Liisi Keedus

This paper reconstructs the decline of ‘History' and the European crisis of historicism as a formative intellectual and experiential context for the thought of several of the prominent scholars associated with Russian formalism. The second aim of the paper is to challenge the common differentiation made between anti-historicism as either a methodological, historiographical or philosophical critique. Instead, the following study will highlight the interconnections between the formalists' (1) revolts against historical methods and claims of the historical nature of all knowledge, (2) their rejection of ontologies of deterministic-evolutionary causality and monochronological temporality, and (3) their critiques of the political implications of scientific evolutionism and progressivism as a Western ideology of colonial oppression, and its commensurate logic of cultural-political inclusion and exclusion. Lastly, the paper suggests that only a cross-disciplinary and transnational narrative can capture the ramifications and legacies of a fundamental rupture in thought that is conventionally, yet inadequately, delimited within the German cultural space as ‘anti-historicism'. The formalists’ interventions not only demonstrate that these debates were relevant on a transnational scale but also highlight the need to integrate the intellectual history of Eastern and Central parts of the continent more prominently into the history of European thought..

The Crisis of German Historicism Hannah Arendt and Leo Strauss - two major political thinkers of the twentieth century, both of German- Jewish background and forced into exile in America - were never friends or intellectual interlocutors. Yet they shared a radical critique of contemporary idioms of politically oriented discourses and a lifelong effort to modify reflective approaches to political experience. Liisi Keedus reveals how Arendt's and Strauss's thinking about political modernity was the product of a common intellectual formation in Weimar Germany, by examining the cross-disciplinary debates guiding their early work. Through a historical reconstruction of their shared interrogative horizons - comprising questions regarding the possibility of an ethically engaged political philosophy after two world wars, the political fate of Jewry, the implications of modern conceptions of freedom, and the relation between theoria and praxis - Keedus unravels striking similarities, as well as genuine antagonisms, between the two thinkers.

Barth scholarship, largely theological in focus, has highlighted his lifelong political engagement, emphasising his early socialist activism, his resolute opposition to the Great War and nationalism, and his authorship of the Barmen declaration. This paper focuses on a series of lectures by Barth, published as Protestant Theology in the 19th Century. Its Pre-history and History (1927–1933/1947), and argues that these lectures reveal his more comprehensive interest and approach to the problem of political modernity than has commonly been allowed for. As such, they illuminate and connect some of the main political concerns and themes in Barth’s thought, especially during the interwar period, usually considered in isolation from each other, such as social justice, revolution, nationalism, totalitarianism, internationalism, resistance, liberalism and Christian politics.

ABSTRACTIt is only recently that a few histories of interwar European political thought have come to acknowledge that its discursive framing of ethical and social crises was closely interwoven with upheavals in the ways Europeans rethought and debated God. The first aim of the present article is to restore to Karl Barth a central place in promulgating a thoroughly interdisciplinary approach to twentieth-century European ethical and political thought. Secondly, it seeks to correct the commonplace association of Barth’s theological revolution with radical and authoritarian political ideologies by exploring his early political thought and activities, whilst focusing on several of his most politically and intellectually influential ideas. The article concludes with a discussion of the wider implications of rethinking Barth’s role in intellectual history.

In Arendt’s interrogations of political modernity, the concepts of history and politics have an ambiguous relation. On the one hand, she insisted that the performative character of politics as action was bound to its narrative aspect as remembrance. She was also a fervent proponent of integrating the historical sense into political understanding. On the other hand, Arendt characterized the modern historical sensibility from the point of view of politics as a “ghastly absurdity,” and asserted that the political thought of our times needed to free itself both “from history” and “from thinking in historical terms.” This paper explores the different meanings that Arendt granted to “history” as a (anti)political force and to historical sensibility as the basis for political understanding. It argues thatnot only were Arendt’s rejection of the modern concept of history and its politics of history central for her critique, but that it was one of the key concerns that shaped the articulation of her own theory of action. The paper also examines the problem against the background of the intellectual tradition of Arendt’s youth and in particular its uncompromising antihistoricism.

Recently legal theorists have pointed out that whereas members of their profession often assume that post-war scholarship had broken with the past completely, political theorists have paid far more attention to questions of influences and continuities in their discipline. This also holds regarding the legacy of Carl Schmitt whose case both as a jurist and political writer is particularly pressing not only for intellectual historians, but also for discussants across a broad range of fields in law and political science. It is in this context that my paper examines Hannah Arendt's immediate critique of the Declaration of Universal Human Rights in 1948. I will juxtapose Schmitt's and Arendt's critiques, arguing that these display more than superficial parallels and yet conflict in their basic contentions. I also hope to show that discussing Arendt's critique in conjunction with Schmitt's allows us to pose some more general questions about the relevance and meaning of intellectual backgrounds and influences. ☆ The writing of the final draft of the article was supported by a grant from the European Social Fund.