Lawrence Ugwuanyi

An understudied aspect of African thought is the question of laughter and humor. Little attempt has, as yet, been made to locate whether laughter and humor add any value in the African worldview and whether this has any theoretical potential in the effort to improve the human condition through an African perspective. By “improving the human condition” is meant (re‐)articulating those core values, such as peace, happiness, and contentment, around which life and human existence acquire meaning and is lived in the best possible manner. This article sets out to address this knowledge gap. It provides views that illustrate a philosophy of humor with an African pedigree. To do this, it maps out a variety of axioms and proverbs in Igbo thought to interpret them and illustrate the insight they provide in locating an African philosophy of humor. The method applied is a mixed method of hermeneutics and critical synthesis.

Universally, the idea of needs arises from the limited nature of man. Arising from this limitation, the desires involved in being human are such that man is trapped in a world of needs, which are biological, psychological, social, political, economic and so on. But the understanding that defines and directs these needs depends on the context and culture where the human being functions. This chapter sets out to articulate the key issues that define the idea of needs in African thought. To do this, it applies the instance of the idea of needs in Igbo thought as an illustration of meaning assigned to needs and the understanding that informs reactions to needs in African thought. It translates needs into three components, namely Required necessity, Required necessity that could be provided through an agent and Required necessity that should be provided by an agent. It then maps out Igbo proverbs on Lack, Care and Duty, and applies them to articulate the idea of needs in African thought. It will also articulate the social and political imperatives implied by this understanding.

This work sets out to engage African endogenous religions with the view to articulate the philosophical principles that will account for the wisdom around which endogenous African religious beliefs are anchored. The work aims to locate how it can be held that there is distinct wisdom that defines endogenous religious practices in Africa. The work will engage African endogenous religious belief(s) as they are practiced in several parts of Nigeria and distill the key features of the practice to abstract from them and articulate what can be held to be the philosophy of this religion. To achieve this aim, I (i) provide some theoretical and conceptual justification of the work by discussing how philosophy (written or unwritten) animates religion. Thereafter, I interrogate the extent to which it is proper to refer to the religion as traditional and for its replacement with the concept “endogenous” and how it serves a more relevant gain. Next, I (ii) apply selected examples of these endogenous religions in Nigeria and explain their basic tenets. Finally, I (iii) abstract from the key dimensions of this religion – such as belief in the supreme being, belief in divinities, belief in the ancestors, and belief in the spirit world – and apply this to locate what could be held to be the philosophy suggested by this religion. The method applied is textual research, speculative hermeneutics, and critical analysis.

What vision directs pan-Africanism and which developmental model does it support and promote? To answer this question, the article evaluates pan-Africanism within the demands of African modernity and locates the extent to which pan-Africanism meets the aspiration of African modernity. It argues that pan-Africanism has what amounts to a north-bound gaze and supports development imperialism, and shows that for this reason it is not properly grounded on African realities, the consequence of which is the weakness of African modernity. The article suggests a re-articulation of pan-Africanism through the ideology of pro-Africanism, which holds that autonomy and self-will are two cardinal principles that are fundamental to African self-definition but which pan-Africanism is not in a position to provide because it amounts to a subordination of African difference. It concludes that a redirection of the African vision in this direction is a worthier ideological alternative to pan-Africanism.

Severally, issues in bioethics generate tensions on the ground that, while life is generally accepted to be valuable, the basis for this value is not often universally acceptable to all people. As result of this, theories of life and the basis, on which life should be found as valuable, often hinge differently on religion, morality, culture, customs etc., and are reliable only to the extent that they do not disagree or contradict one’s own standpoint as anchored on any of these. In this wise then, religion, culture or customs strongly provide the grounds on which literatures on bioethics flourish. In this paper I intend to locate a fresh basis on which alternative theories of bioethics from the African worldview could be explored; one which will improve the literature on bioethics as well as diversify the ethical basis for life and, thereby, mediate in the tensions that define bioethical principles. I shall do this through an analysis of the important essay of the South African philosopher Thaddeus Metz “African and Western theories in a bioethical context”. Through a critical study of this essay and by providing the insight it offers on bioethics, I shall demonstrate how this theory provides positions that strongly suggest alternative but valuable basis for bioethical principles, anchored on African worldview and its theoretical and practical potentials in promoting the growth of literature on bioethics.

Assuming that effort is made to locate the meaning of dignity in the African thought scheme, what does it mean, and what are the ways this notion could be said to defend the idea of a distinctively African worldview? What are the key values that would define and direct this meaning? How does this notion provide a normative basis for the concept of dignity that is capable of conceiving dignity from a fresh but valuable perspective? This work sets out to address these questions. Applying the Igbo thought scheme as an illustration of the African thought scheme, the work seeks to provide an account of an African concept of dignity. To do this, it translates the concept of dignity in Igbo thought to greatness, nobility and honour. It demonstrates how these concepts underlie the Igbo notion of dignity and explains how the norms and values implied by these concepts inform the idea of dignity in an African thought scheme. It articulates the basis and grounds through which these concepts are upheld and the values they defend, and it shows how they illustrate the notion of dignity in an African thought scheme. To do this, I map out a number of Igbo proverbs on greatness, nobility and honour and provide an interpretation of them, of the underlying assumptions they represent, and of how they illustrate the concept of dignity in the Igbo (African) thought. I will then locate the key principles that can be read in these proverbs and how they suggest an idea of dignity. The outcome of my study suggests that the virtues of greatness, nobility and honour are implicated in the notion of dignity, as it can be ascribed to a person in Igbo thought.