•  619
    Time, Change and Freedom: An Introduction to Metaphysics
    with Quentin Smith
    Routledge. 1995.
    First published in 1995. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company
  •  528
    The new tenseless theory of time: A reply to Smith
    Philosophical Studies 58 (3). 1990.
    Quentin Smith has argued (Philosophical Studies, 1987, pp. 371-392) that the token-reflexive and the date versions of the new tenseless theory of time are open to insurmountable difficulties. I argue that Smith's central arguments are irrelevant since they rest upon methodological assumptions accepted by the old tenseless theory, but rejected by the new tenseless theory
  •  292
    Russell, negative facts, and ontology
    with Silvano Miracchi
    Philosophy of Science 47 (3): 434-455. 1980.
    Russell's introduction of negative facts to account for the truth of "negative" sentences or beliefs rests on his collaboration with Wittgenstein in such efforts as the characterization of formal necessity, the theory of logical atomism, and the use of the Ideal Language. In examining their views we arrive at two conclusions. First, that the issue of negative facts is distinct from questions of meaning or intentionality; what a sentence or belief means or is about rather than what makes it true …Read more
  •  284
    Be Careful What You Wish For: A Reply to Craig
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1): 156-163. 2008.
  •  206
    McTaggart’s Paradox and Crisp’s Presentism
    Philosophia 38 (2): 229-241. 2010.
    In his review of The Ontology of Time, Thomas Crisp (Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2005a ) argues that Oaklander's version of McTaggart's paradox does not make any trouble for his version of presentism. The aim of this paper is to refute that claim by demonstrating that Crisp's version of presentism does indeed succumb to a version of McTaggart's argument. I shall proceed as follows. In Part I I shall explain Crisp's view and then argue in Part II that his analysis of temporal becoming, temp…Read more
  •  179
    Since McTaggart first proposed his paradox asserting the unreality of time, numerous philosophers have attempted to defend the tensed theory of time against it. Certainly, one of the most highly developed and original is that put forth by Quentin Smith. Through discussing McTaggart's positive conception of time as well as his negative attack on its reality, I hope to clarify the dispute between those who believe in the existence of the transitory temporal properties of pastness, presentness and …Read more
  •  159
    It is customary in current philosophy of time to distinguish between an A- (or tensed) and a B- (or tenseless) theory of time. It is also customary to distinguish between an old B-theory of time, and a new B-theory of time. We may say that the former holds both semantic atensionalism and ontological atensionalism, whereas the latter gives up semantic atensionalism and retains ontological atensionalism. It is typically assumed that the B-theorists have been induced by advances in the philosophy o…Read more
  •  151
    Personal Identity, Immortality, and the Soul
    Philo 4 (2): 183-194. 2001.
    The soul has played many different roles in philosophy and religion. Two of the primary functions of the soul are the bearer of personal identity and the foundation of immortality. In this paper I shall consider different interpretations of what the soul has been taken to be and argue that however we interpret the soul we cannot consistently maintain the soul is both what we are and what continues after our bodily death
  •  137
    The New Theory of Time (edited book)
    with Quentin Smith
    Yale Up. 1994.
    The Preface and the General Introduction to the book set the debate within the wider philosophical context and show why the subject of temporal becoming is a perennial concern of science, religion, language, logic, and the philosophy of ...
  •  105
    Is there a Difference Between the Metaphysics of A and B Time?
    Journal of Philosophical Research 26 23-36. 2001.
    Clifford Williams has recently argued that the dispute between A- and B-theories, or tensed and tenseless theories of time, is spurious because once the confusions between the two theories are cleared away there is no real metaphysical difference between them. The purpose of this paper is to dispute Williams’s thesis. I argue that there are important metaphysical differences between the two theories and that, moreover, some of the claims that Williams makes in his article suggest that he is symp…Read more
  •  105
    On the Experience of Tenseless Time
    Journal of Philosophical Research 18 159-166. 1993.
    Defending the tenseless theory of time requires dealing adequately with the experience of temporal becoming. The issue centers on whether the defender of tenseless time can provide an adequate analysis of the presence of experience and the appropriateness of certain of our attitudes toward future and past events. By responding to a recent article, ‘Passage and the Presenee of Experience’, by H . Scott Hestevold, I shall attempt to show that adequate analysis of tenseless time is possible
  •  88
    Presentism, Ontology and Temporal Experience
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 50 73-90. 2002.
