Lauri Kallio

Der Beitrag, dessen Schwerpunkt auf metaphysischen Fragestellungen liegt, expliziert das Verhältnis zwischen Kants und Hegels Auffassungen der Person. Der Begriff der Person spielt eine wichtige Rolle in praktischer Philosophie Kants. Kant verneint dagegen die Auffassung der ontologischen Person. Nachkantischer deutscher Idealismus kann als Wiederherstellung der Personontologie erörtert werden. Persönliches Sein prägt auch Philosophie Hegels. Hegel thematisiert Person aber systematisch nur im Bereich der Philosophie des Rechts. Der Standpunkt des finnischen Hegelianers J.V. Snellman (1806–81) wird als Fortsetzung der Philosophie Hegels betrachtet. Besonders sein Werk "Versuch einer spekulativen Entwicklung der Idee der Persönlichkeit" (1841) steht im Brennpunkt des Beitrags.

The paper discusses Arvi Grotenfelt's, professor of philosophy in Helsinki 1905 – 29, reading of Heinrich Rickert's philosophy of history. Rickert was one of the key figures of the so-called south-west German neo-Kantianism. In the center of attention of the south- west neo-Kantians was the topic that Immanuel Kant himself had omitted: how to philosophically establish the humanities and the social sciences and separate them from the natural sciences? Rickert's philosophy of history was essentially an attempt to ground the historical knowledge in a strictly transcendental philosophy in the Kantian sense. His argumentation relied on his concept of value. Grotenfelt did not share Rickert's definition of values. According to his view, the fundamental foundation of our judgements of value is beyond scientific reasoning. I will also argue that Grotenfelt's standpoint has a general affinity to Wilhelm Dilthey's philosophy of world view.

Tämä artikkeli käsittelee J. V. Snellmanin sijoittumista hegeliläisen filosofian kentälle. Hegeliläinen koulukunta jakautui 1830-luvun kuluessa oikeisto-, vasemmisto- ja keskustahegeliläisyyteen. J. V. Snellmanin filosofian tutkimuksessa on usein nostettu esiin Carl Ludwig Michelet’n (1843, 314) luonnehdinta Snellmanista vasemman keskustan hegeliläisenä. Michelet’n käsitys on edeltävässä tutkimuksessa yleisesti hyväksytty. Sitä, mikä tekee Snellmanista nimenomaan vasemman keskustan eikä esimerkiksi oikean keskustan edustajaa ei kuitenkaan juuri ole pohdittu. Esitän seuraavassa muutamia huomioita, joiden myötä kuva Snellmanin sijoittumisesta hegeliläisten kentässä tarkentuu.

Neo-Kantianism emerged over the course of the 1860s and it occupied a leading position in the German universities from the 1870s until the First World War. Demands for getting "back to Kant" had become common since the early 1860s, and these demands were discussed in the meetings of the Philosophical Society of Berlin (Philosophische Gesellschaft zu Berlin; PGB), which was the international organization of Hegelians. In this paper I address some reactions among the PGB members to the 1860s Kant revival. The journal "Der Gedanke", the organ of the PGB, reported closely how Kant returned to the spotlight of German philosophy. The reactions of the PGB members to the Kant revival was not only critical. Over the course of the 1860s the interest on Kant among the members grew little by little.

Johan Vilhelm Snellman (1806–1881) tunnetaan valtiomiehenä, sanomalehtimiehenä ja kansallisena herättäjänä, mutta hänen filosofiansa on usein jäänyt hänen yhteiskunnallisen vaikutuksensa varjoon. "Maailmanhenki Pohjolassa" piirtää yleiskuvan Snellmanin ja hänen esikuvansa G. W. F. Hegelin (1770–1831) filosofiasta. Se toimii johdantoteoksena heidän ajatteluunsa ja kertoo samalla 1800-luvun Suomen henkisen elämän kansainvälisyydestä. "Maailmanhenki Pohjolassa" selittää, miten Snellman Hegelin ajattelua käytti ja tulkitsi, ja korostaa, millaisissa asioissa Snellman teki pesäeron sekä Hegeliin että maineikkaisiin hegeliläisiin kuten Ludwig Feuerbachiin ja David Friedrich Straussiin. "Maailmanhenki Pohjolassa" on perusteos suomalaisesta filosofiasta ja Suomen kulttuurihistoriasta kiinnostuneille.

