Laurence Houlgate

An examination of some of the ethical issues that arise in making policy decisions about divorce child-custody disputes. It is argued in this paper that what needs to be resolved is the dilemma that occurs when the legislator is faced with a choice between using a discretionary standard that promotes the best interests of the child or a non-discretionary standard that settles disputes by an arbitrary assignment of custody. The dilemma is resolved through a normative analysis of various types of dispute-settling processes and a canvas of standard that allow for the automatic but non-arbitrary settling of disputes between contending parents.

This book is a unique introduction to the philosophy of law that repairs an enormous gap in the philosophy of law -- a lack of philosophical attention to family law. (In fact, PhilPapers does not recognize the philosophy of family law as a category.) This book uses only cases drawn from family law to illustrate the traditional problems of legal philosophy. This is why I wrote this book as a textbook rather than as a monograph. My hope is that students will learn more about the problems of legal philosophy by using cases with which they might be more familiar than from criminal law cases. Questions for thought and discussion follow each chapter.

In an unpublished paper of 1693 John Locke weighed in on the ongoing debate in the English Parliament by declaring that there should be a “general naturalization” of all immigrants currently residing in England. His argument for this controversial policy was entirely economic and based on promoting England's interest in achieving greater wealth. He wrote nothing about the interests of the immigrants (most of whom were escaping religious persecution) nor did he appeal to the moral and political theory he had so strongly proposed in Second Treatise of Government, published only a few years earlier in 1690. In this paper I look closely at the concepts of community and law in the state of nature and conclude that if Locke had employed the fundamental principles developed in Second Treatise he would have endorsed a far more radical policy that would have permitted the immigration and eventual naturalization of persons on humanitarian grounds. The application of these principles have important consequences for contemporary debates in the United States Congress and in other wealthy countries about the extent of the obligation to provide relief to foreigners who are escaping religious persecution, war, enslavement, hunger, and natural disaster.

The Minos is one of thirty-five dialogues that ancient editors and commentators regarded as one of the authentic works of Plato. Although it is now regarded as spurious, in both the classical and modern eras, the Minos was treated as a suitable problematic introduction to Plato's Laws. The co-authors (Houlgate and Hathaway) believe that it is still an excellent introduction to the Laws. It has philosophical significance whether or not it is authentic. It is the philosophical significance that is discussed in this article.

This book begins with an overview of the current legal status of children under U.S. federal and state law, It includes an analysis of relevant Supreme Court decisions and an extended critique of the philosophical arguments for treating children differently from adults under the law. Sections in the book include discussions of the need for a theory of juvenile rights, the moral arguments that prop up such theories, Professor Houlgate's proposal for a theory, and a final discussion of the applications of his theory to the debates about status offenses, child neglect, and rehabilitation of juvenile offenders.

I. Although there has been considerable recent dispute as to what Socrates meant by saying that Virtue is Knowledge, if the claim is, as it is sometimes taken to be, that knowledge of the essential nature of virtue is sufficient for virtuous behavior, then it is only necessary to point out what seem to be quite obvious counter in stances. The fact of moral weakness, coupled with what large numbers of scientists and lawyers and plain men now believe about the capacity of human beings for self-control, demonstrates that a man can surely know the good and yet fail to do the virtuous thing. What, then, is left of the view that Virtue is Knowledge?

The purpose of the paper is to discover a rationale for the practice of attaching excuses to criminal responsibility. I do this by criticizing the theory of h l a hart that we adopt this practice largely because it gives persons more power to predict and determine their liability to punishment than would a system of "strict" liability. I extract from my criticisms of hart the alternative theory that we adopt the institution of excuses because it insures that persons do not assume burdens beyond what it is necessary to assume for the benefits of the legal system to accrue to all

This article is primarily a defense of the Paradigm Case Argument (PCA). It is secondarily a comment on a recent controversy over the validity of its use in philosophy. I argue that the controversy rests on a misinterpretation. By extending the analysis of the objections (and here I invoke Descartes' famous method of possible doubt) I show that the occurrence of a paradigm and the fact that a concept is normally used to describe that paradigm logically entails not that the paradigm is instantiated, but only that it is correct to apply that concept to that paradigm. In this manner the ontological fallacy is avoided, and further, this enforces the important separation between saying something about the correct application of a concept and saying something about its meaning

This is a review of Laurence Houlgate's "Family and State: the Philosophy of Family Law. It takes a look at the moral theory from which Houlgate begins and raises questions about is correctness and appropriateness, but it finds more to agree with with respect to his middle-level principles. It considers his definition of "family" in the context of contemporary political controversy over such definitions. It looks at his consequentialist justification for the family, agrees with it, and suggests additional supplementary arguments, primarily from Brigitte and Peter Berger, to give additional support for Houlgate's argument. It looks at his justification for family law and agrees with his principle of optimum communal benefit. It seeks to place Houlgate's views within the context of contemporary political debate about being "pro-family" or "anti-family". It then goes on to look briefly at some of the specific issues of family law that Houlgate considers, taking time to raise a few questions about some of them, and concludes by dealing in a more extensive way with the question of what the extent and limits of state interference in the family should be, agreeing with Houlgate's basic position, but considering further its application to specific issues