In “Individualist Theories and Interpersonal Aggregation”, Erik Zhang (2024)
attempts to reconcile partial aggregation with the individualist restriction: the aggregate
value we forgo to satisfy a claim enters moral deliberation indirectly as a criterion for
equal consideration. We argue that Zhang’s understanding of forgone value is flawed
and requires two refinements. First, Zhang remains vague on which interests can count
for forgone value. To accommodate partial aggregation, however, forgone…
Read moreIn “Individualist Theories and Interpersonal Aggregation”, Erik Zhang (2024)
attempts to reconcile partial aggregation with the individualist restriction: the aggregate
value we forgo to satisfy a claim enters moral deliberation indirectly as a criterion for
equal consideration. We argue that Zhang’s understanding of forgone value is flawed
and requires two refinements. First, Zhang remains vague on which interests can count
for forgone value. To accommodate partial aggregation, however, forgone value must
be restricted to relevant interests. Second, his account entails an implausible principle of
outweighing: we ought to satisfy weaker claims only if their number is much greater than
their relative strength suggests. We offer a better understanding of forgone value that
avoids the problem. While both refinements revise Zhang’s account, they retain its
individualist character.