Logiikan ja reaalifilosofian suhde on keskeisimpiä Hegelin filosofian herättämiä kysymyksiä. Hegelin mukaan hänen systeeminsä ensimmäinen osa eli logiikka ja toisen ja kolmannen osan muodostava reaalifilosofia vastaavat toisiaan. Hegelin tuotannossa on kuitenkin aineksia monenlaisille tulkinnoille tästä vastaavuudesta. Yleensä ajatellaan, ettei Hegel ei tarjonnut tyydyttävää selitystä logiikan ja reaalifilosofian suhteesta. Jos otamme tämän tulkinnan lähtökohdaksi, on kysyttävä, miltä osin Hegelin lupaama vastaavuus ei toteudu. Toiseksi on kysyttävä vastaavuusvaatimuksen merkitystä Hegelin filosofialle ylipäänsä. Johtaako luopuminen logiikan ja reaalifilosofian vastaavuudesta absoluuttisen idealismin hylkäämiseen?

The study discusses the philosophy of Finnish philosopher J.V. Snellman (1806–81). The focus is on Snellman's so-called philosophy of personality, which he presented in his work "Essay on the speculative Development of the Idea of Personality" (Tübingen, 1841). Besides this work he addressed his philosophy of personality in his other works and in his public lectures. In his philosophy of personality Snellman develops the concept of personality within the framework of G.W.F. Hegel's (1770–1831) philosophy. The concept of personality serves as a basis for Hegel's philosophy of right, and it plays an important role also in other parts of Hegel's system. However, he never provided a comprehensive definition of this concept. The essence of personality was debated among Hegelians after Hegel's death in 1831. In the course of the debate the Hegelian school split into two groups. At the time of publication of "The Idea of Personality" there was a serious rift between the Right- and the Left-Hegelians. The study analyzes Snellman's philosophy of personality in respect of Hegel's philosophy and in respect of the views of other Hegelians – mainly D.F. Strauss (1808–74), L. Feuerbach (1804–72) and C.F. Göschel (1781–1861). I also attend to some contemporaries outside the Hegelian School like F.W.J. Schelling (1775–1854) and I.H. Fichte (1796–1879). The study is divided into six sections (A–F). The first comprises an introduction and an outline of the structure of the study. The second section (B) discusses the historical context of Snellman's philosophy. The first subsection focuses on the Central European debate on Hegel's legacy. The second subsection deals with Snellman's life and his work on philosophy. The systematic part of the study comprises three sections (C–E), which consider the dialectic of Snellman's work of 1841. This dialectic follows the outline of Hegel's philosophy of subjective spirit and culminates in the definition of personality. Snellman, however, exceeds the realm of the philosophy of subjective spirit, as he discusses e.g. the philosophy of religion. He also comments on the debate among Hegelians. According to Snellman, neither Right- nor Left-Hegelians are true to Hegel's philosophy. In effect, his own standpoint in the debate, as I will argue, comes close to that of the Left-Hegelians. The study concludes with a summary (F).

The paper addresses Thiodolf Rein’s (1838–1919) view of empiricist philosophies, which arrived in Finland in the second half of the nineteenth century. Rein was the key figure of Finnish philosophy towards the end of the nineteenth century. His philosophy was strongly influenced by Hermann Lotze (1817–1881), probably the most distinguished German philosopher of the time. In his main work, "Försök till en framställning af psykologin eller vetenskapen om själen" (Attempt at a presentation of psychology, or the science of the soul, 1876–1891), Rein attempts to reconcile modern natural science and its empirical methodology with idealist metaphysics. His chief concern is to refute the claim that the results of natural science corroborate materialism. Whereas Lotze had only shortly commented on Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution, Rein attempts to integrate Darwin’s theory into his idealist metaphysics. Besides philosophy, Rein’s arguments had also implications for broader political and cultural issues of the time.

