•  3
    Harsh and Disrespectful
    with David V. Axelsen
    Social Theory and Practice 46 (4): 657-679. 2020.
    Many policies hinge on determining whether someone’s situation is due to luck or choice. In political philosophy, this prevalence is mirrored by luck egalitarian theories. But overemphasizing the distinction between luck and choice will lead to tensions with the value of moral agency, on which the distinction is grounded. Here, we argue that the two most common contemporary critiques of luck egalitarianism, holding it to be harsh and disrespectful are best understood as illustrating exactly this…Read more
  •  14
    What Is the Point of the Harshness Objection?
    Utilitas 32 (4): 427-443. 2020.
    According to luck egalitarianism, it is unjust if some are worse off than others through no fault or choice of their own. The most common criticism of luck egalitarianism is the ‘harshness objection’, which states that luck egalitarianism allows for too harsh consequences, as it fails to provide justification for why those responsible for their bad fate can be entitled to society's assistance. It has largely gone unnoticed that the harshness objection is open to a number of very different interp…Read more
  •  4
    Harsh and Disrespectful
    with David V. Axelsen
    Social Theory and Practice 46 (4): 657-679. 2020.
    Many policies hinge on determining whether someone’s situation is due to luck or choice. In political philosophy, this prevalence is mirrored by luck egalitarian theories. But overemphasizing the distinction between luck and choice will lead to tensions with the value of moral agency, on which the distinction is grounded. Here, we argue that the two most common contemporary critiques of luck egalitarianism, holding it to be harsh and disrespectful are best understood as illustrating exactly this…Read more
  •  29
    What is Wrong with Sufficiency?
    Res Publica 25 (1): 21-38. 2019.
    In this paper, I ask what is wrong with sufficiency. I formulate a generic sufficiency principle in relation to which I discuss possible problems for sufficientarianism. I argue against the arbitrariness–concern, that sufficiency theory need only to identify a possible space for determining a plausible threshold, and I argue against the high–low threshold dilemma concern, that multiple-threshold views can solve this dilemma. I then distinguish between currency-pluralist and currency-monist multi…Read more
  •  21
    Playing for social equality
    Politics, Philosophy and Economics 17 (4): 427-446. 2018.
    This article claims that the protection of children’s capability for play is a central social-political goal. It provides the following three-premise argument in defense of this claim: we have strong and wide-ranging normative reasons to be concerned with clusters of social deficiency; particular fertile functionings play a key role for tackling clusters of social deficiency; and finally the capability for childhood play is a crucial, ontogenetic prerequisite for the development of those particu…Read more
  •  12
    Name der Zeitschrift: Jahrgang: 13 Heft: 2 Seiten: 190-206
  •  35
    Sufficiency as Freedom from Duress
    with David V. Axelsen
    Journal of Political Philosophy 23 (4): 406-426. 2015.
  •  34
    Why Health Matters to Justice: A Capability Theory Perspective
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (2): 403-415. 2015.
    The capability approach, originated by Amartya Sen is among the most comprehensive and influential accounts of justice that applies to issues of health and health care. However, although health is always presumed as an important capability in Sen’s works, he never manages to fully explain why health is distinctively valuable. This paper provides an explanation. It does this by firstly laying out the general capability-based argument for health justice. It then discusses two recent attempts to ju…Read more
  •  23
    Sufficiency Grounded as Sufficiently Free: A Reply to Shlomi Segall
    Journal of Applied Philosophy 33 (2): 202-216. 2016.
    Telic sufficientarianism is the view that it is better, other things equal, if people are lifted above some sufficiency threshold of special moral importance. In a recent contribution, Shlomi Segall has raised the following objection to this position: The telic ideal of sufficiency can neither be grounded on any personal value, nor any impersonal value. Consequently, sufficientarianism is groundless. This article contains a rejoinder to this critique. Its main claim is that the value of autonomy…Read more
  •  24
    Three Strikes Out: Objections to Segall's Luck Egalitarian Justice in Health
    with David Vestergaard Axelsen
    Ethical Perspectives. forthcoming.
    Setting out to defend luck egalitarianism in matters of justice in health, Shlomi Segall outlines a pluralistic version of the luck egalitarian framework allowing egalitarian justice to be traded-off against other moral requirements. The suggested pluralism enables luck egalitarian justice to coexist with a concern for meeting everyone’s basic needs thereby avoiding Elizabeth Anderson’s ‘abandonment objection’. In this article, however, we present three objections to Segall’s luck egalitarian ju…Read more