My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Lean toward: yes
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Accept: Platonism
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Accept: objective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Lean toward: yes
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Accept: internalism I am answering this question on the assumption that views like Conee/Feldman mentalism is a form of internalism.
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Accept: non-skeptical realism
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Accept: compatibilism Compatibilism in principle, but not willing to commit on the question of whether determinism is true.
God: theism and atheism Accept: atheism But I would be very excited if someone can convince me I am wrong
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism Accept both
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Accept: invariantism
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Accept: non-Humean
Logic: classical and non-classical Other I'm not sure whether to regard the question as unclear or myself as insufficiently familiar with the question.
Mental content: internalism and externalism The question is too unclear to answer "Content" is simply used in too many ways by too many people for me to know what this question purports to be asking. Though I suspect on most views, I would accept externalism.
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Accept: moral realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism Insufficiently familiar with the issue If this is asking something like arm-chair vs. ex-phi, then I have an opinion, but I can't tell if that is what the question is asking about, in part because I am not sufficiently familiar with the literature on metaphilosophy
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Accept: physicalism
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Accept: cognitivism
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Lean toward: externalism
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes The question is too unclear to answer I would pick one box, but I think, in standard versions of the set-up, it is irrational for me to do so.
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Lean toward: virtue ethics
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Reject one or two, undecided between others Definitely not disjunctivism or sense-data theory. Not clear on what is intended by "qualia theory" or "representationalism", or where adverbialist approaches would fit in this schema.
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view Agnostic/undecided
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Insufficiently familiar with the issue I am reasonably sure I do not adhere to libertarianism.
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Accept: Millian
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Accept: scientific realism
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death Lean toward: death
Time: A-theory and B-theory The question is too unclear to answer
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch Lean toward: switch
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Accept more than one I accept both Correspondence and Deflationary
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Accept: conceivable but not metaphysically possible