The paper addresses three late Hegelian philosophers from northern Europe: Norwegian M.J. Monrad (1816–97), Swede J.J. Borelius (1823–1909) and Finn Th. Rein (1838–1919). The focus is on their views on the crisis of Hegelian speculative philosophy. The popularity of G.W.F. Hegel's philosophy in Germany declined rapidly since the 1840s. The decline was influenced by e.g. new scientific discoveries. Hegelianism maintained a strong position in northern Europe (especially in Norway and in Finland) several decades longer than in Germany. Rein, Monrad and Borelius, all professors of philosophy, endorsed Hegel’s philosophy and agreed that it has to be reformed in order to meet the new challenges. They disagreed with each other, however, about the extent of this reform. They had conflicting interpretations of Hegel’s method too.

Artikkeli käsittelee J. V. Snellmanin (1806–81) varhaisvaiheen filosofiaa ja sen suhdetta hänen 1840-luvun alun filosofiseen pääteokseensa "Persoonallisuuden idean spekulatiivisen kehittelyn yritys" (Versuch einer speculativen Entwicklung der Idee der Persönlichkeit). Varhaisvaiheen filosofia viittaa Snellmanin julkaistuihin kirjoituksiin vuosina 1835–40 sekä luentokäsikirjoituksiin ja muihin muistiinpanoihin. Artikkelin keskiössä on Snellmanin varhainen luenta G. W. F. Hegelin (1770–1831) filosofiasta. Snellmanin filosofian on yleensä katsottu seuraavan Hegelin esikuvaa uskollisesti. Tämä pitää pääasiassa paikkansa, mutta toisaalta Snellman ei missään vaiheessa uraansa epäröinyt poiketa Hegelin viitoittamalta tieltä. Hän ei tosin juuri korostanut eroja itsensä ja saksalaisen esikuvansa välillä. Snellman esitti varhaisfilosofiassaan muun muassa omaperäisen tulkinnan Hegelin subjektiivisen hengen filosofiasta. Hän pyrki myös yhdistämään Hegelin kaksi logiikan pääesitystä yhdeksi kokonaisuudeksi. Snellman myös täydensi joiltain osin Hegelin systeemiä. Hegel ei esimerkiksi koskaan vastannut yksiselitteisesti kysymykseen siitä, tarvitseeko hänen systeeminsä itsenäisen johdannon. Snellman katsoi johdannon tarpeelliseksi ja esitti varhaisfilosofiassaan oman versionsa johdannosta. Snellmanin johdanto keskittyi itsetietoisuuden käsitteeseen, joka oli keskeisessä roolissa myös hänen vuonna 1841 julkaisemassaan teoksessa "Persoonallisuuden idean spekulatiivisen kehittelyn yritys".

The paper discusses three talks, which were given at the meetings of the Philosophical Society of Berlin (Philosophische Gesellschaft zu Berlin) in the mid-1870s. In these talks, the principles of some main movements in contemporary philosophy (realism, absolute idealism, critical idealism) were elaborated and contrasted to each other. The paper focuses on the concepts of real-idealism and ideal-realism. All the discussants, Friedrich Frederichs, C. L. Michelet and J. H. von Kirchmann, introduce these concepts. Frederichs, an adherent of critical idealism, argues only for the standpoint of real-idealism. Michelet, G. W. F. Hegel’s personal student and an adherent of absolute idealism, takes real-idealism and ideal-realism to be the two sides of the one coin. Kirchmann, an advocate of realism, regards real-idealism as an objective, and he is skeptical about the possibility to achieve it.

Although personal being plays an important role in G.W.F. Hegel's (1770–1831) philosophy he never provided a comprehensive definition of personality. Within the framework of his works it is thus possible to formulate different definitions of person and personality, and several conflicting definitions were presented among Hegelians during the 1830s and 1840s. In this paper I examine the role of personality in Hegel's system and discuss the relationship between personality and metaphysics. The question shall be analyzed in the context of various works by Hegel and contrasted with two important precursors of Hegel, I. Kant (1724–1804) and J.G. Fichte (1762–1814). I shall also put the philosophy of Finnish Hegelian J.V. Snellman (1806–81) under scrutiny. The paper will indicate the importance of logic for Hegelian metaphysics and for Hegelian conception of personality.

