Laura Purdy

The Religious RightReligious right is using every means to impose its restrictive view of sexual and reproductive rights on everyone under the umbrella of a so-called culture of life (CL). The CL prohibits the direct killing of innocents (but not, apparently, letting them die), and requires that all sexual activity be open to procreation, thus restricting access to abortionAbortion and contraception. All this is alleged to be based on God’s will and to constitute the only objective moralityMorality. But there is no epistemological basis for this claim, the strictures are inconsistent, and the rules create unnecessary misery. Those most at risk from the sexual strictures are women, children, and gay men. The risks are greatly magnified in Third World countries because of povertyPovertyand lack of accessHealth/ healthcare, right toaccess to even the most basic health care. Yet the Bush administration is doing everything in its power to impose the CL on such countries by means of its foreign policyForeign policy and aid programs.

Medical issues affecting health care have become everyday media events. In response to mounting public concern, growing numbers of bioethicists are being appointed to medical school faculties and public policy panels. However the ideas voiced in these forums are seldom informed by feminist perspectives. In this important book, a distinguished group of feminist scholars and activists discuss crucial bioethics topics in a feminist light. Among the subjects explored are the care/justice debates, transforming bioethics, practice, and reproduction. The book also covers less commonly discussed issues, such as culturally appropriate responses to reproductive health problems in developing countries

Pronatalism—the social bias toward having children—is at the core of much violence against women. Its chief characteristic, and its moral Achilles heel, is that it undermines autonomous decision-making about childbearing. Together with its soulmates misogyny and geneticism, it harms children, male partners, and humanity as a whole, given the serious environmental challenges now facing us. But, of course, biology requires women to gestate offspring, and women are generally expected to be responsible for childrearing. Female gender roles incorporate these facts, and thus pronatalism’s negative impact on women—both their bodies and their lives—is of another order of magnitude. Yet, this state of affairs is so taken for granted that it is almost invisible, and is therefore especially hard to eradicate. Attempts to do so are also often erroneously confused with, and undermined by, negativism about having children.

In Neutrality and the Academic Ethic, distinguished philosopher Robert L. Simon explores the claim that universities can and should be politically neutral. He examines conceptual questions about the meaning of neutrality, distinguishes different conceptions of what neutrality involves, and considers in what sense, if any, institutional neutrality is both possible and desirable. In Part II, a collection of original and previously published essays provides different views on these and related issues

This article is an expansion of comments I was honored to present at a celebration of the life and work of Anne Donchin at the June 2016 meeting of the International Network on Feminist Approaches to Bioethics in Edinburgh. It is obviously far from comprehensive, but I hope it gives readers a glimpse of an Anne of whose depths many of us were not fully aware. One of the most difficult parts of talking about someone who has died is highlighting the positive without overdoing it to the extent that their friends and loved ones find themselves rolling their mental eyes a bit, since most of us—no matter how wonderful—are a little less than perfect. But my problem here is that the more I have found out...

This is the first anthology to take a theoretical look at violence against women. Each essay shows how philosophy provides a powerful tool for examining a difficult and deep-rooted social problem. Stanley G. French, Wanda Teays, and Laura M. Purdy, all philosophers, present a familiar phenomenon in a new and striking fashion. The editors employ a two-tiered approach to this vital issue. Contributors consider both interpersonal violence, such as rape and battering; and also systemic violence, such as sexual harassment, pornography, prostitution, and violence in a medical context. The editors have further broadened the discussion to include such cross-cultural issues as rape in war, dowry deaths, female genital mutilation, and international policies on violence against women. Against this wide range of topics, which integrate personal perspectives with the philosophical, the contributors offer powerful analyses of the causes and effects of violence against women, as well as potential policies for effecting change.

This article critically evaluates the central claims of the various feminist responses to new reproductive arrangements and technologies. Proponents of a “progressivism” object to naive technological optimism and raise questions about the control of such technology. Others, such as the FINRRAGE group, raise concerns about the potentially damaging consequences of the new technologies for women. While a central concern is whether these technologies reinforce harmful biologically determinist stereotypes of women, it may be that these critiques function with a devastating gender blindness that puts women at risk in other, heretofore unnoticed, ways

Nancy Tuana holds that the nature/nurture dichotomy does not accurately represent the world and hence that a whole series of assumptions about human nature is mistaken. She rejects both biological determinism and alternative interactionist views. I argue that although her arguments and political concerns do rule out any kind of simple biological determinism, they do not show that the alternative interactionist view is untenable: in fact, she uses the distinction in her attempt to demolish it. I argue that the assumption that "nature" implies fixity is the source of difficulties here, not the dichotomy itself