 747-760. 2018.
    Peter Goldie has argued for the view that the intentionality of emotions is inseparable from their phenomenology, but certain criticisms have revealed his argument as problematic. I will argue that it is possible to address these problems, at least in the case of the emotion of fear, thereby vindicating IPE, by appeal to a Husserlian version of the perceptual account of emotions, centered on the idea that the contents of perceptual experiences are fulfillment conditions. Fulfillment means the ac…Read more
  •  19
    Attitudes and illusions: Herbert Leyendecker’s phenomenology of perception
    Continental Philosophy Review 52 (3): 279-298. 2019.
    In this paper, I discuss aspects of Herbert Leyendecker’s 1913 doctoral dissertation, Towards the Phenomenology of Deceptions, which he defended in 1913 at the University of Munich. Leyendecker was a member of the Munich and Göttingen Phenomenological Circles. In my discussion of his largely neglected views, I explore the connection between his ideas concerning “attitudes”, e.g., of searching for, observing, counting, or working with objects, and the central topic of his text, perceptual illusio…Read more
  •  18
    Presence by Degrees
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (9-10): 125-138. 2018.
    In this paper, I argue for two claims. First, Alva Noë’s discussions of perceptual presence contain an ambiguity between what I refer to as ‘presence as absence’ (PA) and ‘virtual presence’ (VP). This ambiguity emerges in Noë’s solution to ‘the problem of perceptual presence’, or the problem of how to account for our perceptual experience of that which we ‘strictly speaking’ are not seeing. Second, his account of presence by degrees, i.e. his radical claim that many distant, out-of-view objects …Read more
  •  14
    In this paper, I sketch an account of emotion that is based on a close analogy with a Husserlian account of perception. I also make use of the approach that I have limned, viz., to articulate a view of the kind of “conflict without contradiction” which may obtain between a recalcitrant emotion and a judgment. My main contention is that CWC can be accounted for by appeal to the rationality of perception and emotion, conceived as responsiveness to experiential evidence. The conflicts in question c…Read more
  •  14
    Distant Things: A Closer Look
    Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 50 (3): 249-263. 2019.
    In a discussion of the constitutive role of colour in our visual perceptual experiences, Wilhelm Schapp centrally argues that we cannot visually perceive certain distant things, like a house seen far down in the valley. My main contention is that, in cases relevantly similar to Schapp’s, we do perceptually experience distant things, viz., as drastically “decayed” things, which are part of distant scenes. In doing so, we adopt towards them a kind of conservative “attitude.” The ideas of decay and…Read more
  •  13
    Phenomenological Reflections on Instincts
    Studia Phaenomenologica 18 109-128. 2018.
    The familiar Husserlian conception of fulfillment involves a contrast between the same content as being represented emptily and then fully, and also the idea that the empty givenness is rightly conceived in terms of anticipations of fullness. Since perceptual experiences provide a paradigmatic case of such fulfillment, I will call it “P-fulfillment.” Additionally, there is also the fulfillment of our wants, wishes, and desires. Taking wants as the paradigmatic case, I will call it “W-fulfillment…Read more
  •  5
    Asjade antusest tajus
    Akadeemia (1): 104-123. 2013.
    Edmund Husserl on tuntud kui fenomenoloogia rajaja ning möödunud sajandi ja käesoleva aja mõjukaimaid filosoofe, seda eriti kontinentaalses, kuid viimasel ajal ka analüütilises traditsioonis. Fenomenoloogia on filosoofia suund, mis uurib seda, kuidas esemed on meile kogemuses antud, laskumata metafüüsilistesse spekulatsioonidesse näiteks selle üle, kas materiaalsed asjad on olemas või mitte meie kogemusest sõltumatult. Niisuguse orientatsiooni raames on Husserl andnud panuseid mitmetesse filosoo…Read more
  •  5
    Materiaalse looduse konstitutsioon (Katkendid). II. Tlk. Kristjan Laasik
    with Edmund Husserl
    Akadeemia (2): 348-357. 2013.
    A translation, from German into Estonian, of § 15, and § 18, (a)-(c), of Husserl, E. (1952). Ideen zu einer Reinen Phänomenologie und Phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch. Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution (Husserliana, Vol. IV). (M. Biemel, Ed.) The Hague, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff. Translated title: “The Constitution of Material Nature.”
  •  4
    Materiaalse looduse konstitutsioon (Katkendid). I. Tlk. Kristjan Laasik
    with Edmund Husserl
    Akadeemia (1): 83-102. 2013.
    A translation, from German into Estonian, of § 15, and § 18, (a)-(c), of Husserl, E. (1952). Ideen zu einer Reinen Phänomenologie und Phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch. Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution (Husserliana, Vol. IV). (M. Biemel, Ed.) The Hague, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff. Translated title: “The Constitution of Material Nature.”