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3QuineIn W. H. Newton‐Smith (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Science, Blackwell. 2017.Willard Van Orman Quine was born on 25 June 1908 in Akron, Ohio. For many years he was a professor of philosophy at Harvard University and is now emeritus. To some extent his views are connected with the American pragmatist tradition, but a more important influence comes from the empiricist tradition and, in particular, from the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle (see logical positivism). Quine has always remained faithful to the spirit of empiricism, but he has also criticized and revised …Read more
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4Quine and the A PrioriIn Ernie Lepore & Gilbert Harman (eds.), A Companion to W. V. O. Quine, Wiley-blackwell. 2013.John P. Burgess: Quine's continuing struggles with epistemological and ontological problems about mathematics and logic are traced from his first rebellion against logicism, through his flirtation and subsequent disillusionment with nominalism, to his final endorsement of naturalism, with an eye throughout to tensions among different aspects of his overall philosophy.
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Reasons in ethicsIn Gilbert Ryle (ed.), Contemporary aspects of philosophy, Oriel Press. pp. 177. 1977.
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5880Putnam on the Fact-Value DichotomyCroatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2): 117-129. 2002.In Reason, Truth and History and certain related writings, Hilary Putnam attacked the fact-value distinction. This paper criticizes his arguments and defends the distinction. Putnam claims that factual statements presuppose values, that “the empirical world depends upon our criteria of rational acceptability,” and that “we must have criteria of rational acceptability to even have an empirical world.” The present paper argues that these claims are mistaken.
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121A Defense of Quinean NaturalismIn Chase B. Wrenn (ed.), Naturalism, Reference, and Ontology, Peter Lang Publishing Group. 2008.This paper argues that a naturalized epistemology of the kind presented by W.V. Quine preserves everything worthwhile in traditional epistemology. Arguments against Quinean naturalism by such writers as Laurence BonJour, Jaegwon Kim, Richard Rorty, Barry Stroud, and Donald Davidson are criticized. Contrary to what is sometimes assumed, Quinean naturalism does not reject a priori justification. The important point is that epistemology is contained in science. There is no ‘first philosophy’, and, …Read more
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6685Death and Eternal RecurrenceIn Johansson Feldman Bradley (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death, Oxford U P. 2013.
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1346Quine's relativismTheoria 72 (4): 286-298. 2006.Keywords: W.V.Quine claimed that relativism is paradoxical and unacceptable; nevertheless, his own views concerning truth and the underdetermination of theories by data amount to an interesting and plausible form of relativism.
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37Hintikka on "Prima Facie" ObligationsTheoria 40 (3): 163-165. 1974.In this note it is argued that professor jaakko hintikka's explication of the notion of a 'prima facie obligation' within the framework of deontic logic must be regarded as unsatisfactory. since our world is not morally (or 'deontically') perfect, hintikka's proposal seems to have the absurd consequence that everything is a prima facie obligation
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711Quine and the A PrioriIn Ernie Lepore & Gilbert Harman (eds.), A Companion to W. V. O. Quine, Wiley-blackwell. 2013.
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25A note on John R. Searle's derivation of 'ought' from 'is'Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 8 (1-4): 309-314. 1965.
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2369Davidsons's Objections to Quine's EmpiricismIn G. Segal P. Pagin P. Kotatko (ed.), Interpreting Davidson, Csli Publications. 2001.
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49Thomas Nagel - Recipient of the Rolf Schock Prize in Logic and Philosophy, 2008Theoria 75 (2): 76-78. 2009.
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16On the Value of Scientific KnowledgeGrazer Philosophische Studien 30 (1): 53-63. 1987.Presumably, most scientists believe that scientific knowledge is intrinsically good, i.e. good in itself, apart from consequences. This doctrine should be rejected. The arguments which are usually given for it — e.g. by philosophers like W.D. Ross, R. Brandt, and W. Frankena — are quite inconclusive. In particular, it may be doubted whether knowledge is in fact desired for its own sake, and even i f it is, this would not support the doctrine. However, the doctrine is open to counter-examples. Th…Read more
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6846Scientific valueInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 10 (3): 189-202. 1996.Abstract Criteria of scientific value are of different kinds. This paper concerns ultimate criteria, i.e. the axiology of science. Most ultimate criteria are multi?dimensional. This gives rise to an aggregation problem, which cannot be adequately solved with reference to attitudes and behaviour within the scientific community. Therefore, in many cases, there is no fact of the matter as to whether one theory is better than another. This, in turn, creates problems for methodology
Stockholm, Sweden
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Meta-Ethics |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
General Philosophy of Science |
Value Theory, Miscellaneous |
Normative Ethics |