Lieke Asma

Munich School of Philosophy
  •  5
    Implicit bias as unintentional discrimination
    Synthese 202 (5): 1-21. 2023.
    In this paper, I argue that instead of primarily paying attention to the nature of implicit attitudes that are taken to cause implicit discrimination, we should investigate how discrimination can be implicit in itself. I propose to characterize implicit discrimination as unintentional discrimination: the person responds to facts unintentionally and often unconsciously which are, given their end, irrelevant and imply unfair treatment. The result is a unified account of implicit bias that allows f…Read more
  • This special section is the outcome of a conference organized in Würzburg, as part of the interdisciplinary research project Motivational and Volitional Processes of Human Integration: Philosophical and Psychological Approaches to Human Flourishing (2018–2021). The goal of the project was to connect (philosophical) perspectives on flourishing to empirical research that suggests that implicit motives play an important role in who we are and what we do and decide. One main aim was to find a middle…Read more
  •  16
    From causation to conscious control
    Philosophical Explorations 26 (3): 1-17. 2023.
    Surprisingly little attention has been paid to the nature of conscious control. As a result, experiments suggesting that we lack conscious control over our actions cannot be properly evaluated. Joshua Shepherd (2015; 2021) aims to fill this gap. His proposal is grounded in the standard causalist account of action, according to which, simply put, bodily movements are controlled by the agent if and only if they are caused, in the right way, by the relevant psychological states. In this paper, I ar…Read more
  •  61
    The relationship between free will and consciousness
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1-17. forthcoming.
    Reflection on the relationship between free will and consciousness has mainly revolved around Libet-style experiments, for example by criticizing the claim that conscious intentions never cause what we do. Less attention has been paid to whether this response captures the sense in which consciousness is relevant for free will, however. In this paper I argue that scholars seem to accept two assumptions they should reject: (1) that the relationship between free will and consciousness is best chara…Read more
  •  17
    Mijn intenties en ik. Filosofie van de vrije wil
    Boom uitgevers Amsterdam. 2021.
    Vrije wil is een raadselachtig fenomeen. Wij mensen hebben de indruk dat we zelf keuzes maken, maar de wetenschap vertelt een heel ander verhaal: onze handelingen zijn slechts het resultaat van onze persoonlijke eigenschappen, onbewuste associaties en hersenprocessen. Ons bewuste zelf is niets meer dan een passieve toeschouwer. Het is dan ook niet verrassend dat wetenschappelijk onderzoek vaak uitmondt in determinisme of ‘willusionisme’. Maar wat is vrije wil eigenlijk? En wat betekent het om ze…Read more
  •  14
    On the nature of implicit motives
    Theory and Psychology 33 (4). 2023.
    David McClelland’s research on the different kinds of (implicit) motives and how to measure them has a substantial influence on contemporary psychology of motivation. He did not, however, reflect on the nature of implicit motives in much detail. In this paper I fill this gap. I argue that implicit motives should not be understood as mental states the agent has no introspective access to. Instead, I propose that the implicit motives that McClelland and others in the field distinguish – the power,…Read more
  •  19
    Habitual virtuous action and acting for reasons
    Philosophical Psychology 35 (7): 1036-1056. 2022.
    How can agents act virtuously out of habit? Virtuous actions are done for the right reasons, and acting for (right) reasons seems to involve deliberation. Yet, deliberation is absent if an agent’s action is habitual. That implies that the relationship between reasons and actions should be characterized in such a way that deliberation is unnecessary. In this paper, I examine three possible solutions: radical externalism, unconscious psychologism, and unconscious factualism. I argue that these pro…Read more
  • Primary teachers' attitudes towards science and technology: Results of a focus group study
    with Juliette Walma van der Molen and Sandra van Aalderen-Smeets
    In Professional Development for Primary Teachers in Science and Technology The Dutch VTB-Pro Project in an International Perspective. pp. 89-105. 2011.
  • Primary teachers' attitudes towards science: A new theoretical framework
    with Sandra van Aalderen - Smeets and Juliette Walma van der Molen
    Science Education 1 (96). 2012.
  •  32
    The Guidance Theory of Action: A Critical Review
    Topoi 40 (3): 687-694. 2021.
    Theories based on Frankfurt’s (Am Philos Q 15(2):157–162, 1978) view of action have recently been developed to account for passive, automatic, and habitual actions. What these theories share is that they aim to distinguish between actions and mere bodily movements without appealing to psychological states as causes. Instead, agents have guidance control over their actions. In this paper I argue that the versions of the theory that have been proposed are problematic. I propose to pay attention to…Read more
  •  23
    Neurowetenschappen en de Illusie van Vrije Wil
    Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 111 (3): 339-358. 2019.
    Neuroscience and the Illusion of Free WillCurrently, few neuroscientists and philosophers still defend the claim that neuroscience has shown the brain ‘decides’ what we do and that free will is an illusion. This does not imply, however, that this kind of neuroscientific researchcould notsay anything about the existence of free will. Neuroscience can offer insights in the unconscious causes and underlying processes of our actions and, because of this, could perhaps show whether we act out of free…Read more
  •  15
    There Is No Free Won't: The Role Definitions Play
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (5-6): 8-23. 2017.
    In this paper, I analyse how neuroscientists come to the conclusion that the brain 'decides' what we will do. I do so by focusing on a recent study on free won't, from which it is concluded that the decision to veto is not free. First, I argue that assumptions about voluntariness and freedom that underlie this and other Libet-style experiments are more stringent than assumed by other critics. Second, I claim that these assumptions lead to an experimental setting in which the conclusion that the …Read more