•  7
    Moods in the Music and the Man: A Response to Kivy and Carroll
    Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 65 (3): 307-312. 2007.
  •  3
    Good and Good For You: An Affect Theory of Happiness
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1): 133-163. 2010.
  •  1
    A Theory of Moods and Their Place in Our Science of Mind
    Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin - Madison. 2000.
    I present a computational theory of moods that identifies moods with biases in the operations of our cognitive functional architecture. Moods, I argue, are not representational states. They are biases in the operations of functional architecture-level processes such as memory and attention. Changes at the level of functional architecture have global effects on representation-level states and processes in ways that are independent of the semantic content of those states. My theory accounts for th…Read more
  •  161
    Good and good for you: An affect theory of happiness
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1): 133-163. 2010.
    In the philosophical literature on happiness, happiness has sometimes been identified with subjective psychological states or conditions (feelings or sets of judgments), and sometimes with more objectively evaluable conditions of a life. I refer to these as 'good feelings' versus 'good lives' accounts of happiness, and show how they satisfy different aspects of our intuitions about the nature of happiness. This paper offers an affect theory of happiness that brings together both the subjective a…Read more
  •  35
    The Two Facets of Pleasure
    Philosophical Topics 41 (1): 215-236. 2013.
    Several tensions run through philosophical debates on the nature of pleasure: is it a feeling or an attitude? Is it excited engagement during activities, or satisfaction and contentment at their completion? Pleasure also plays fundamental explanatory roles in psychology, neuroscience, and animal behavior. I draw on this work to argue that pleasure picks out two distinct, but interacting neurobiological systems with long evolutionary histories. Understanding pleasure as having these two facets gi…Read more
  •  130
    What feelings can't do
    Mind and Language 21 (1): 108-135. 2006.
    Arguments over whether emotions and moods are feelings have demonstrated confusion over the concept of a feeling and, in particular, what it is that feelings can—and cannot—do. I argue that the causal and explanatory roles we assign emotions and moods in our theories are inconsistent with their being feelings. Sidestepping debates over the natures of emotions and moods I frame my arguments primarily in terms of what it is emotions, moods and feelings do. I provide an analysis that clarifies the …Read more
  •  42
  •  157
    Towards a computational theory of mood
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4): 743-770. 2000.
    Moods have global and profound effects on our thoughts, motivations and behavior. To understand human behavior and cognition fully, we must understand moods. In this paper I critically examine and reject the methodology of conventional ?cognitive theories? of affect. I lay the foundations of a new theory of moods that identifies them with processes of our cognitive functional architecture. Moods differ fundamentally from some of our other affective states and hence require distinct explanatory t…Read more