•  78
    The Art of Tattoos
    British Journal of Aesthetics 60 (4): 419-433. 2020.
    In this paper I make the case that at least some tattoos are artworks. I go on to propose a definition of tattoo art that distinguishes it from other uses of tattooing, and from other forms of visual art. I argue that tattoo art is an art form that creates artworks in living skin, and that the living body is an essential component of and contributor to the artwork. This gives rise to several other distinctive features of tattoo art, in particular that it reconfigures in interesting ways the rela…Read more
  •  87
    Sad Songs Say So Much: The Paradoxical Pleasures of Sad Music
    Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 77 (3): 255-266. 2019.
    Listening to music can be an intensely moving experience. Many people love music in part because of its power to alter or amplify their moods, and turn to music for inspiration, comfort, or therapy. It is a puzzle, then, why many of us spend so much time listening to sad music. If music can influence our moods, and assuming that most people would prefer to be happy not sad, why would we choose to listen to sad music? I revisit the question of why we like sad music, drawing from work in both the …Read more
  •  353
    Good and Good For You: An Affect Theory of Happiness
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1): 133-163. 2010.
    Philosophers tended to identify happiness with either subjective psychological states or conditions (feelings, emotions or a set of judgments), or with the objective conditions of a life—how well the life is going for the person living it. Each approach captures different but important features of our intuitions, making it difficult to accept either a purely subjective or objective view. This has led some philosophers to suggest that these are not competing accounts of one thing, ‘happiness,’ bu…Read more
  •  2
    A Theory of Moods and Their Place in Our Science of Mind
    Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin - Madison. 2000.
    I present a computational theory of moods that identifies moods with biases in the operations of our cognitive functional architecture. Moods, I argue, are not representational states. They are biases in the operations of functional architecture-level processes such as memory and attention. Changes at the level of functional architecture have global effects on representation-level states and processes in ways that are independent of the semantic content of those states. My theory accounts for th…Read more
  •  252
    What feelings can't do
    Mind and Language 21 (1): 108-135. 2006.
    Arguments over whether emotions and moods are feelings have demonstrated confusion over the concept of a feeling and, in particular, what it is that feelings can—and cannot—do. I argue that the causal and explanatory roles we assign emotions and moods in our theories are inconsistent with their being feelings. Sidestepping debates over the natures of emotions and moods I frame my arguments primarily in terms of what it is emotions, moods and feelings do. I provide an analysis that clarifies the …Read more
  •  138
    Moods in the music and the man: A response to Kivy and Carroll
    Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 65 (3): 307-312. 2007.
    This is a response to the debate between Peter Kivy and Noel Carroll over whether music qua music can induce emotions or moods. I critically examine Kivy’s arguments in light of work in the psychology and neuroscience of music and argue in support of Carroll that music can induce moods. I argue that Kivy’s notion of formalist ‘canonical listening’ is problematic, both as an argument against Carroll and as a claim about how we ought to listen to music, and that Kivy may be begging the question ag…Read more
  •  407
    Towards a computational theory of mood
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4): 743-770. 2000.
    Moods have global and profound effects on our thoughts, motivations and behavior. To understand human behavior and cognition fully, we must understand moods. In this paper I critically examine and reject the methodology of conventional ?cognitive theories? of affect. I lay the foundations of a new theory of moods that identifies them with processes of our cognitive functional architecture. Moods differ fundamentally from some of our other affective states and hence require distinct explanatory t…Read more
  •  150
    The Two Facets of Pleasure
    Philosophical Topics 41 (1): 215-236. 2013.
    Several tensions run through philosophical debates on the nature of pleasure: is it a feeling or an attitude? Is it excited engagement during activities, or satisfaction and contentment at their completion? Pleasure also plays fundamental explanatory roles in psychology, neuroscience, and animal behavior. I draw on this work to argue that pleasure picks out two distinct, but interacting neurobiological systems with long evolutionary histories. Understanding pleasure as having these two facets gi…Read more
  •  34
    How Pleasure Works: The New Science of Why We Like What We Like by bloom, paul (review)
    Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 70 (4): 394-397. 2012.
    A review of Paul Bloom's book, "How Pleasure Works: The New Science of Why We Like What We Like"