•  3
    Logical Atomism
    In Hans-Johann Glock & John Hyman (eds.), A Companion to Wittgenstein, Wiley-blackwell. 2017.
    In the Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus, Wittgenstein adopts a version of logical atomism. This chapter offers an exposition of the Tractarian version of logical atomism. Wittgenstein argues that the constituents of the end products of complete analysis are simple signs, and that there are necessarily existent objects. The chapter explains Wittgenstein's main argument for the possibility of complete analysis. It comments on three recent interpretations of the substance argument and offers an expos…Read more
  •  4
    Ineffability and Nonsense in the Tractatus
    In Hans-Johann Glock & John Hyman (eds.), A Companion to Wittgenstein, Wiley-blackwell. 2017.
    Early commentaries on the Tractatus, such as Russell's introduction and Ramsey's review in Mind already noted and commented on Wittgenstein's peculiar views concerning nonsense and elucidation. Ramsey also complains that 'sentences apparently asserting such properties of objects are held by Mr Wittgenstein to be nonsense, but to stand in some obscure relation to something inexpressible'. However, there would not be 'the orthodox reading' of the Tractatus exemplified by these remarks, were it not…Read more
  •  2
    In their influential paper “The extended mind”, Andy Clark and David Chalmers argue for the possibility of the extended mind. Based on Clark and Chalmers’s views, Stephen Hetherington argues in his paper “The extended knower” that there are extended knowers, provided epistemic externalism holds. He also uses the argument and its conclusion to criticize Baron Reed’s scepticism in the paper “The long road to skepticism” : 236–262, 2007). In this chapter, I argue that both Hetherington’s notion of …Read more
  •  13
    On William Rowe’s Evidential Arguments from Evil
    Philosophia Christi 23 (1): 125-140. 2021.
    William Rowe has put forward four popular evidential arguments from evil. I argue that there was already a prominent distinction between logical and evidential arguments from evil—the IN-IM-distinction, and that its adoption leads to two important results. First, all three non-Bayesian evidential arguments are actually not evidential but logical, while the Bayesian evidential argument genuinely evidential. Second, and most importantly, Rowe’s Bayesian evidential argument is redundant, in the sen…Read more
  •  50
    A Zhuangzian Critique of John Hick’s Theodicy
    Sophia 59 (3): 549-562. 2020.
    Hick’s soul-making theodicy defends the omnipotence, omniscience, and all-goodness of God in the face of evil. It holds that the end of the creation process is the development of human beings into children of God. In order to achieve the end, an evil-dependent soul-making process must be employed. It then concludes that, because the end is so valuable, the omnipotent and omniscient creator’s not having prevented the existence of evil is morally justified and thus not in conflict with her being a…Read more
  •  42
    The Metaphysics and Unnamability of the Dao in the Daodejing and Wittgenstein
    Philosophy East and West 67 (2): 352-379. 2017.
    This essay is basically exegetical in nature, and its purpose is fourfold. First, I argue against the prevailing view that the dao 道 of the Daodejing 道德經 is metaphysically either a non-being or something transcending all senses by showing that it is a nonempty transforming unsummed totality.1 Dao is still metaphysical, but only as something that defies our ability to experience it as a totality or as any of its aspectual totalities.Second, I argue that in the Daodejing Laozi 老子 adopts the condit…Read more
  •  57
    Variable Names and Constant Names in Wittgenstein's Tractatus
    Philosophical Investigations 28 (1): 14-42. 2005.
    In this paper, I argue that the Tractatus classifies names into constant names and variable names. A variable name, via the application of the existential quantifier against the background of picturing, picks out and denotes an unspecified object from the range of objects of the form shown by the relevant variable. A constant name labels an object picked out from a scope of the existential quantifier. I also refute two types of attempts to argue that the Tractarian relation between a name and it…Read more
  •  65
    The tractarian operation N and expressive completeness
    Synthese 123 (2): 247-261. 2000.