The paper discusses J.V. Snellman's (1806–81) reading of F.W.J. Schelling's (1775–1854) philosophy. The reading was presented in his book "Essay on the speculative Development of the Idea of Personality" (1841). Snellman, the most remarkable Finnish Hegelian, focused on Schelling's text "Philosophical investigations into the essence of human freedom" (1809). In Snellman's view Schelling is a forerunner to Hegel. He was not familiar with the details of Schelling's later critic towards Hegel. Snellman became interested in Schelling, because the latter highlights the importance of personality. The essence of evil is further linked with the essence of personality. One asks, for example, that if human personality is seen as dependent on the personality of God, is it reasonable to say that human person is responsible for evil acts? Snellman's main concern is to argue against the positivity of evil. He agrees with Schelling that evil exists only as evil action.

Embora ser pessoal desempenhe um papel importante na filosofia de G.W.F. Hegel, ele nunca forneceu uma definição compreensiva de personalidade. Dentro do arcabouço de seus trabalhos, é, então, possível formular diferentes definições de pessoa e personalidade e algumas definições conflitantes foram apresentadas entre hegelianos durante as décadas de 1830 e 1840. Nesse artigo, examino o papel da personalidade no sistema de Hegel e discuto a relação entre personalidade e metafísica. A questão deve ser analisada no contexto dos vários trabalhos de Hegel e contrastada com dois precursores importantes de Hegel, I. Kant e J.G. Fichte. Tentarei também por a filosofia do hegeliano finlandês J.V. Snellman sob escrutínio. O artigo também indica a importância da lógica à metafísica hegeliana e a sua concepção de personalidade.

F.A. Trendelenburg's work "Logical Investigations" influenced greatly the decline of G.W.F. Hegel's philosophy in the early 1840s. In this work Trendelenburg challenged the very foundation of Hegel's system, his speculative logic. Somewhat twenty years later two leading late Hegelians, C.L. Michelet from Berlin and K. Rosenkranz from Königsberg, replied to Trendelenburg. Their common strategy was to show that Trendelenburg owes more to Hegel than he admits. At the same time, Trendelenburg has misunderstood Hegel's dialectics and in fact fallen into the standpoint of empiricism. Michelet and Rosenkranz agreed on many problems of Trendelenburg's account, but their readings of Hegel differed in several respects. For example, they were apart on I. Kant's significance for Hegel. Partly because of this, I will argue, Rosenkranz has more affinity to Trendelenburg than Michelet. The debate between the three continued until Trendelenburg's passing in 1872.

As is well known, Hegel's philosophy arrived in Finland early. Already at the end of 1820s the studies in philosophy at the sole Finnish university were conducted in a Hegelian manner. The most important advocates of Finnish Hegelianism were professor J.J. Tengström and his pupil J.V. Snellman. Thiodolf Rein succeeded Snellman as a professor in 1868. At that time the status of Hegelianism was already diminishing in Finland. Also Rein became increasingly critical towards Hegel's philosophy over the course of the 1870s. In his works of 1860s Rein still presented ideas for the reform of Hegel's philosophy. The paper examines these ideas and contrasts them with the tradition of Finnish Hegelianism. Additionally, the paper also discusses Rein's commentary on various German idealist philosophies of the 1860s.

Erkenne dich selbst sei die schwierigste Zumutung, die einem Menschen gemacht worden ist – so proklamierte Finnischer Philosoph und Hegelianer J.V. Snellman (1806–81) in der Ein-leitung zum seinen ersten philosophischen Hauptwerk. In diesem Werk ("Versuch einer spekulativen Entwicklung der Idee der Persönlichkeit", Tübingen 1841) kommentierte Snellman sowohl G.W.F. Hegels (1770–1831) Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes als auch die Diskussion unter deutschen Hegelianern. Laut Snellman setzt die Durchführung der Idee der Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes eine engere Verbindung zwischen spekulativer Logik und Geistesphilosophie vor. Im Vortrag stelle ich die Frage, was für eine Verbindung Snellman tatsächlich im Auge hatte.