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36Representation and knowledge are not the same thingBehavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5): 784-785. 1999.Two standard epistemological accounts are conflated in Dienes & Perner's account of knowledge, and this conflation requires the rejection of their four conditions of knowledge. Because their four metarepresentations applied to the explicit-implicit distinction are paired with these conditions, it follows by modus tollens that if the latter are inadequate, then so are the former. Quite simply, their account misses the link between true reasoning and knowledge.
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23Mathematical induction and its formation during childhoodBehavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (6): 669-670. 2008.I support Rips et al.'s critique of psychology through (1) a complementary argument about the normative, modal, constitutive nature of mathematical principles. I add two reservations about their analysis of mathematical induction, arguing (2) for constructivism against their logicism as to its interpretation and formation in childhood (Smith 2002), and (3) for Piaget's account of reasons in rule learning
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17Acts of judgment, not epistemic trianglesBehavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1): 122-123. 2004.Carpendale & Lewis's (C&L's) reanalysis of Chapman's (1999) epistemic triangle dealing with the coordination of interactions with physical objects and people's communication is misleadingly incomplete. An alternative proposal is outlined combining the causality of action with the normativity of knowledge in acts of judgment. This alternative is empirical and developmental, with a focus on rich but neglected phenomena.
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52Internality of mental representation: Twenty questions for interactivism. CommentConsciousness and Emotion 4 (2): 307-326. 2003.
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |