Lars Leeten

It is often assumed that the concept of alētheia, or ‘truth’, in Gorgias of Leontini belongs to the art of rhetoric. Along these lines, it is usually understood as an aesthetic concept or even a mere ‘adornment’ of speech. In this paper, it is argued, by contrast, that Gorgianic alētheia is a definable criterion of speech figuring in the practice of moral educa­tion. While the ‘truth’ of a logos indeed has to be assessed on aesthetic grounds, the underlying concept of alētheia is predominantly ethical. For Gorgias, speech is ‘true’ when it promotes virtue (aretē) by being expressive of virtue. The principle stated in the opening passage of the Encomium of Helen, that a speaker has ‘to praise what is praiseworthy and to blame what is blameworthy’, explains precisely this understand­ing of alētheia.

It is often assumed that the concept of 'alētheia', or ‘truth’, in Gorgias of Leontini belongs to the art of rhetoric. Along these lines, it is usually understood as an aesthetic concept or even a mere ‘adornment’ of speech. In this paper, it is argued, by contrast, that Gorgianic alētheia is a definable criterion of speech figuring in the practice of moral educa­tion. While the ‘truth’ of a logos indeed has to be assessed on aesthetic grounds, the underlying concept of alētheia is predominantly ethical. For Gorgias, speech is ‘true’ when it promotes virtue (aretē) by being expressive of virtue. The principle stated in the opening passage of the Encomium of Helen, that a speaker has ‘to praise what is praiseworthy and to blame what is blameworthy’, explains precisely this understand­ing of alētheia.

In Plato’s 'Gorgias', Socrates makes pronounced use of ‘rhetorical’ means. While this has often been pointed out, it has rarely been asked which constitutive features are shared by Socrates’ and Gorgias’ discursive practices. This article tackles this question based on the notion of logos that emerges in Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen. It is claimed that Gorgias was not concerned with a rhetorical technique but in fact with a practice of ethical formation. In this practice, or culture of speech, speakers bring virtue to bear by displaying virtuous ways of speaking. Socratic dialectic, as presented in the Gorgias, can be interpreted as bringing this discursive practice to perfection.

In his late ‘A Plea for Excuses’, John L. Austin suggests labelling his philosophy ‘linguistic phenomenology’. This article examines which idea of phenomenology Austin had in mind when he coined this term and what light this sheds on his method. It is argued that the key to answering this question can be found in Merleau-Ponty’s 'Phenomenology of Perception', which Austin must have been familiar with. Merleau-Ponty presents phenomenology in a way Austin could embrace: it is a method, it aims at description and uses reduction, it is a non-idealistic study of essence, and interprets intentionality as ‘operative’. In this light, Austin’s method can be appreciated more fully.

The article examines a close link between Socratic dialectic and the sophistic discourse practice known as »antilogic«. First, traditional assumptions are rejected, in particular the prejudice that antilogic is a kind of eristic that is indifferent to truth, solely aiming at blindsiding the opponent. In order to develop an alternative perspective, antilogic is contextualized within the discursive climate of its time. In this way, antilogic can be interpreted as an educational practice attempting to determine the »right logos« by generating contradictions. In conclusion, continuities between antilogic and dialectic become visible that shed light on their differences too.

This paper asks what it would mean for epistemic practices to take irreducible perspectivity into account. It starts with the premise that such perspectivity cannot be explained on the basis of conceptual logic alone, but only by virtue of the logic of sensual perception. Following Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception, four requirements are developed that irreducible perspectivity demands from epistemic practice: interminable movement, broadening horizons, bearing disharmonies and the presupposition of different horizons. As soon as truth-oriented practice is detached from the traditional idea of final insights into ›things themselves‹, as it survives in the concepts of epistemology, it emerges as a concrete, mundane endeavour that continuously has to deal with the possibility that the world might be understood better, deeper or differently.

This article argues that Kant’s attack on the ars oratoria in §53 of the Critique of the Power of Judgement is directed against eighteenth-century school rhetoric, in particular against the ‘art of speech’ (Redekunst) of Johann Christoph Gottsched. It is pointed out that Kant suggests a revision of Gottsched’s conception of ‘true eloquence’, which was the predominant rhetorical ideal at the time. On this basis, and in response to recent discussions on ‘Kantian rhetoric’, Kant’s own ideal of speech is adressed. It emerges that he favours a culture of speech embedded in moral cultivation, which excludes any disciplinary form of rhetoric.

The contribution examines Goodman’s conception of philosophy, in particular his remark that his project can be understood as a «critique of worldmaking». It is argued that, despite dealing with epistemological questions, the general theory of symbols and worldmaking does not answer them. Rather, it can be conceived as a practical conception comparable to Kant’s critique of reason or to Wittgenstein’s critique of language games, i. e. , as a philosophy of world orientation. It is claimed that Goodman himself could not articulate this dimension of his position appropriately as he kept using the language of epistemology. Yet many aspects of his thinking become much clearer if they are interpreted within a non-epistemological frame

This literature review describes the current state of research on the Greek sophists. It draws on recent work on the beginnings of rhetoric, overviews of sophistic thought and case studies on Protagoras, Gorgias, Antiphon and Prodicus. It is shown that the traditional notion of a sophistic antithesis to philosophy has lost further ground: While earlier »rehabilitations« of sophistic thought still use the dichotomous distinction of philosophy und sophistic, now any generic talk of »the sophist« should better be regarded as misleading.

O presente artigo aborda a dimensão ética no pensamento de Jean-François Lyotard. Como conceito decisivo para essa relação, é aqui proposto o conceito de receptividade. Partindo dele, deseja-se mostrar que é possível reconstruir uma concepção de responsabilidade ética no pensamento do filósofo francês, a qual se coloca em sentido diametralmente oposto à concepção de autonomia: a obrigação ética se torna por conta disso afetiva, fundada e repousando na capacidade de se deixar falar. Com vistas a uma determinação mais acurada dessa posição, serão consultadas as reflexões de Lyotard acerca da filosofia da linguagem em Le Differénd: a concepção do “acontecimento da fase” se deixa mostrar na ética do diálogo, que deixa espaço para a assimetria, alteridade e transformação. O pensamento do conflito insolúvel mostra-se como plenamente implicado com essa ética. This contribution examines the ethical dimension in the thinking of Jean-François Lyotard. It is shown that receptivity is crucial to its understanding. On these grounds, ethical responsibility can be conceived as fundamentally different from the standard conceptions of autonomy: ethical obligation has its sources in affection and is founded by a capacity of responsivity. This position is further developed by drawing on Lyotard ’s thoughts on language in Le Différend: the idea of a “sentence event” can be conceptualized within the framework of an ethics of dialogue, which leaves room for asymmetry, alterity, and transformation. The philosophy of the irreconcilable conflict turns out to be a form of ethics in this sense

This article discusses Seyla Benhabib’s transformation of Jürgen Habermas’s discourse ethics. It focusses on her interpretation of communicative moral reason by reference to actual „moral conversations“. While she does not draw on universal pragmatics, Benhabib still claims that her ethical theory represents a form of universalism. This study argues that this claim is misleading: Benhabib’s discourse ethics points to a culture of moral judgment that is essentially open to different kinds of moral thinking. Such a culture, however, needs moral humility and cannot appropriately be called „universalism“.

If we regard discursive practice as constitutive for the way we relate to the world, ourselves and others, then it is vitally important to ask how this practice can be formed or cultivated. For this reason, rhetoric has always been closely connected to ethics. This article attempts to explicate this relationship. It revolves around ancient conceptions of rhetoric that do not aim at establishing a system or a theory of speech, but at cultivating speech as a practice of good life. This “rhetorical ethics” of antiquity remains instructive for contemporary thinking, since it points to a way of reflecting discourse that accounts not only for the content of speech but also for how it shapes human life. In particular, it is instructive for modern ethics, since it reveals that moral discourse can be regarded as a rhetorical practice too: it is not ethically neutral but has to be reflected upon as a practice of life.

The article argues that the doctrine of Gorgias of Leontinoi, as expressed in his ›Encomion of Helen‹, is not a rhetorical technique but a practice of moral education. The medium of this »ethical speech practice« is perceptual forms, its basic mode being the practice of showing or epideictic speech. The crucial standard of this practice is »epideictic rightness«, which is identical to Gorgias’ conception of »truth«. According to this conception, speech is true if it exemplifies morally right conduct and moral beauty. True speech in this sense must also be effective speech, since it will promote right behaviour in the future.