    In a recent article, ‘Tensed Time and Our Differential Experience of the Past and Future,’ William Lane Craig attempts to resuscitate A. N. Prior's ‘Thank Goodness’ argument against the B-theory by combining it with Plantinga's views about basic beliefs. In essence Craig's view is that since there is a universal experience and belief in the objectivity of tense and the reality of becoming, ‘this belief constitutes an intrinsic defeater-defeater which overwhelms the objections brought against it.…Read more
  •  81
    Parfit, circularity, and the unity of consciousness
    Mind 96 (October): 525-29. 1987.
    In his recent book, Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit propounds a version of the psychological criterion of personal identity.1 According to the variant he adopts, the numerical identity through time of persons consists in non-branching psychological continuity no matter how it is caused. One traditional objection to a view of this sort is that it is circular, since psychological continuity presupposes personal identity. Although Parfit frequently denies the importance of personal identity, he c…Read more
  •  63
  •  62
    The Importance of Time is a unique work that reveals the central role of the philosophy of time in major areas of philosophy. The first part of the book consists of symposia on two of the most important works in the philosophy of time over the past decade: Michael Tooley's Time, Tense, and Causation and D.H. Mellor's Real Time II. What characterizes these essays, and those that follow, are the interchanges between original papers, with original responses to them by commentators. The wide range o…Read more
  •  58
    Shoemaker on the duplication argument, survival, and what matters
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (2): 234-239. 1988.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  58
    A defence of the new tenseless theory of time
    Philosophical Quarterly 41 (162): 26-38. 1991.
  •  57
    Absolute Becoming and the Myth of Passage
    Philo 7 (1): 36-46. 2004.
    In a recent paper, Steven Savitt attempts to demonstrate that there is an area of common ground between one classic proponent of temporal passage, C.D. Broad, and one classic opponent of passage, D.C. Williams. According to Savitt, Broad's notion of “absolute becoming” as the ordered occurrence of (simultaneity sets of) events, and Williams’ notion of “literal passage,” as the happening of events strung along the four-dimensional space-time manifold, are indistinguishable. Savitt recognizes that…Read more
  •  56
    Loux on Particulars: Bare and Concrete
    with Alicia Rothstein
    Modern Schoolman 78 (102): 97-102. 2000.
    Peer Reviewed.
  •  48
    Does the Russellian Theory of Time Entail Fatalism?
    Modern Schoolman 59 (3): 206-212. 1982.
    Peer Reviewed.
  •  48
    Particulars, positional qualities, and individuation
    Philosophy of Science 44 (3): 478-490. 1977.
    In this paper I attempt to show that an argument offered by Bergmann and Hausman against positional qualities and for bare particulars as individuators is unsound. I proceed by giving two ontological assays of an ordinary thing and showing that the entity that individuates on one assay--a bare particular--does not provide deeper ontological ground of individuation than the entity that individuates on the other assay--a positional quality. Since the argument for particulars is based on the premis…Read more
  •  43
    The Inherence Interpretation of Berkeley: A Critique
    Modern Schoolman 54 (3): 261-269. 1977.
    Peer Reviewed.
  •  41
  •  40
  •  39
    Temporal Phenomena, Ontology and the R-theory
    Metaphysica 16 (2). 2015.
    One of the more serious criticisms of the B-theory is that by denying the passage of time or maintaining that passage is a mind-dependent illusion or appearance, the B-theory gives rise to a static, block universe and thereby removes what is most distinctively timelike about time. The aim of this paper is to discuss the R-theory of time, after Russell, who Richard Gale calls “the father of the B-theory,” and explain how the R-theory can respond to the criticisms just raised, and others. In the c…Read more
  •  37
    The Bundle Theory of Substance
    New Scholasticism 52 (1): 91-96. 1978.
    Peer Reviewed.
  •  37
    Personal Identity, Responsibility and Time
    In Heather Dyke (ed.), Time and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 161--178. 2003.
    Peer Reviewed.