Laurent Cesalli

“Austrian” (or “Austro-German”) philosophy of language is characterized, among other things, by the following two features: (1) Problems of language are considered within the broader framework of an intentionality-based philosophy of mind—or, to put it more precisely, questions of meaning are considered as involving a quite articulated theory of intentions; (2) several aspects of such an account are explicitly presented as inspired by or somehow already at work in the Medieval Scholastic tradition. In this study we follow the track indicated by these two features and use some “Austrian” reflections on the articulation between meanings and intentions as a “heuristic filter”, as it were, to shed a new and different light on some Medieval debates in philosophy of language on the relationship between significare and intendere. It will be roughly divided into three parts. We begin by singling out some distinctive tenets of the “Austrian” strategy aimed at describing the relationship between meaning and intentions (section I), and then turn to various Medieval texts from the 13th and 14th century dealing with the two related notions of significatio and intentio (section II). The upshot of our investigation is to show how, for both “Austrian” and Medieval philosophers of language (and beyond their differences), a proper understanding of linguistic meaning—in the twofold sense of words or sentences having a lexical content and utterances having a determinate pragmatic function—presupposes an account of what one could call the “agentive intentionality”, i.e. the complex intentionality proper to practical goal-directed human behaviours. Some final remarks about outcomes, meaning, scope and perspectives opened by the method applied will conclude the study (section III).

This article is about the conception of truth and signification in Augustine's early philosophical writings. In the first, semantic-linguistic part, the gradual shift of Augustine's position towards the Academics is treated closely. It reveals that Augustine develops a notion of sign which, by integrating elements of Stoic epistemology, is suited to function as a transmitter of true knowledge through linguistic expressions. In the second part, both the ontological structure of signified things and Augustine's solution to the apparent tautologies of mathematical truths are examined. Again his notion of sign turns out to be the keystone; this time, however, the natural in contrast to the conventional sign of linguistic expressions. In their complementarity, both parts show how Augustine intensely struggles with and overcomes the skepticism of the sensible world through his conception of sign and signification.

This article is about the conception of truth and signification in Augustine's early philosophical writings. In the first, semantic-linguistic part, the gradual shift of Augustine's position towards the Academics is treated closely. It reveals that Augustine develops a notion of sign which, by integrating elements of Stoic epistemology, is suited to function as a transmitter of true knowledge through linguistic expressions. In the second part, both the ontological structure of signified (sensible) things and Augustine's solution to the apparent tautologies of mathematical truths are examined. Again his notion of sign turns out to be the keystone; this time, however, the natural in contrast to the conventional sign of linguistic expressions. In their complementarity, both parts show how Augustine intensely struggles with and (partially) overcomes the skepticism of the sensible world through his conception of sign and signification.

This paper considers medieval moderate realism with respect to universals. In the first part, I present and discuss the reasons why some late medieval philosophers—for example, Pseudo-Richard of Campsall and Richard Brinkley—hold the following conjunction of claims: whatever exists is particular and universals exist. The short answer is that such a conjunction is possible provided one distinguishes between what is de se and what is de facto. In the second part, I compare such a philosophical stance with other forms of medieval realism and trace the de se/de facto distinction back to (at least) Albert the Great’s definition of universals. As a whole, the paper is an attempt to shed some light on what appears to be the magic formula of medieval moderate realism, namely: be a realist with respect to universals and stick to particularist ontology.

Walter Burley (1275-c.1344) and John Wyclif (1328-1384) follow two clearly stated doctrinal options: on the one hand, they are realists and, on the other, they defend a correspondence theory of truth that involves specifi c correlates for true propositions, in short: truth-makers. Both characteristics are interdependent: such a conception of truth requires a certain kind of ontology. Th is study shows that a) in their explanation of what it means for a proposition to be true, Burley and Wyclif both develop what we could call a theory of intentionality in order to explain the relation that must obtain between the human mind and the truth-makers, and b) that their explanations reach back to Augustine, more precisely to his theory of ocular vision as exposed in the De trinitate IX as well as to his conception of ideas found in the Quaestio de ideis.

Is medieval logic formal? And if yes, in what sense? There are striking affinities between medieval and contemporary theories of language. Authors from the two periods share formal ambitions and maintain complex, and at time uneasy, relations with natural language. However, modern scholars became careful not to overlook the specificities of theories developed more than five hundred years apart, in particular with respect to their 'formal' character. In 1972, Alfonso Maieru noted that the efforts of medieval logicians to identify logical structures in language formal enough to become objects of scientific consideration. He also stressed that the language investigated is a historical one, Latin, so that one can legitimately wonder to which extent... one is allowed to speak of 'formal logic' in the middle ages. In other words, medieval logic is characterized by a tension between 'formalist ambitions' and constraints proper to natural language. Today, our knowledge of the field has considerably expanded, calling for a new assessment of the question.

Collectives are familiar items in Wyclif's ontology. They are characterized as aggregates – aggregata – and this is the technical term I first took to be a trustworthy lexical indicator for collectives in Wyclif. But his use of that technical term turned out to be way too wide, for aggregata are all over the place in Wyclif. Here are some examples. Wyclif calls aggregates, in logic: propositions, truths, and inferences; in metaphysics: individual substances, relations, mixed bodies, integral wholes and universals; in ethics: passions, virtues and vices, but also sins, and so on and so forth. So while the term aggregatum does indeed catch all the collectives, it appears also to designate many items that, at least prima facie, are not collectives. In this paper, I will first briefly evaluate the reasons given for considering Wyclif's mereology as being deviant; second, I will consider the objection of infinite regress addressed to the wyclifian theory of the aggregate man; third, I will try to connect Wyclif's mereology with two other central aspects of his thought, namely is broader metaphysics and his Trinitarian theology.

Anton Marty (1847-1914) is known to be the most faithful pupil of Franz Brentano. As a matter of fact, most of his philosophical ideas find their source in the works of his master. Yet, the faithfulness of Marty is not constant. As the rich correspondence between the two thinkers shows, Marty elaborates an original theory of intentionality from ca. 1904 onward. This theory is based on the idea that intentionality is a process of mental assimilation (ideelle Verähnlichung), a process at the core of which lies a sui generis relation of “ideal similitude” holding between a thinking subject and its object. This study spells out the Martyian notion of mental assimilation and traces back Marty’s evolution from his earlier position (prominently described in the recently published Deskriptive Psychologie of 1893-1894) to his final view as it is found in the Untersuchungen of 1908. It turns out that besides Brentano, Husserl is a key figure in that evolution. Such a “genetic”elucidation of Marty’s last theory is required in order to reach the main goal of this paper, namely: the clarification of Marty’s degree of dependence upon Brentano with respect to the theory of intentionality. That being said, we do not merely intend to compare the mature Marty with Brentano: our “genetic” considerations will also allow us to describe the interaction between the two thinkers before 1904. Accordingly, we begin by presenting Brentano’s own position on intentionality in discussing its two currently competing readings, namely the “discontinuist” and the “continuist” one. Against a recent interpretation, we argue that Marty’s endorsement of a “discontinuist” reading is not based on a misunderstanding of Brentano’s position.

Since the first discussion of Brentano’s relation to (and account of) medieval philosophy by Spiegelberg in 1936, a fair amount of studies have been dedicated to the topic. And if those studies focused on some systematic issue at all, the beloved topic of intentionality clearly occupied a hegemonic position in the scholarly landscape . The following pages consider the question from the point of view of ontology, and in a twofold perspective: What did Brentano know about medieval ontology and what kind of access did he have to that material (section 1)? What kind of use did Brentano make of medieval material in his own philosophy, and with what kind of results (section 2)?

Roger Bacon is a remarkable figure for his theory of the sign. According to the new reading hypothesis presented in this article, the whole theory is grounded on the relational nature of the sign. Every sign is involved in two relations: one to the interpreter, the other to the significate, the first being “more essential” than the second. The hypothesis allows for a better understanding of Bacon’s central claim that speakers constantly re-impose words in colloquial practice, as well as of its main technical developments. In his whole semantics, Bacon’s focus is not so much on entities as on relations holding between entities. From a comparative point of view, the paper offers considerations on the theological background of Bacon’s ideas.

Is medieval logic formal? And if yes, in what sense? There are striking affinities between medieval and contemporary theories of language. Authors from the two periods share formal ambitions and maintain complex, and at time uneasy, relations with natural language. However, modern scholars became careful not to overlook the specificities of theories developed more than five hundred years apart, in particular with respect to their 'formal' character. In 1972, Alfonso Maieru noted that the efforts of medieval logicians to identify logical structures in language which are formal enough to become objects of scientific consideration. He also stressed that the language investigated is a historical one, Latin, so that one can legitimately wonder to which extent... one is allowed to speak of 'formal logic' in the middle ages. In other words, medieval logic is characterized by a tension between 'formalist ambitions' and constraints proper to natural language. Today, our knowledge of the field has considerably expanded, calling for a new assessment of the question.

Regarding marriage, John Wyclif defends the following position: strictly speaking, no words or any kind of sensory signs would be needed, since the consensus of the spouses together with God's approbation would suffice for the accomplishment of marriage. But if words do have to be pronounced, then the appropriate formula should not be in the present, but in the future. In the following, I shall discuss Wyclif's arguments by comparing them with some other medieval positions, as well as with some elements of contemporary theories of speech acts. It will appear that in his analysis of the only sacrament which is a “social act“ in the literal sense of the expression, Wyclif (i) clearly acknowledges the central role of individual intentions behind (linguistic) conventions, and (ii) carefully distinguishes between the different, chronologically disparate acts involved in marriage and their respective (semantic, psychological and factual) felicity conditions

La Summa logicae de Brinkley est l’un des grands manuels de logique réaliste qui fleurissent en Angleterre, à partir de 1320-1330. Dans le De propositione, le Doctor antiquus, avant d’aborder la question du significatum propositionis, s’interroge sur la nature, les lieux et les divisions des propositions. Sa théorie de la proposition mentale comme résultat d’une composition, non de concepts, mais des choses qu’ils signifient, rappelle celle de Gauthier Burley, mais Brinkley n’étend pas la notion de proposition hors de la sphère des signes linguistiques