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2Toward the World and Wisdom of Wittgenstein’s ‘Tractatus’Philosophical Quarterly 25 (98): 84-85. 1975.
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15Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore.Philosophical GrammarPhilosophical Quarterly 25 (100): 279. 1975.
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49III A Unified Solution to Some ParadoxesProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (n/a): 53-74. 2000.The Russell class does not exist because the conditions purporting to specify that class are contradictory, and hence fail to specify any class. Equally, the conditions purporting to specify the Liar statement are contradictory and hence, although the Liar sentence is grammatically in order, it fails to yield a statement. Thus the common source of these and related paradoxes is contradictory (or tautologous) specifying conditions-for such conditions fail to specify. This is the diagnosis. The cu…Read more
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71Spandrels of Truth * By JC BEALLAnalysis 70 (3): 586-589. 2010.(No abstract is available for this citation)
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The Barber, Russell's Paradox, Catch-22, God, Contradiction, and MoreIn Graham Priest, J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction: New Philosophical Essays, Clarendon Press. 2006.
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2Gardner-Inspired Design of Teaching MaterialsDiscourse: Learning and Teaching in Philosophical and Religious Studies 10 (1): 173-202. 2010.
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12The Philosophy of Wilfrid Sellars: Queries and ExtensionsPhilosophical Quarterly 30 (119): 153-155. 1980.
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8The Imagination as Glory: The Poetry of James DickeyJournal of Aesthetic Education 22 (2): 118. 1988.
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13The general aim of this project is to fundamentally re-think the design of teaching materials in view of what is now known about cognitive deficits and about what Howard Gardner has termed ‘multiple intelligences’. The applicant has implemented this strategy in two distinct areas, the first involving the writing of an English language programme for Chinese speakers, the second involving the construction of specialized equipment for teaching elementary logic to blind students. The next phase is t…Read more
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16Mind, Machine, and Metaphor: An Essay on Artificial Intelligence and Legal ReasoningPhilosophical Books 36 (2): 134-136. 1995.
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32Scientific scotism - the emperor's new trousers or has Armstrong made some real strides?Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (1). 1983.(1983). Scientific scotism — The emperor's new trousers or has armstrong made some real strides? Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 61, No. 1, pp. 40-57
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92The development of wittgenstein's views on contradictionHistory and Philosophy of Logic 7 (1): 43-56. 1986.The views on contradiction and consistency that Wittgenstein expressed in his later writings have met with misunderstanding and almost uniform hositility. In this paper, I trace the roots of these views by attempting to show that, in his early writings, Wittgenstein accorded a ?unique status? to tautologies and contradictions, marking them off logically from genuine propositions. This is integral both to his Tractatus project of furnishing a theory of inference, and to the enterprise of explaini…Read more
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2Wittgenstein as soilIn Max Kölbel & Bernhard Weiss (eds.), Wittgenstein's Lasting Significance, Routledge. 2004.Wittgenstein likened himself to a soil distinctive only in that once implanted with the seeds of great thinkers, interesting flora grew. This chapter examines the influence on him of authors he regarded as truly original, such as Bolzmann, Hertz, Schopenhauer, Frege and Russell.
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103Pierre and circumspection in belief-formationAnalysis 69 (4): 653-655. 2009.In a well-known story constructed by Saul Kripke , Pierre, a rational but monolingual Frenchman who has never visited England, acquires, on the evidence of many magazine pictures of London, the belief that London is beautiful. He is happy to declare ‘Londres est jolie’. Pierre eventually moves to England and settles in one of the seedier areas of London, travelling only to comparably shabby neighbourhoods. He learns English by immersion, though he does not realize that ‘London’ and ‘Londres’ are…Read more
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106The Sorites is nonsense disguised by a fallacyAnalysis 72 (1): 61-65. 2012.It is uncontroversial that, on any run through a Sorites series, a subject, at some point, switches from an ‘F’ verdict on one exhibit to a non-‘F’ verdict on the next. (Where this ‘cut-off’ point occurs tend to differ from trial to trial.) It is a fallacy to infer that there must be a cut-off point simpliciter between F items and non-F items. The transition is from firm ground to swamp. In the Sorites reasoning, some conditionals of the form ‘If Item n is F, then Item n + 1 is F’ are not false …Read more
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1A Problem For The DialetheistBulletin of the Section of Logic 15 (1): 10-13. 1986.There has recently been revived logical interest, particularly in the context of attempts to solve the logico-semantical paradoxes, of the idea that there are true contracistions, and of semantics accomodating the glut value both true and false. By considering some generally accepted claims about assertion. I attempt to show that this dialetheist idea is untenable
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University of KentRegular Faculty
University of St. Andrews
PhD, 1977