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11Event Identity and a Significant PhysicalismSouthern Journal of Philosophy 19 (2): 171-180. 1981.
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23Experience And The Objects Of PerceptionUniversity Press Of America. 1967.This work argues for a Direct Realist view of the perception of public objects. It argues against the need for special intermediary sensory objects, or sense impressions, requiring only stages in a physical process beginning with events at the surface of a physical object, the resultant stimulation of one's sense organs, and finally the excitation of the sensory portions of one's brain.
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7The Roots of KnowledgePacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (2): 81-95. 1993.I defend the view that propositional knowledge can be defined as follows: A knows that p if and only if A believes that p because p. Spelling out the meaning of 'because' in this formula results in a causal-explanatory view of knowledge.
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16Blind Realism (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (3): 715-719. 1995.I argue that Robert Almeder's "Blind Realism," although instructive, fails to show that recourse to completely justified belief defuses Gettier counterexamples. This is because Almeder's notion of complete justification involves conflating truth with "warranted assertibility," thus making truth relative to what was scientifically fashionable at the time
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15The essential tie between knowing and believing: a causal account of knowledge and epistemic reasonsEdwin Mellen Press. 2011.This book offers a causal-explanatory account of knowledge as true belief caused by the worldly state of affairs that explains its existence. It also defends a contextual account of epistemic reasons, arguing that both foundationalism and coherentism cannot provide a satisfactory account of such reasons. Skeptical arguments are answered against a historical background from Plato to the present day.
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66Does Knowledge Entail Justification?International Philosophical Quarterly 34 (4): 413-418. 1994.
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66Event identity and a significant physicalismSouthern Journal of Philosophy 19 (2): 171-180. 1981.
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38Perception and Animal BeliefPhilosophy 55 (212). 1980.I argue that sentences ascribing beliefs to non-human animals have the same logical form as sentences of the "perceives that" variety. Pace D.M. Armstrong, I argue that animal belief sentences can be referentially opaque, just as perception sentences containing a propositional clause are. In both cases, referential opacity requires our assuming that the animal believer and the human perceiver has each identified the object of the belief or perception.
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26Skepticism DisarmedCanadian Journal of Philosophy 13 (1). 1983.If skepticism is once again fashionable, then much of the credit must go to Peter Unger who gives a sustained defense of an ultra-pyrrhonian position in his book, Ignorance: A case for Skepticism. Starting with a version of the traditional argument that we know nothing about the external world, Unger plunges deeper into skeptical waters by next arguing that there is at most hardly anything which we know to be so; and he scarcely pauses before proceeding to defend the stronger conclusion of ‘univ…Read more
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58Out-Gunning SkepticismCanadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (3). 1987.Bredo C. Johnsen1 misconceives my strictures concerning acceptance of the following principle : If A both knows that p and knows that p entails q, then A can come to know that q.Johnsen seems unaware that my criticism was intended to apply only after is made to appear in its most plausible light; that is, only after its consequent is interpreted as: ’It is logically possible for A to know that q.’ Without this interpretation might be dismissed simply on the grounds that A suffers from some physi…Read more
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18The Irreducibility of KnowledgeLogique Et Analyse 77 (Sommaire): 167-176. 1977.In this article it is argued that it is impossible to give a reductive analysis of knowledge, given that knowledge is an "epistemic" concept with these marks: (1) like necessity, it is only partially truth-functional; and, (2) unlike necessity, it includes an "intentional" component (belief) which is completely non-truth-functional. a reductive analysis would have to contain at least one extensional component, one intentional component, and none that is itself epistemic. but any plausible analys…Read more
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54The impossibility of massive errorPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (2): 405-409. 1993.I argue that Davidson's anti-skeptical thesis can survive objections made against it by treating skepticism as logically possible, but not epistemically possible. That is, the skeptical hypothesis of massive error conflicts with what we must take ourselves to know if we are to have coherent thought and speech.
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90Free will and intentional actionPhilosophia 16 (3-4): 355-364. 1986.I argue for the following analysis of a freely willed action: an act is done of one's own free will, if and only if, it is an intentional act performed by one acting as a rational agent from unobstructed reasons, and so situated that he or she has the capacity to forbear from performing it.
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Areas of Specialization
1 more
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy |
20th Century Philosophy |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Social and Political Philosophy |