    The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, I visit the Fogelin–Geach-dispute, criticizeMiller''s interpretation of the Geachian notationN(x:N(fx)) and conclude that Fogelin''s argumentagainst the expressive completeness of the Tractariansystem of logic is unacceptable and that the adoptionof the Geachian notation N(x:fx) would not violate TLP5.32. Second, I prove that a system of quantificationtheory with finite domains and with N as the solefundamental operation is expressively complete. La…Read more
  •  194
    The disenchantment of nonsense: Understanding Wittgenstein's tractatus
    Philosophical Investigations 31 (3). 2008.
    This paper aims to argue against the resolute reading, and offer a correct way of reading Wittgenstein'sTractatus. According to the resolute reading, nonsense can neither say nor show anything. The Tractatus does not advance any theory of meaning, nor does it adopt the notion of using signs in contravention of logical syntax. Its sentences, except a few constituting the frame, are all nonsensical. Its aim is merely to liberate nonsense utterers from nonsense. I argue that these points are either…Read more
  •  63
    The unity of language and logic in Wittgenstein's tractatus
    Philosophical Investigations 29 (1). 2005.
    The purpose of this paper is to offer an interpretation of the Tractatus’ proof of the unity of logic and language. The kernel of the proof is the thesis that the sole logical constant is the general propositional form. I argue that the Grundgedanke, the existence of the sole fundamental operation N and the analyticity thesis, together with the fact that the operation NN can always be seen as having no specific formal difference between its result and its base, imply that NN is intrinsic to ever…Read more
  •  84
    Meaning, Use and Ostensive Definition in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations
    Philosophical Investigations 37 (4): 350-362. 2014.
    In this paper, I argue that the restricted claim in §43a of the Philosophical Investigations is that, for a large class of cases of word meanings, the meaning of a word is its use in the language. Although Wittgenstein does not provide any example of words having uses but no meaning as exceptions to the claim, he does hint at exceptions, which are names being defined, or explained, ostensively by pointing to their bearers, in §43b. Names in ostensive definitions, or explanations, are meaningful,…Read more
  •  79
    The Tractatus contains twodifferent proofs of the Grundgedanke, or thenonreferentiality of logical constants. In thispaper, I explicate the first proof in TLP 5.4s andreconstruct the less explicitly stated second proof. My explication of the first proof shows it to beelegant but based on an invalid inference. In myreconstruction of the second proof, the main argumentis that the sign of a logical constant does not denotebecause it possesses the punctuation-mark-nature. Andit possesses the punctua…Read more
  •  45
    The unification of dao and Ren in the analects
    Journal of Chinese Philosophy 31 (3). 2004.
  •  80
    On Two Versions of 'the Surprise Examination Paradox'
    Philosophia 41 (1): 159-170. 2013.
    In this paper, I consider a popular version of the clever student’s reasoning in the surprise examination case, and demonstrate that a valid argument can be constructed. The valid argument is a reductio ad absurdum with the proposition that the student knows on the morning of the first day that the teacher’s announcement is fulfilled as its reductio. But it would not give rise to any paradox. In the process, I criticize Saul Kripke’s solution and Timothy Williamson’s attack on a key step of the …Read more
  •  48
    Ernest Sosa has proposed at least three responses to the dream argument for skepticism in his writings in the past decade. The first and the main purpose of this paper is to critically examine the three Sosaian responses, as well as a Wittgensteinian response Sosa would endorse, by investigating whether they can refute the six different versions of the dream argument found in a passage in the Zhuangzi. The second purpose of this paper is exactly to offer an exposition of the passage in the Zhuan…Read more
  •  45
    The way of the Xunzi
    Journal of Chinese Philosophy 28 (3). 2001.
  •  137
    This paper aims to explain how the Tractatus attempts to unify logic by deriving the truth-functionality of logical necessity from the thesis that a proposition shows its sense. I first interpret the Tractarian notion of showing as the displaying of what is intrinsic to an expression (or a symbol). Then I argue that, according to the Tractatus, the thesis that a proposition shows its sense implies the determinacy of sense, the possibility of the complete elimination of non-primitive symbols, the…Read more